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1. Introduction
`Authoritarian capitalist states, today exempliﬁed by China and Rus-
sia, may represent a viable alternative path to modernity, which in turn
suggests that there is nothing inevitable about liberal democracy's ul-
timate victory or future dominance' (Gat 2007, 60).
As the third wave of democratization ebbed away in the 2000s, a growing interest
in the causes for autocratic survival was emerging.1 After a decade that was
dominated by a focus on democratization and transitology the `turning tides' in
freedom (Puddington 2007), the `rollback of democracy' (Diamond 2008) or the
end of the transition paradigm (Carothers 2002) was declared. Even those who
view the current situation more optimistically as one in which liberal democracy
is not at the retreat, but systemic competition is merely frozen, come to the
conclusion that the number of autocracies is unlikely to decrease over the coming
years (Merkel 2010).
While one might doubt whether democracy is really on the retreat, one parallel
trend, the re-emergence of two autocratic major powers China and Russia, is
undeniable (Gat 2007). For a long time already, the Chinese government has
been accused of protecting dictatorships in North Korea, Burma or Sudan (Storey
2007b,a; Choo 2008; Kleine-Ahlbrandt and Small 2008). More recently, it has
been criticized to be at the cutting edge of campaigns to stiﬂe free expression
domestically as well as abroad (Puddington 2010; Farah and Mosher 2010).
With the recent global ﬁnancial crises, China has, however, also become in-
creasingly attractive to other regimes which, even though less despotic, searched
for alternatives to the Western development path and value system (Kurlantzick
1Please note that parts of this section have been presented earlier in a conference paper at the
IPSA/ECPR Joint Conference in Sao Paulo 2011.
1
1. Introduction
2008). To many young democracies or hybrid regimes with democratic shortfalls,
the breakdown of the global ﬁnancial system symbolized the failure of the West-
ern liberal model not only economically, but also politically. While many Western
governments experienced increased political pressure as a consequence of economic
diﬃculties, the Chinese economy and leadership, after the ﬁnancial crisis, seemed
stronger than ever (Halper 2010). China has become increasingly active in many
parts of the world as an investor and an alternative donor since the beginning of
the new millennium, but even more so after the global ﬁnancial crisis (Kobayashi
2008; Brautigam 2009).
Given their simultaneity, some have tried to establish a link between the trends
of stagnation of democratization and the rise of powerful non-democratic powers
(Kagan 2008; Puddington 2007). The Chinese government has countered the accu-
sation that it is helping autocratic leaders to survive by referring to its adherence
to the ﬁve principles of peaceful coexistence and non-interference. In the mean-
time, among scholars, the discussion of whether the Chinese government acts as
a patron for autocratic regimes and whether this alleged support has made the
world more authoritarian and has helped autocratic leaders to bolster their power
respectively has to a certain degree developed into a question of belief.
This thesis attempts to ﬁnd an answer to the empirical question whether the rise
of China is a cause of autocratic longevity. In this attempt, this thesis is connected
to several scientiﬁc debates. The scepticism about the prospects of democratization
in the future which followed the perception that a transition to democracy is by
no means inevitable or irreversible necessarily boosted the research interest in
autocratization and autocratic regimes respectively. This interest centres on the
causes that enable autocratic regimes to stabilize their often illegitimately acquired
power position and to eventually transform their reign into a more institutionalized
form of governance.
But just as in the context of democratization, the debate on autocratization or
autocratic stability has so far primarily looked on internal factors such as the dif-
ferent types of autocratic systems (Geddes 1999a), the development of autocratic
institutions (Gandhi and Przeworski 2006, 2007; Magaloni 2008), the interplay of
democratic and autocratic elements in so-called competitive autocracies (Levitsky
and Way 2002), or the mechanisms of power transfer from one to the next gener-
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ation (Brownlee 2007). While the role of external factors in democratization and
democratic consolidation is reﬂected in discussions about democratic diﬀusion or
in the debate on democracy promotion, they have by and large been underrepre-
sented in the study of autocratic survival.
Departing from another starting point, the debate on the nexus of economic re-
sources, economic development and political regime type has increasingly touched
upon the question of regime durability. This debate was revived by Przeworski
and Limongi (1997) and has shifted its focus towards the eﬀects of external sources
of income such as foreign aid or income from oil sales on regime type and regime
survival (Ross 2001; Knack 2004; Smith 2004; Ulfelder 2007). Most recently, Mor-
rison (2009) argued that it does not matter how non-tax income is generated, but
in which type of regime it appears. In general, non-tax revenue stabilizes both
democracies and autocracies. Interestingly, the empirical investigations within
this debate have taken on an overtly Western perspective by mostly focusing on
the eﬀect of Western development aid or Western strategic interests on autocratic
longevity.
Given the rise of powerful autocracies, more speciﬁcally China, the underrepre-
sentation of China as an external factor in the studies of autocratization is striking.
Although the question whether China is a cause of autocratization has been raised
in the ﬁeld of area studies, it has thus far not been studied systematically either.
Even though China's rise has received much attention and a growing number of
studies trys to assess the eﬀects of China on other countries (Kurlantzick 2007)
there is no clear picture of China's impact on the political regimes in other coun-
tries to date. Of course, it is evident that China's increased external engagement
from the late 1990s onwards is a relative recent phenomenon. In addition, while
often widely visible and sensible, China's engagement in many countries remains
diﬀuse and the extent of China's presence in other countries with respect to many
aspects is opaque and intransparent. Data on China's external engagement are
generally diﬃcult to access or not available at all. There are, for example, no
published disaggregated statistics of Chinese development assistance2 or of Chi-
nese ﬁnancial ﬂows to other governments and Chinese companies or state actors




abroad are known to be hesitant in communicating to the public. China's domestic
structure with party dominance over state structures and a complex interdepen-
dence between party, state, economic, and state-controlled economic actors makes
an analysis even more troublesome. The constellation and interdependence of
players in China's foreign policy and their hidden hierarchy remains often unclear
- not only to the outside observer.
For all these reasons, the `ﬁrst generation' of studies examining the impact
of China's rise in and on other countries have predominantly been occupied in
illuminating China's objectives, strategies and instruments (Davies et al. 2008;
Alden 2007), mapping the various actors involved in Chinese foreign policy (Reilly
and Na 2007), or reconstructing the amount of Chinese assistance, foreign direct
investment and ﬁnancial ﬂows to a given country (Brautigam 2008, 2009; Frost
2004).
Besides their explorative value, these approaches mostly nevertheless tend to be
non-comparative and remain relatively unconnected to any of the above debates.
They provide valuable insights on what China is doing elsewhere in the world, how
it does it, and who exactly is involved on the Chinese part, but only few research
have attempted to systematically assess the eﬀects of China's rise in the world
(Berthélemy 2009; Dreher and Fuchs 2011).
Against this gap in research, my thesis adds to the current debate on autocratic
survival in several ways. Firstly, with its reference to political economy and the
selectorate theory in particular, this thesis develops a new theoretical perspective
on the potential causes of the persistence of autocratic regimes by connecting the
growing interest in the survival of autocracies with external factors of political
stability. Empirically, one can distinguish between autocratic support, that is
those actions that not necessarily intentionally increase the stability of a prevalent
autocratic regime, and intentional autocracy promotion, which is the intentional
attempt to induce or strengthen autocratic structures where they are absent or
weak. The focus of this study clearly is on the former.
Second, this thesis focuses on externally generated revenues and autocratic sup-
port, thereby empirically examining the particular role of China as an external
factor in the survival of other autocracies in a quantitative and qualitative man-
ner.
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Thirdly, by doing so, I carry out a theoretically guided investigation of some
forms of China's external cooperation and shed light on the recent Chinese en-
gagement in the developing world.
In my theoretical reasoning, I identify the diﬀerent distributional patterns that
can be observed in autocratic and democratic regimes as an incentive for major
powers to cultivate autocracies elsewhere. The main argument is that the highly
discretionary redistribution of resources in autocratic systems makes these systems
prone to exploitation from outside. Accordingly, it should be easier for external
players - whether autocracies or democracies - to realize their external interests
in autocratic countries than vis-à-vis democratic governments. The possibility to
exploit autocratic regimes gives a formidable reason why China is expected to
prefer autocracies over democracies to cooperate with. It has been argued that
international cooperation in turn aﬀects the distribution of power in a country and
impacts on the survival of speciﬁc leaders, especially in autocracies (Smith 2009).
I test whether this argumentation empirically holds in a twofold manner. On
the one hand, I quantitatively examine what determines China's recent interna-
tional economic cooperation projects and whether these are speciﬁcally targeted
at autocrats. Moreover, I assess whether diﬀerent forms of cooperation between
China and other autocratic countries increases autocratic survival.
On the other hand, by the means of three comparative case studies, I investigate
whether Chinese decision makers ﬁnd it indeed easier to realize their interests in
autocratic than in democratic countries. If this core assumption of the theoretical
argument does not hold, there is no reason to assume that China prefers to co-
operate with autocracies in its external relations, and thus, no reason to assume
that China's international cooperation aims at improving the prospects of survival
for autocratic leaders. To this end, I compare three countries in China's regional
neighborhood with respect to their compliance with Chinese interests. These three
countries are Burma, Cambodia, and Mongolia. I selected these countries, because
they capture the spectrum between outright autocracy and democracy.
My quantitative analysis suggests that autocratic countries and countries with
high oil reserves have indeed received more economic cooperation from China in re-
cent years. Also, the Chinese government rewards governments with economic co-
operation that are compliant with Chinese interests, most notably the `one China'
5
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policy. When investigating the impact of cooperation with China on autocratic
survival, I ﬁnd that cooperation can help autocratic leaders to remain in power.
According to my analysis, bilateral trade with China has a stabilizing eﬀect on
the reign of autocrats. However, I did not ﬁnd empirical evidence that economic
cooperation from China prolonges the persistence of autocrats in power.
As to the comparative case study analysis, I ﬁnd that the Chinese government is
very successful in realizing its interests in the more autocratic small coalition coun-
tries Burma and Cambodia while it faces more diﬃculties to pursue its objectives
in the more democratic or large-coalition country Mongolia. My investigation also
ﬁnds empirical evidence that the Chinese government adapts to the distribution
patterns in small and large coalition systems in order to increase the responsiveness
to its interests.
The remainder of this thesis is divided in ten parts: In chapter 2 the thesis starts
oﬀ with a literature review in which I present two debates: i) the current debates in
the study of democracy and autocracy, whereby I focus on the external factors of
regime type and regime stability, and ii) the literature on China's external relations
and the discussion of China's impact on political regimes and governance in the
developing world.
Chapter 3 provides a theoretical reasoning on why major powers are generally
interested in system convergence, and why especially autocracies seek to nourish
other autocrats elsewhere. The main argument is that it is beneﬁcial to major
powers if other countries share a similar regime type, and autocracies are partic-
ularly easy to be exploited from outside. This political economy argumentation is
broadly based on the selectorate theory (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). At the
end of chapter 3, six hypotheses are derived from this theoretical framework. These
hypotheses describe under which circumstances I expect to observe increased coop-
eration between autocracies and when this cooperation should lead to autocratic
survival.
The thesis then proceeds by testing the main empirical implication of my argu-
ment in the chapters 4 to 9. Chapter 4 and 5 deliver a quantitative test of the
hypotheses. The chapters 6 to 10 examine another empirical implication, being
that small-coalition governments can easier be exploited from outside. By the
means of three comparative cases studies, I examine whether and how China has
6
realized its interests in countries with diﬀering degrees of democratization. This
investigation begins with a description of the case study design in chapter 6, in
which the case selection of Burma, Cambodia and Mongolia is explained. This
chapter also introduces three key interests of China. These key interests refer to
China's `one China' policy, to its objective to gain access to natural resources and
to geo-political considerations with respect to strategic interests.
It is the resilience to these Chinese key interests which is discussed one by one
in each of the following case studies (chapters 7 to 9). Each of the case studies
consists of ﬁve parts: i) It begins with a brief historical introduction of the country.
ii) It presents the current domestic political situation from the perspective of the
selectorate theory as the independent variable. iii) The third section bridges the in-
dependent and the dependent variables. In this section, the links between Chinese
actors and their counterparts in the case study countries are illuminated. iv) The
actual examination of a country's compliance with China's interests is presented
in section four which again consists of three subsections, one for each Chinese
interest. v) Each case study concludes with a summary of ﬁndings. Chapter 10
synthesizes and discusses the ﬁndings of the three cases.
Finally, the study closes with a summary of the analysis and some reﬂections
on their theoretical and empirical implications in chapter 11.
7
2. Literature review
This chapter links my research project to the recent scientiﬁc debate. It provides
an overview of the existing literature relevant for this study and highlights the
prevalent research gap. This chapter is divided in two parts: In the ﬁrst part, it
focuses on the dependent variable, autocratic durability and in the second part it
sheds some light on the independent variable, China's impact.
Throughout this study, autocracy is understood as the opposite of democracy
while democracy is conceptualized according to a minimalist procedural deﬁnition
derived from Schumpeter (1942) and Dahl (1971). A more detailed discussion of
this deﬁnition will follow in section 4.1. For now, it is important to note that
according to this approach, a regime that fulﬁls both criteria of i) free and com-
petitive legislative elections and ii) competition in the executive is considered to
be democratic. Regimes that fail to fulﬁll one or both of these requirements are
considered to be non-democratic and thus fall in the category of autocracy. In con-
trast to substantive concepts of democracy in which the existence of institutions
are viewed as necessary but not a suﬃcient characteristics of democracy, the above
deﬁnition relies exclusively on the existence of certain institutions, without con-
sidering the outcomes generated such as civil liberties, political rights or economic
development (Cheibub et al. 2010).
Given this dichotomous perspective, section 2.1 of the following literature re-
view will cover the literature on the determinants of democracy and of autocracy
respectively. It is thereby looking particularly on Asia. More speciﬁcally, this part
has a focus on the external factors of regime type and regime survival.
In section 2.2, the second part of the literature review looks at the independent
variable, Chinese inﬂuence. In this section, I will present the Chinese perspective
on its foreign aﬀairs. Then, I will discuss the literature that investigates the impact
of China's rise in the developing world.
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2.1. The study of regime type and regime durability
2.1. The study of regime type and regime
durability
2.1.1. The study of autocracy: From totalitarianism to
competitive authoritarianism
`For over a quarter of a century the dominant conceptual framework
among analysts interested in classifying the diﬀerent political systems
in the world has been the tripartite distinction between democratic,
authoritarian, and totalitarian regimes' (Linz and Stepan 1996, 38).
This literature overview follows this distinction in reversed order. The interest
in totalitarian political systems dates back to the 1950s, when Europe's fascist and
Stalinist totalitarian regimes were scientiﬁcally examined (Arendt 1951; Friedrich
and Brzezinski 1956). The derived descriptive theories or concepts of totalitarian-
ism that emphasized the role of ideology and mass movements were for years the
leading approach to the study of non-democratic regimes (Brooker 2009).
However, these totalitarian regimes were an exceptional phenomenon. Based on
Linz' (Linz 2000) distinction between totalitarian, traditional and modern auto-
cratic regimes, the research interest soon shifted towards the latter and a body of
political sociology literature evolved that focused on patterns of behavior in au-
tocracies and on the base of these patterns generated typologies (Haber 2006). In
Linz' concepts, a special focus lied on the military. O'Donnell further developed
the notion of bureaucratic authoritarianism which focused on the role of large
public and private business corporations, bureaucracies, technocrats, and state
organizations in controlling the society (O'Donnell 1973).
Other approaches to analyse autocratic systems produced less comprehensive
concepts, but focused more on speciﬁc types of autocratic regimes such as single or
one-party regimes, military regimes, or personalist regimes (Tucker 1961; Weber
1964; Huntington 1967; Perlmutter 1977; Finer 1988).1 While these attempts
highlighted the high degree of variance in forms of autocratic governance, their
limitation is that `many of them are neither exclusive nor exhaustive, some are
1Brooker (2009) provides an excellent overview.
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based on ad hoc criteria; and at least one of them bureaucratic authoritarianism
contains a regime `type' that appears to include only one case' (Haber 2006, 694).
In general, the scientiﬁc understanding of the political economy of authoritarian
governments is much weaker than that of democracies even though the vast ma-
jority of states have been autocratic (Haber 2006). This is partly because driven
by a wave of democratizations in Latin America, Southern Europe, Southeast
Asia and Central and Eastern Europe the research interest on political regimes
strongly shifted to studying democracies during the following decades. While an
extensive international debate evolved among political scientists on the causes of
democracy and democratization, the studies of autocratic regimes, for a long time,
was somewhat marginalized into the ﬁeld of area studies, where a number of de-
tailed studies on autocracies resulted for example in Latin-America, the former
Soviet-Union, and the Arab world (amongst others Entelis 1976; Vandewalle 1998;
Magaloni 2006). In the Asian region, these studies were related to concepts of the
autocratic developmental state (Wade 1990). It was a path-breaking contribution
by Geddes (1999b) that brought the study of autocratic regimes back into the fo-
cus of political scientists. In the wake of the emergence of various hybrid regimes
in which initial democratization did not lead to democracy, Geddes (1999b) formu-
lated the need to better understand how authoritarian systems function. Geddes
thereby revitalized political scientists' interest in autocratic regimes. In the tra-
dition of democratization literature, this research agenda was still inspired by the
debate on the link between the mode and the outcome of regime transition and
the main argument was that diﬀerent characteristics of autocratic regimes would
lead to systematically diﬀerent transition paths (Geddes 1999b; Levitsky and Way
2002; Hadenius 2007; Teorell 2010, chapter 8).
Around the same point in time, a new strand in literature concerned with qual-
itative patterns of democracy emerged from within the democratization debate
(Collier and Levitsky 1997; Merkel et al. 2003; Croissant 2004; Morlino 2004;
Schneider and Schmitter 2004; Merkel et al. 2006). This new research body was
encouraged by the rise of `defective' (Merkel et al. 2003) or `illiberal' democracies
(Zakaria 1997) and many semi-authoritarian systems adopting electoral proce-
dures. Scholars soon argued for a new perspective which should consider these
hybrid regimes' not as imperfect versions of liberal democracies, but as possible
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political regimes in their own right' (Jayasuriya and Rodan 2007, 773). Research
on democracy has subsequently converged with the recent research interest in au-
tocratic regimes. As a result, concepts such as `competitive' (Levitsky and Way
2002) or `electoral authoritarianism' (Schedler 2006) evolved, describing `regimes
in which formal democratic institutions exist and are widely viewed as the primary
means of gaining power, but in which incumbents' abuse of the state places them
at a signiﬁcant advantage vis-à-vis their opponents' (Levitsky and Way 2010, 5).
With this renewed interest in autocracies, soon a new literature strand with a
more economic background evolved. As a common starting point, these studies
assume a `dilemma of the dictator': Because dictators rely on the use of repression
to stay in power, all authoritarian leaders face inherent insecurity about who sup-
ports them and who does only profess loyalty (Tullock 1987; Wintrobe 1990, 2000;
Haber 2006). The examination of how autocrats try to overcome this dilemma has
moved the discussion more to the phenomenon of autocratic rule as such, transi-
tions from one type of autocracy to another and the strategies in and causes of
autocratic survival.
According to a fundamental contribution by Wintrobe (1990, 2000), dictators
are assumed to complement repression with loyalty in order to stay in power.
Loyalty involves the creation and distribution of political rents with which the
dictator can bind parts of the population to him.
`To the extent that governments provide wanted services to their cit-
izens, it is useful to look at political life - even in dictatorships - as
a market in which political exchanges are consummated. [. . . ] The
literature on regulation and interest groups, for example, describes one
kind of political exchange. In that literature politicians supply interest
groups with policies that amount to some form of favorable regulation
- a subsidy, tariﬀ, control over entry, favorable tax treatment, or the
like - in exchange for political support' (Wintrobe 1990, 852).
Against this background, the question how the autocrat can make credible com-
mitments vis-à-vis subgroups of the population becomes crucial. Therefore the
literature on loyalty in autocratic regimes tends to examine the institutionaliza-
tion of autocracies. Scholars are scrutinizing the strategies to institutionalize suc-
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cession, participation, and cooperation deemed to be indispensable for interaction
between the rulers, elites, and the population (Slater 2003; Nathan 2003; Gandhi
and Przeworski 2006; Brownlee 2007; Magaloni 2008).
Given the considerable increase in dominant-party regimes after the post-Cold
War period, the role of political parties within autocratic regimes, especially in
one-party regimes, has received particular attention, speciﬁcally by `cooptation
theorists' (Smith 2005; Schedler 2006; Gandhi and Przeworski 2007; Svolik 2011b).
Parties in autocracies are believed to be an important instrument for multiple
purposes: i) tying individual incentives of the elites to the survival of the ruling
regime, ii) mobilizing mass support, and iii) enhancing economic development by
enabling the ruler to make credible promises not to expropriate investors (Gehlbach
and Keefer 2007; Wright 2008).2 While empirical evidence generally supports the
role of parties to explain autocratic stability and economic growth, the debate
has now become more nuanced and explores the impact of single-parties versus
dominant parties (Svolik 2011b).
Both strategies of a dictator to stay in power, repression and loyalty, are con-
sidered to be costly and interdependent: political loyalty might be aﬀected by the
degree of repression and vice versa (Wintrobe 1990). As resources over which an
autocrat can dispose are restricted, a trade-oﬀ is assumed between coercion and
loyalty which has created a lively debate on the impact of income and autocratic
longevity (Desai et al. 2009; Escriba-Folch 2009).3 Speciﬁcally important for this
study is the debate on externally generated revenues and the rentier state, because
it connects to the later discussion of the external factors of regime type and regime
stability.
Derived from Middle East area studies, natural resource wealth and more specif-
ically oil and mineral deposits, were suspected to inhibit democratization and to
contribute to the longevity of autocratic rule. In general, three complimentary
mechanisms why resource wealth, associated with externally obtained revenues
should increase authoritarian longevity were assumed: `a `rentier eﬀect', which
suggests that resource-rich governments use low tax rates and patronage to re-
2For an excellent overview see Magaloni and Kricheli (2010).
3This debate, for example, examines how autocratic regimes react to budget constraints (Win-
trobe 1990).
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lieve pressures for greater accountability; a `repression eﬀect', which argues that
resource wealth retards democratization by enabling governments to boost their
funding for internal security; and a `modernization eﬀect', which holds that growth
based on the export of oil and minerals fails to bring about the social and cultural
changes that tend to produce democratic government' (Ross 2001, 327f).
Large-N studies examining the rentier state eﬀect in several ways deliver a more
detailed picture, which is, however, not free of contradictions. First, it was found
that oil and mineral resources correlated with low democratization not only in
the Middle East and in strongly oil dependent states, but even more so in poor,
weakly oil-dependent countries all over the world (Ross 2001). Second, this ﬁrst
ﬁnding is supported by Smith (2004) who showed that oil revenues increase regime
durability and stability in democratic and non-democratic developing countries,
that is, oil revenues in these countries are connected with longer regime survival
and fewer domestic protests and civil wars. Thirdly, only looking at existing
autocracies, oil, mineral, and gas wealth was found to reduce the probability for
existing dictatorships to democratize (Ulfelder 2007).
Finally, in a contribution that did not only broaden the focus in examining
the eﬀects of resource wealth and regime stability, but also linked it to the de-
bate on the impact and the eﬀectiveness of foreign aid, Morrison (2009) showed
that it is not oil or mineral revenues that have an antidemocratic property, but
that nontax revenues more generally exert a stabilizing eﬀect on a given politi-
cal regime be it autocratic or democratic. He identiﬁes two diﬀerent mechanisms
for this eﬀect in autocracies and democracies: i) In democracies, nontax revenue
leads to less taxation of richer elites, and ii) in dictatorships, nontax revenue leads
to increased spending on poorer citizens, both easing pressure from potentially
regime-threatening subgroups of society. This reasoning seems to explain why ear-
lier research on the rentier eﬀect was unable to prove the repression mechanism,
through which oil rents were assumed to work.4 However, there are also empirical
indications that the dictator's time horizon plays a crucial role and strongly im-
pacts on how external revenues are used, because it has been found that foreign
aid is signiﬁcantly more eﬀective in generating growth in autocracies when the
4Ross (2001) did not ﬁnd a robust relation between oil revenues and military personnel.
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government has a long-term perspective (Wright 2008).5
2.1.2. The study of democracy
The classical debate on democratization6 has produced roughly three strands of
explanation: A structuralist, a culturalist approach, and a perspective that focuses
on agents and institutions. Although the democratization waves included some
Asian countries, the mainstream political scientist debate on democratization has
tended to bypass large parts of Asia (Case 1996; Wagner 1999; Adeney 2004; Chang
and Chu 2006; Slater 2006). Asia therefore provides a formidable opportunity to
expose the theoretical explanations derived elsewhere to a critical test. Therefore,
especially during the last two decades, a more speciﬁc research interest in Asian
democratization has evolved.7 Interestingly however, the debate on democracy in
Asia tends to be fragmented, especially between speciﬁc sub-regions.
The structuralist approach which embedded modernization theory established a
causal relationship between economic (industrialization and wealth) and socioeco-
nomic (education) development and the political system (Lipset 1960; Moore 1960;
Inglehart and Welzel 2009). Modernization theory has been empirically criticized,
for example by Przeworski and Limongi (Przeworski and Limongi 1997) or by
Acemoglu et al. (2008) who found that although development does not necessarily
lead to democracy, development is helpful in sustaining established democracies.
Although showing a strong correlation, the nexus between income and democracy
remains controversial (Diamond 1992; Boix and Stokes 2003; Acemoglu and Robin-
son 2006) - especially with respect to Asia with its various contradicting empirical
evidence (Anek 1997; Lee 2002; Lee and Shin 2003; Knutsen 2010; Croissant and
5Smith (2004) could not ﬁnd an indication that oil bust periods increase the likelihood of regime
collapse either. He therefore questions whether the stabilizing eﬀect of windfall revenues
is correctly attributed to patronage and coercion and suggests that such revenues are also
invested in `building state institutions and political organizations that could carry them
through hard times' (Smith 2004, 232).
6The study of democracy is structured along three waves of democratization (Huntington 1991).
The ﬁrst wave refers to the ﬁrst century of democratization in North America and Western
Europe following the 1820s; the second wave occurred after the Second World War in Western
Europe and Japan; and the third wave starts in 1974 and describes a number of transitions
in Latin America, Southern Europe, Southeast Asia and Central and Eastern Europe.
7See for example Dukalskis (2009).
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Bünte 2011).
The second, more culturalist approach emphasizes the connection between democ-
racy and culture arguing for a `civic culture' (Lerner 1958; Almond and Verba 1963)
or social capital (Putnam et al. 1993)8 as the base of a democratic system. Fur-
thermore, scholars within this strand also connected religious culture with democ-
racy, arguing that Protestantism was supportive to democracy whereas Catholi-
cism, Islam, and Confucianism were hindering democratic development (Pye 1985;
Fukuyama 1993; Huntington 1996). With respect to the latter, a particular East
Asian debate about `East Asian values' has evolved.
The idea of `East Asian values' was originally promoted in the early 1990s in
order to impair the universalism of human rights by the governments of econom-
ically highly successful states and `city-states' respectively, of China, Singapore
and Hong-Kong. It is reﬂected in a scientiﬁc discourse about the validity of those
`Asian values', namely Confucianism that are claimed to inhibit democracy (Pye
1985; Huntington 1996).9 While this was to some extent a merely normative de-
bate - especially prior to the Asian ﬁnancial crisis in 1997 - (Schmiegelov 1997;
Kim 1997; Hood 1998; Root 2002; Thompson 2004), a number of recent quanti-
tative analyses dismiss a substantial impact of such distinctive `Asian values' on
empirical grounds (Lee 2002; Croissant 2004; Lindner and Brächtiger 2005; Chang
et al. 2007).10
These ﬁndings are further supported by recent opinion polls ﬁnding that `liberal-
democratic culture is emerging in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan - the very coun-
tries which, among all East Asian democracies, are the most thoroughly imbued
with Confucian principles and ideals. Their Confucian legacy might not have been
conducive to the acquisition of liberal-democratic values, but it appears to have
done nothing to hinder the process either' (Chang et al. 2007, 77).11 Equally,
8Social capital refers to social norms and networks which increase people's ability to cooperate
(Putnam et al. 1993).
9Confucian cultural heritage favors group over individual interests, authority over liberty and
duties over rights. The debate seems however not always strictly one-dimensionally concerned
with the link between culture and democracy, but with the nexus of liberal values, democracy,
and economic development in general (Dorn 1993).
10These authors both conclude that economic development and cultural background as well as
colonial history did not impact systematically on democratization in Asia.
11Kim (1997) makes a similar argument on theoretical grounds. However, according to Chang,
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`comparison of the ﬁndings [of opinion polls] from South Asia with the responses
to this question from the rest of the world suggests that unless we see `no response'
as a sign of ambiguity, support for democracy in the region is not very diﬀerent
from what it is anywhere else' (DeSouza et al. 2008, 86).12 However, Shin and
Cho (2011) identify a lack of democratic culture in Southeast Asia: Even though
democracy is embraced as the most preferred regime by a large majority of people
in Southeast Asian countries, large parts of the populations remain uninformed or
misinformed about what makes a political order democratic. As a consequence,
many citizens in Southeast Asia's autocracies or hybrid regimes perceive their
country as being democratic. This perception might partly be explained by the
instrumental role of public schooling in Asia in `creating loyal and eﬃcient citizens'
as found by Jones (1998, 151).
Finally, a third approach highlights the importance of agents and institutions
(Rustow 1970; Dahl 1971; Sartori 1976; Lijphart 1984). Although this approach
has early been pursued by a number of scholars of South Asia, who `pointed to
the importance of political institutions created under British rule', they linked
their analysis of South Asia's democratic experiences only weakly to the interna-
tional debate over how democracies develop (Wagner 1999, 915). More recent
Asia-focused literature referring to this strand is more explicitly connected to the
international debate (Stockton 2001; Lee 2002; Croissant 2004; Reilly 2007).13
While the research interest during the ﬁrst two waves of democratization was
focusing on already established democracies, in the course of the third wave, this
interest shifted more and more to the actual process of democratization. On
the ground of Rustow's phasing model - describing transition as a gradual pro-
cess from liberalization over democratization to consolidation - a new school of
empirically these `liberal values have not yet taken hold in Mongolia, the Philippines, and
Thailand-on the contrary, the political culture in each country [the only three other democ-
racies in Asia] seems to have taken an authoritarian turn' (Chang et al. 2007, 76).
12Chang and Chu (2006) also ﬁnd that contextual factors such as the hierarchical Confucian
social structure in Asia do not dilute the negative relationship between corruption and insti-
tutional trust.
13Stockton (2001), for example transfers an institutional approach from the Latin American
context to Asia, but is unfortunately only examining South Korea and Taiwan. Reilly (2007)
identiﬁes a recent Asian trend from instable multiparty systems or authoritarian one-party
systems to two party systems in which elements of representative electoral rules increasingly
disappear (Reilly 2007).
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thought developed: elite-centred transition theory (Rustow 1970; O'Donnell et al.
1986; Di Palma 1990; Przeworski 1991). This approach pointed towards the agree-
ments or pacts made between elites designed to lead to a negotiated transition to
democracy and analysed their desired or undesired outcomes.
Although the breakdown of the Soviet Union was a stimulus in the ﬁeld of
democracy research and boosted the emergence of a more comparative approach
(Bunce 1998; Lee and Shin 2003),14 it also directed attention to a new research
interest. While it in the ﬁrst place turned attention towards the sequencing of
reforms as numerous countries started to pursue post-communist economic and
political transition simultaneously (Haggard and Kaufman 1997; Hellman 1998),
in the late 1990s optimism about the third wave democratization vanished and
left political scientists more sceptical about further steps towards democracy. Ac-
knowledging that democratic consolidation does not necessarily result from the
transition, and that transitions can have many possible outcomes and even may
be reversible (Schmitter 1994) the new agenda shifted from `transitology' to the
question of consolidation. Later, as described in section 2.1.1, it further shifted
its focus to the quality of democratic structures in not fully consolidated regimes
and new forms of so-called hybrid regimes or anocracies. In this context, scholars
coming from both the study of democracy and autocracy have intensiﬁed their
interest in political institutions.
2.1.3. External factors of regime type and regime durability
From the theories discussed above, it follows that regime type is widely believed to
be determined to a large extent by internal factors. There are, however, also exter-
nal determinants of regime type. I now turn to these external determinants, and
more speciﬁcally to the inﬂuence of external actors to the way a regime functions
and persists.
The literature on speciﬁc regime promotion roughly comes in two generations
14Comparisons between the democratization in former Soviet republics and in Asia lead to the
conclusion that both waves vary rather in their results than in the mode of transition (Guo
1998; Lee 2002; Lee and Shin 2003). Scholars ﬁnd that Asian transitions in most cases did
not dilute the existing concentration of power and led to relatively informal possibilities of




before and after the Cold War. The ﬁrst discussion is related to regime promotion
during the Cold War. World system (Wallerstein 1974) and dependency theory
(Cardoso and Faletto 1979) were theories that implicitly argued for the impor-
tance of external factors in shaping a state's regime. Both approaches perceive a
division between more and less developed countries were the more developed `core
countries' exploit the dependent underdeveloped `periphery'. `In order to maintain
this system of exploitation democratic rule in peripheral countries needs to be sti-
ﬂed, according to dependency theorists, since authoritarian leaders are supposedly
more receptive to the interests of international economic centers' (Teorell 2010,
77f). As Teorell summarizes the empirical evidence for the dependency theory is
mixed: Early studies did not ﬁnd strong support, but in an era of increased glob-
alization, trade and portfolio investment volumes were found to negatively aﬀect
democratization. At the ﬁrst glance, Teorell's own research seems to be in support
for the latter. In his investigation, where he contrasts the eﬀect of trade volumes
against other international factors of democratization (such as diﬀusion or regional
organizations as discussed in the following) he ﬁnds that largely trade-dependent
countries are less likely to democratize. However, when he investigates whether it
matters whether a country's trade is dependent on democratic (the U.S., France,
and the United Kingdom) or autocratic (China and Russia) `core countries' he
does not ﬁnd any impact on the likelihood to democratize (Teorell 2010).
Grounded in the democratization discourse, the post-Cold War literature has
looked on the external eﬀects of regime type and regime stability predominantly
from a democratic perspective. It has done so in a twofold sense and with only
a few recent exceptions. First, it mainly investigated external factors as a cause
of democratization. Only during the last ﬁve years or so, the question whether
external factors are also a source of autocratization or autocratic persistence has
been raised. Second, the examined external factors, such as the intervention of
other powerful countries, diﬀusion eﬀects, international organizations, or neigh-
boring states, are almost exclusively democratic in nature. With the exception of
a discussion concerning the eﬀect of autocratic regional organizations, autocratic
external factors are underrepresented.
Within this post-Cold War debate, Whitehead (1996) was among the pioneers to
develop a conceptual framework to analyse external inﬂuences on democratization.
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He diﬀerentiated between the categories of contingency and control (Whitehead
1996, 4) and these categories are reﬂected in the structure of the discussion that
further evolved.
Whitehead's notion of contingency is reﬂected in diﬀusion theory. Diﬀusion
theory recognizes that democratization has appeared not only in temporary, but
also in spatial waves where countries face signiﬁcant higher probabilities to un-
dergo regime change following transitions in neighboring states. Diﬀusion theory
argues that ideas, norms, policies and political structures spread spatially through-
out the world (Simmons and Elkins 2004; Levitsky and Way 2005; Gleditsch and
Ward 2006; Brinks and Coppedge 2006). While Gleditsch and Ward (2006) try to
connect the elite based argument of domestic power struggle with the theory of dif-
fusion and expect that democracies will support those actors in favor of transition
towards democracy, they do not give a reason why this should be so. Levitsky and
Way (2005) argued that linkage and leverage was the cause of democratic diﬀusion
refering to the density of interactions with democracies and to the vulnerability
of a government to external incentives provided by this interaction.15 Neverthe-
less, a recent empirical investigation of the democratic domino theory quantifying
the eﬀect of neighborhood found that only 11% of changes in democracy level of
a country's neighbors are actually absorbed suggesting that diﬀusion eﬀects are
rather small (Leeson and Dean 2009).
Probably, the most illuminating approach to the puzzle of contingency is pro-
vided by studies examining the role of regional multilateral organizations in regime
promotion. Again, pioneers in this approach were studies on democracy promotion
- most prominently of the European Union's enlargement policies (Solingen 1996;
Brabant 1998), but also of the Organization of American States and MERCOSUR
(Pevehouse 2005). Relatively recently, however, within the contingency debate, a
discussion of the role of multilateral organizations in protecting autocratic regimes
has started. In the Asian context, in particular two regional organizations, the
(ASEAN) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), have come under
scientiﬁc scrutiny.16
15In their more recent book (Levitsky and Way 2010), the argumentation shifts somewhat from
explaining democratization to explaining comparative authoritarianism and gains another
dimension of organizational capacity of autocrats.
16It is noteworthy, however, that it would be misleading to transfer the `European experience
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Given the historical evolution of ASEAN , its normative underpinning are deeply
illiberal and
`ASEAN has pursued a policy of benign neglect towards democratic
movements and in the process has strengthened authoritarianism. The
central issue is ASEAN's decision not to interfere in support of demo-
cratic forces that challenge an incumbent government. By not inter-
fering, either rhetorically or institutionally, ASEAN has denied demo-
cratic groups moral support and political legitimacy. The impact of
ASEAN therefore has been one of hindering democratic aspirations
rather than of actively supporting authoritarian persistence' (Kuhonta
2006, 340).
Some stress that ASEAN 's principle of non-interference is not as absolute as
usually assumed, but has frequently been handled ﬂexibly to secure the dominance
of illiberal business elites (Jones 2010). Others see ASEAN in a more positive
manner and observe a slow process of norm building with respect to human rights,
democracy and good governance, arguing that there was considerable divergence in
the notion of the endorsement of these values in the 2007 ASEAN charter among
ASEAN 's governments (Cole and Jensen 2009).
ASEAN has served as a model for the much younger SCO. But it has been
argued that the SCO has more actively been instrumented, because it `was overtly
political in its goal of upholding the existing territorial and political order' (Yahuda
2005, 352). Similar to ASEAN , when the normative framework in favor of the
authoritarian regimes in place was established, conditionality did not play a role
since these states were non-democratic before. However, Ambrosio (2008) identiﬁes
a process of socialization of Central Asia into an authoritarian `Shanghai Spirit'
which is driven by Russia and China and which is likely to hinder democratization
in any of the member states in the future (Ambrosio 2008, 1341).
Whitehead's notion of control refers to intended democracy promotion by major
democratic powers. There is no theory of democracy promotion as such (Merkel
of pooling sovereignty with the aim of establishing an ever-closer political union through a
process of rule-based integration' and the subsequent erosion of national interdependence to
ASEAN (Yahuda 2005, 349).
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2010) which reﬂects the diﬃculty of the discipline as a whole to come to a con-
sensus on basic concepts such as democracy or democratization. But as numerous
democratic governments engaged in proliferating democracy in the world, a lively,
debate about the instruments and the eﬀectiveness of external democracy promo-
tion has emerged (Carothers 1999). Studies exploring the eﬀect of development
aid in general and democracy promotion in particular usually follow one of the two
lines of argumentation. i) Development aid is expected to have a positive impact
on democratization because it encourages structural changes and supports distinct
actors and institutions conducive to democracy (e.g. Finkel et al. (2007)). ii) In
addition to the indirect impact development assistance can have in the long run
through the structural improvement, democracy promotion can in the short run
help to deliver democracy either through technical assistance or through condi-
tionality (e.g. Knack (2004)).
However, in this debate, it has eventually been cautioned that externally ﬁ-
nanced transfers rather cultivate rentier-states, not only allowing political elites to
evade political responsibility, but also artiﬁcially stabilizing their domestic power
(Ross 2001; Morrison 2009). The resulting systematic analysis of the eﬀectiveness
of democracy promotion seems to support a rather sceptical view. Researchers,
whether qualitatively or quantitatively, ﬁnd it inherently diﬃcult to substanti-
ate the eﬀectiveness of democracy promotion due to various analytical problems.
Whereas numerous empirical studies dealing with the conditionality of develop-
ment assistance and multilateral loans conclude that the conditionality of external
funds due to insuﬃcient sanctioning remain by and large ineﬃcient (Collier and
Gunning 1999; Dollar and Svensson 2000; Svensson 2003b; Knack 2004; Scott and
Steele 2005), some authors have even discovered a counter-productive impact of
external funding on good-governance and democratization (Knack 2001; Easterly
2002; Svensson 2003a; Leeson and Sobel 2008; Knack and Rahman 2007).
In brief, it has been found that the eﬀect of aid on democratization depends
on the initial constitutional context. Foreign aid only helps autocratic leaders
to democratize when they are relying on a large distributional coalition (Wright
2009), when democracy is already emerging (Nielsen and Nielson 2010), or when
they face the threat of being overthrown (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2009b).
Most interestingly in this context, is the fact that the perceived ineﬀectiveness of
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development aid and aid conditionality has usually been connected with conﬂicting
goals of Western strategic objectives (Emmanuel 2010).17 A comparative analysis
of democracy promotion in eight post conﬂict states comes to the conclusion that it
is particularly donors' prevalent preference for stability over democratization which
renders most democracy assistance not only ineﬀective but even counterproductive
in the long run (De Zeeuw 2005).
This view is shared by those coming from the discussion on autocratic longevity
(as introduced in section 2.1.1). For example, Bellin (2004) attributed the longevity
of Middle Eastern and North African autocracies to strategic Western interests in
the region. `Multiple western security concerns in the region guarantee continuous
international support to authoritarian regimes in the Middle East and North Africa
even after the cold war. But the prevalence of patrimonialism in state structures
and the low level of popular mobilization are not unique to the region. Together,
these factors reinforce the coercive apparatus' capacity and prevent democratic
reform' (Bellin 2004, 152). Similarly, Magaloni and Kricheli suspect Western
donors and the international ﬁnancial institutions behind the geopolitical trends
that caused the observable spread of dominant-party autocracies in the post-Cold
War period (Magaloni and Kricheli 2010). Levitsky and Way (2010) look only
at the linkage to and leverage by Western countries when investigating the rise
of electoral autocracies from 1990 onwards. Even though they admit that `not
all linkage is Western', they attribute failures in democratization and persisting
autocratic structures respectively to low vulnerability and exposure to Western in-
ﬂuence rather than to the inﬂuence of autocratic powers (Levitsky and Way 2010,
50).
It was within the democracy promotion debate, and not within the ﬁeld of auto-
cratic persistence that ﬁnally reﬂections came up on whether and how autocratic
rule is protected and promoted by major autocratic countries (Carothers 2006;
Gershman and Allen 2006; Burnell 2006; Diamond 2008; Burnell 2010). While
17Bueno de Mesquita and Downs (2006) go even further and reject the idea that democratic
leaders should have any great interest in democracy promotion at all. Their claims are based
on the quantitative ﬁnding that the likelihood that military interventions by democratic states
lead to increased level of democratization in the target state is slim and military interventions
by the United Nations (UN) do not improve the level of democracy in comparison to countries
without such kind of intervention.
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there is some descriptive research on Russia's support for authoritarian regimes in
its regional environment (Ambrosio 2009; Jackson 2010), no convincing conceptu-
alization of external autocracy promotion or the like exists. Burnell, for example
diﬀerentiates between active, passive and an intermediate form of what he calls
`anti-assistance' or `counter-promotion' by autocratic powers, but remains rather
vague when conceptualising these concepts further (Burnell 2010).
To sum up the current state of research, the debate on the external factors of
regime type and regime durability is very much guided by a Western perspective
and by the presumption that mostly or sometimes even only democratic Western
countries intentionally or unintentionally aﬀect regime type and regime survival
elsewhere. While authoritarian powers are assumed to have inﬂuenced the form
and durability of political systems in the developing world during the Cold War
(Bates 2001; Easterly et al. 2008), their inﬂuence on autocratic longevity today
is less investigated. The research community occupied with exploring the deter-
minants of autocratic longevity, by and large has not yet reﬂected on the rise of
major authoritarian powers such as China or Russia. Furthermore, while the ﬁeld
of area studies oﬀers some interesting investigations in Russia as an external patron
for autocratic regimes (Ambrosio 2009; Jackson 2010), it will become clear in the
following section that China's role as an emerging autocratic power is contested
and that tere is a need for more systematic comparative empirical investigation.
2.2. The Study of China's external relations
As relevant for this study as the research on speciﬁc regime types that has been
presented in the previous sections, is the research on China's external relations in
the recent era of China's rise. With its growing integration in the world economy
during the last decade, and with its increasingly independent role in international
relations, China has attracted the attention of all, IR scholars, economists, security
experts, and Sinologists.
What can be drawn from this massive body of literature for this study? Several
questions are particularly important here: Is there any analysis - from whatsoever
background - on China's impact on the political regimes of others or autocratic
stability elsewhere? Or, in other words, is it possible that the weak reﬂection on
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new autocratic actors such as China which I identiﬁed in the ﬁeld of autocracy
studies is compensated by a research agenda in other research communities or
scientiﬁc disciplines? And what do we know about the Chinese government's
foreign policy agenda: Is there any discussion on how the Chinese government
itself perceives its role in inﬂuencing political structures abroad? Because the
above mentioned debates take on a variety of diﬀerent perspectives, approaches and
methodologies, and are therefore only losely connected to each other, this section
is structured along these latter two questions rather than along the individual
disciplines, approaches or schools of thoughts.
Hence, the remainder of this section is structured in the following way: I start
oﬀ with the Chinese perspective by brieﬂy presenting China's relevant foreign
policy concepts18 and their discussion in the scientiﬁc debate. The most heated
debates with respect to China as a role model for development circle around the
so called `Beijing Consensus' and China's new soft power. Second, I turn to the
literature looking on the impact of China's rise in the developing world. Here, I
ﬁnd two types of debates that are relevant: One debate is a development within
the soft power debate. These works are often focused on the Asian continent and
undertake a change in perspective to investigate the reaction of nations in China's
proximity on the new security architecture in Asia. The other type of literature
is very much empirically oriented and investigates the implementation of China's
new engagement in foreign countries.
Now, lets turn to the Chinese perspective. The basic principles in China's
foreign policy, the ﬁve principles of peaceful coexistence, date back to the 1955
Bandung Conference and are almost as old as the People's Republic of China
(PRC) itself. But against the background of China's emergence as a regional
and global power the call for strict adherence to the principles of non-interference
and the sovereignty of other states is probably more valid today than ever to
the Chinese government. In the past, these principles had ﬁrst been a mere lip
service and later with a sharp retreat to domestic politics became ineﬀectual, but
the recent Chinese rise has stimulated increased security concerns especially in its
neighbors which require reassurance of China's peaceful intentions. Despite the
18Please note that parts of this sections have been presented earlier in a conference paper at the
5th ECPR General Conference in Potsdam in 2009.
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emphasis placed by Chinese leaders on the ﬁve principles of peaceful coexistence,
China's foreign policy during the Cold War pursued revolutionary ambitions and
was driven by the quest to establish a new world order (Umbach 2004, 341).
It was driven also by ideological militancy, with support given to revolutionary
insurgency in other Asian and African countries such as Thailand, Cambodia, the
Philippines and Malaysia.
Under Deng Xiaoping this interventionist foreign policy approach was eventu-
ally abandoned. Deng Xioaping retreated to an overtly inward-oriented policy. His
`new diplomacy' was primarily intended to normalize China's external relations.
Focusing on the country's own development and modernization, Deng Xiaoping
refocused Chinese external relations on the industrialized world in order to access
foreign sources of the capital and technology needed by China, thus temporarily
neglecting its overly close relations with many developing countries (Van Ness 1998;
Davies et al. 2008). It was only when Western powers distanced themselves from
China in the aftermath of the Tiananmen incident that China's regional neigh-
borhood came increasingly into the focus of Chinese decision makers and gained
importance. Ever since, China's foreign policy has been explicitly subordinated to
the overall goal of internal modernization. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the
overriding aim of China's foreign policy was to keep a low proﬁle in foreign aﬀairs
and to opt for stable international relations and political stability in its region so
as not to jeopardize internal reconstruction (Wang 2005a; Shirk 2007).
In terms of implementation of this policy, empirical evidence with reference to
the Chinese reactions to political transitions elsewhere suggests that at least dur-
ing the period of Deng Xiaoping, the proclaimed withdrawal to domestic politics
eﬀectively translated into a foreign policy approach which was agnostic with regard
to the type of political regime in other countries. During the 1980s, the material
support that had been provided to communist insurgency groups in several African
and Asian countries was phased out (Roy 1998). Based on the analysis of Chi-
nese media reports of political upheavals in Burma and the Philippines during the
1980s, Bert ﬁnds that the Chinese government in this period was in support for
any government `that would provide stability and be a reliable ally' (Bert 1990,
1082) but, would opportunistically shift in policies `to avoid alienating the poten-
tial new power holders' in situations of likely power changes (Bert 1990, 1068).
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Whether a political actor could rely on support from China, in this view, was
basically depending on his likelihood to survive.
In 2003, the Chinese government oﬃcially adopted the concept of `peaceful rise',
which stressed the peaceful nature of China's growing power. But soon the term
was replaced with `peaceful development' in order to underline the component
of peace rather than rise. In an attempt to clarify the opaque Chinese foreign
intentions, it seeked ways of persuading the world of China's peaceful ambitions
(Gu 2005; Shirk 2007). The concept had evolved since the mid-1990s, when China
published its ﬁrst defence white paper. At its core it was also a commitment to
draw more attention to China's regional neighborhood and to speciﬁcally address
its neighbors' security concerns that had evolved during the ﬁrst half of the 1990s
when China had aggressively pursued its territorial claims in the South China Sea
(Harris 2005; Osborne 2006; Li 2007). In order to make the nations in its regional
environment less receptive for a U.S. containment strategy against a rising China,
the Chinese government re-deﬁned its diplomatic strategy. It became more pro-
active and open to regional multilateral organizations, invested increasingly in its
public and state diplomacy and increased its attempts to develop soft power. For
example, the Chinese government considerably professionalized its public diplo-
macy, it established regular high-level regional forums to engage with diﬀerent
world regions, and from 2004 onwards it founded more than 200 `Confucius Insti-
tutes' all over the world to spread the Chinese language and culture (Lum et al.
2008). The latest Chinese foreign policy concept of `harmonious world' was pre-
sented by Hu Jintao to the UN General Assembly in 2005 as a response to the
Western promotion of democracy and human rights and to repeat the continued
validity of the principle of peaceful coexistence in China's foreign policy. It is
derived from traditional Chinese philosophy and describes the coexistence of dif-
ferent civilizations and the consultations among all involved countries rather than
unilateralism and hegemony (Suisheng 2010).
A major driver behind China's soft power strategy was China's integration into
the world economy. During the 2000s, the Chinese government increased its eco-
nomic activities in many developing countries around the globe. Driven by the
quest to constantly maintain high growth rates in order to maintain China's do-
mestic stability and the rule of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP ), the Chinese
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government adopted the `go out' policy. This policy had two objectives. On the
one hand, it was designed to increase the competitiveness of the top Chinese state-
owned enterprise (SOE) by going and investing abroad. On the other hand, it was
designed to improve energy security for the Chinese economy. As a consequence of
the many incentives provided by this policy, investment projects of China's SOE
increased dramatically.
Despite these clear statements on the part of the Chinese government of having
no ambitions to interfere in the domestic politics elsewhere, in the mid 2000s, a
debate evolved among academics about a possible `export' of China's development
model to the developing world. Because the Chinese model is associated with
a strong government, state-centered development, and an approach that favors
economic development over democratization and individual freedoms, an implicit
question in this debate is whether the spread of a Chinese model props-up au-
thoritarian structures. The development of this debate can be traced back to two
sources, being a popular essay coining the term `Beijing Consensus' on the one
hand, and China's increased engagement in terms of economic interaction and soft
power with countries in the developing world on the other.
In his thought provoking essay `The Beijing Consensus: Notes on the New
Physics of Chinese Power', Cooper Ramo (2004), a Western consultant, proposed
that China's extremely successful development experience would become a role
model for development for other developing countries. He sketched this model as
being in contradiction with the dominant paradigm endorsed in the `Washington
Consensus'. More precisely, his argument centered on three points: First, he ar-
gued that China's economic success was created by innovation-based development.
Second, he found that balanced growth and equitable distribution was a central
concern of the leadership. Thirdly, he proclaimed that the self-determination of
China's development path would make it an attractive development model for other
developing nations, but that China, on the other hand, also wanted to project its
model abroad (Cooper Ramo 2004, 28).
With respect to Cooper Ramo's analysis of the Chinese success story, it appears
that there is much disagreement among Chinese scholars. On empirical grounds,
his analysis is considered incorrect and incoherent. Neither has innovation been
the centerpiece of China's growth (Young 2000). Nor has it consistently been
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connected to extraordinarily attempts to produce equality or has been pursued by
the diﬀerent state institutions according to any orchestrated economic master-plan
(Dirlik 2006; Kennedy 2008; Huang 2011).
`The large majority of Chinese commentary is critical of the BC
[Beijing Consensus]. Some believe it is inaccurate or an exaggeration
[. . . ], while others believe it overlooks the most important elements of
China's economic reforms. [. . . ] Many commentators write that the
BC makes claim to a consensus that does not exist. [. . . ] Still others
stress that the BC understates the depth of problems that China's
economic strategy has produced and the depth of problems still to
overcome. [. . . ] And ﬁnally, a number of observers hold that China's
economic reform strategy has depended on elements of the WC, such as
free prices, competition, limiting inﬂation, and accession to the WTO.
Hence, those elements distinctive to China merely supplement rather
than challenge the WC [Washington Consensus]' (Kennedy 2008, 17).
Given the disagreement with its underlying analysis, there is also broad skepti-
cism concerning the Chinese role as model for other developing countries. Chinese
academics agree that China's development model has produced a number of un-
solved problems such as corruption and the poverty gap and consider it therefore to
be less attractive for others (Suzuki 2009). They also question the ability to `sell'
such kind of a Chinese model to the outside world without a clear understanding
what it actually depicts: authoritarian capitalism, socialism with Chinese charac-
teristics, or an extension of the East Asian Developmental state (Kennedy 2008).
Others point out that the term `consensus' is misguiding all together. They see
the experimentation with and adaptation of alternative development strategies as
the centerpiece of China's development experience of which the insight that there
is no one-size-ﬁts-all strategy can be the only lesson learned. Even if a deﬁnition
of the components of China's development experience would be found, `the term
inevitably indicates a competing framework to the Washington consensus which
consists of outwards-oriented policy recommendations. A policy and a policy rec-
ommendation are two inherently diﬀerent things, and cannot be described with
the same term' (Rebol 2010, 14).
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While the Chinese government, in fact, has never adopted or incorporated the
term `Beijing Consensus' as opposed to the `Washington Consensus' in any pub-
lished foreign policy concept (Dirlik 2006), it has - as mentioned above - revised
its foreign policy strategy with the aim of increasing its reputation and increasing
its soft power. Against the background of this explicit Chinese soft power strategy
which also seemed to be astonishingly successful at the ﬁrst sight, the debate on
the Beijing Consensus became blurred with an already existing discussion among
observers on China's new soft power.19 Because of its focus on security issues, the
bulk of `traditional' literature on global power shifts that is connected to the soft
power literature is not particularly helpful to my research.20
However, under the new label of `soft power' the old predominantly Western-
led debate of the `Beijing Consensus' continued. This discourse portrays China's
soft power as opposed to Western values and the Western democratic development
model (Gill and Huang 2006; Kurlantzick 2007; Lum et al. 2008; Halper 2010). It
19The term soft power was coined by Nye (2004).
20There are a number of studies discussing the emergence of China in connection to the recent
dynamics on the Asian continent, which have boosted trade and investment links between
China and its neighbors, brought about novel implications for regional security structures,
and new forms of interaction such as increasing regional multilateral engagement. This lit-
erature mostly focuses on the respective novelties in China's regional policy concepts, and
the evolution of both Chinese hard and soft power (Bin 1999; Medeiros and Fravel 2003;
Shambaugh 2004; Harris 2005; Kuik 2005; Shambaugh 2005; Glosny 2006; Osborne 2006;
Li 2007). Two outstanding works are Osborne's `The Paramount Power - China and the
Countries of Southeast Asia' and Shambaugh's volume `Power Shift - China and Asia's New
Dynamics' (Shambaugh 2005; Osborne 2006) because of the detailed comparative analysis
of China's relations to ten Southeast Asian neighbors and the comprehensive discussion of
recent developments in Asia from various ankles, respectively.
It has been criticized that this literature, though empirically rich `tends to either be de-
scriptive or focus on implications for the United States' (Li 2007). Indeed, linking empirical
analysis to theoretical concepts has been neglected and the few scholars cautiously doing so
ﬁnd this task markedly diﬃcult (Kang 2003; Shambaugh 2004; Foot 2005; Khoo and Smith
2005). Even more important for my research is that this literature is biased towards the Chi-
nese perspective (as opposed to the U.S.) and discusses the impact of China's rise for China's
neighbors predominantly from a security and economic perspective, if at all. In brief, the
debate in this respect turns around the question with which security strategy Asia's govern-
ments respond to the emerging Chinese proﬁle in the region: with bandwagoning, balancing,
or hedging. Bandwagoning' implies an `all the way' approach to dealings with a single large
power. `Balancing' implies an eﬀort to follow policies that prevent a state from being ﬁrmly
linked to one large power rather than another' (Osborne 2006, 47). Content wise, many
scholars agree that although insecurities about Chinas long-term intentions persist, most
Asian nations seek strong relations with both China and the U.S. and favor not being forced
to take side for any of the two players.
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is acknowledged, that there is no expressed agenda of the Chinese government to
exert inﬂuence on the political structures or on domestic policy choices in other
countries. But the main point here is that the Chinese government delivered supply
of an alternative model exactly at a point in time when - against the background
of widespread disagreement with the U.S. intervention in Iraq and in the wake of
the global ﬁnancial crisis - a demand had arisen. `China hasn't moved to impose
its own market-authoritarian model on others - but has made others aware of its
approach and doesn't object if others wish to replicate it or learn from its manage-
ment expertise' (Halper 2010, 127). Not only is the Chinese development model
appealing to leaders in authoritarian or hybrid regimes, but also Chinese culture
and language increasingly gains popularity among the populations, particularly in
Asia (Lampton 2005; Kurlantzick 2007).
But China's repeated commitment to the principle of non-interference and na-
tional sovereignty is not only naturally appealing to autocratic regimes. Some
have argued that the Chinese government has become a de facto supporter for
pariah states, because its investments, grants and loans to dictators remarkably
increased with the `go out' policy. Moreover the Chinese government has used its
veto power in the UN Security Council to protect repressive regimes against inter-
national sanctions (Kleine-Ahlbrandt and Small 2008; Halper 2010). A main point
made here is that the Chinese government provides trade, grants and aid with `no
strings' attached, that is without any of the conditions for `good governance' or
economic or political reforms which are usually requested by the international ﬁ-
nancial institutions or the Western donor community. By oﬀering an exit option,
the Chinese government enables dictators to simply leave negotiations with the
West when the pressure for reforms become too strong.
These allegations have triggered a heated response. In defence for the peace-
ful intentions of the Chinese government, the Chinese steps towards becoming a
`responsible stakeholder' have been cited as a proof that the Chinese government
is neither a patron for autocratic regimes nor does it attempt to spread its own
political system (Suzuki 2009; Womack 2010). For example, the Chinese govern-
ment has silently modiﬁed its non-interference policy to pressure non-democratic
regimes behind the scenes as in the case of Burma, North Korea and has shown in-
creased willingness to participate in UN peace-keeping missions. Still others point
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to the hypocrisy of Western standards and argue counterfactually, that even if the
Chinese government and China's state-corporation have embraced the most awk-
ward authoritarian regimes in search for oil supply or markets for their military
industry, so have Western ﬁnancial institutions, energy companies and weapon
producers (Brautigam 2009). The bottom line of this argument is that, against
the strong strategic and economic interests of the major Western powers which
have frequently pushed them to ﬂirt with dictators and rogue states in the past,
the recent Chinese engagement does not make any diﬀerence.
A diﬀerent aspect was brought up by Kurlantzick's extensive empirical inves-
tigation of China's soft power strategy, tracing the Chinese goals, strategies and
tools for building inﬂuence and subsequently assessing their success and impact
in diﬀerent targeted countries: the aspect of unintentional spill-over eﬀects. With
respect to China's impact on other nations, Kurlantzick's analysis which is largely
based on anecdotal evidence from all parts of the world ﬁnds that `China could
essentially wind up exporting its own domestic weaknesses' (Kurlantzick 2007,
154).
Against the background of this debate, with China's more and more visible
engagement in the developing world a new scientiﬁc interest has emerged which
focuses on gaining a better understanding what Chinese actors are doing in the
developing world and how China's engagement works. While the decision-making
process in China's foreign policy remains diﬃcult to access, there is a growing
body of research on Chinese practices in the ﬁeld of policy implementation. As
research on China's involvement, especially in Africa and to a lesser extent in Asia
or Latin-America, is largely driven by Western interests in these continents many
studies in this ﬁeld take on a less theoretically driven, but more empirically oriented
approach. Most of these studies simply explore Chinese policies towards a set of
developing countries (Reilly and Na 2007; Chan-Fishel and Lawson 2007; Alden
2007; Davies et al. 2008; Brautigam 2008, 2009). As a consequence, these studies
are particularly enlightening in that they deliver most valuable insights on the
actors, processes and structures of recent Chinese foreign policy implementation,
especially in the context of China's foreign development assistance.
Furthermore, a few quantitative studies tried to ﬁnd out what determines Chi-
nese engagement, but these attempts are rare. For example, Berthélemy (2009)
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investigates what determines Chinese economic cooperation, even though his fo-
cus is restricted to the African continent. Another important contribution which
looks at the number of completed Chinese aid projects, food aid, and the num-
ber of medical teams dispatched, ﬁnds that fears that Chinese aid undermines
democracy and good governance are unwarranted (Dreher and Fuchs 2011).
To conclude, what can be taken from this existing research for this study? First
of all, it is a noteworthy fact that the Chinese government is keen to stress national
sovereignty and self-determination, and that it is to be seen as a partner and not
as an interventionist power.
Moreover, it becomes apparent that despite the Chinese oﬃcial rhetoric, the
debate about the true nature of Chinese engagement with developing countries
and with autocratic ones in particular is heated. It sometimes developed into a
contest over the interpretation of the Chinese intentions with a split between those
viewing China's rise as a threat, those who acknowledge that China has gained
inﬂuence, but don't percieve it as a long-term challenge to the West, and those
negating a strategic Chinese intention or campaign to propagate a Chinese model
and downplaying the Chinese impact. Since the debate is highly political, it is as
much a discussion about believes, convictions and speculation as about scientiﬁc
ﬁndings and research.
To complicate the matter, there is still much opacity around what China is
doing, how diﬀerent Chinese actors operate and who they are. In so far, much
of the existing literature is a `ﬁrst generation' literature that - very much on the
base of case-studies and by putting together piece by piece - tries to assemble a
more comprehensive picture of what is going on. Only a few quantitative studies
exploring the determinants of China's engagement exist. Against this background,
this systematic global quantitative assessment of China's impact on autocratic
stability helps to increase our empirical understanding of whether or not China's
rise is a cause of autocratic longevity.
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In this chapter I elaborate a theoretical argumentation explaining why autocratic
powers have an interest in being surrounded by states with similar political regimes
and how this preference for autocratic regimes in the neighborhood translates
into autocratic survival. As has become clear in the previous literature review,
there is currently no comprehensive framework on the role of external players in
promoting or supporting a speciﬁc regime type in other countries. Most studies
on external regime type promotion so far are empirically driven and focus on
democratic players and their impact in promoting democracy abroad. Only few
studies consider whether autocratic powers too could have an interest in promoting
or preserving their own type of political regime elsewhere in the world.
In the following, I deliver a number of reasons, why we should expect autocracies
to be interested in the prevalence of other autocratic regimes in the world.1 By
connecting my arguments with a number of existent theoretical approaches on i)
the logic of domestic politics, ii) the interplay between domestic politics and foreign
policy, and iii) regime type and international cooperation as well as international
cooperation and political survival, I present an integrated framework why and
how the major power preference for autocratic persistence may lead to autocratic
longevity.
3.1. The domestic logic of political survival
In this section, I present some basic considerations on the principles of power and
politics which are widely acknowledged in literature and which are important for
1The basic considerations of this argument have been developed in the context of a research
project carried out at the German Development Institute (DIE) in Bonn and have been
published in a co-authored paper (Bader et al. 2010).
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my argument as they deﬁne the incentive structures for political actors. Propo-
nents of a political economy approach believe that political actors play a crucial
role in determining political outcomes (Olson 1965, 1982; Gilpin 1996; Milner 1999;
Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Lake 2006). Most fundamentally, they assume po-
litical actors to be rational2 and to be oﬃce-seekers. Political actors seek to attain
power, and once reached there, to remain in oﬃce (Downs 1957; Wintrobe 2000;
Lake and Baum 2001; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003).
Furthermore, it is assumed that in their struggle to achieve and preserve power,
political actors are reliant on the loyalty of the population - or more precisely of
speciﬁc societal groups - to accept and support the government in oﬃce. A political
leader can create loyalty by distributing resources among a targeted constituency
and so bind the welfare of this constituency to the survival of his regime. Therefore,
in the view of political economy theory, the political process is understood as a
political game in which the government oﬀers concessions or privileging policies in
exchange for political support (Wintrobe 1990; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003).
At the same time, a leader can use repressive means to coerce opponents and
repress critical segments in society (Wintrobe 2000; Bueno de Mesquita et al.
2003), so `the use of violence by governments is a strategic choice' (Vreeland 2008,
73).3 Repression is a strategy that is carefully weighed against other strategies to
respond to challenges to the ruling coalition. Which of these strategies is chosen
depends on their expected utilities (Gurr 1986; Gartner and Regan 1996; Moore
2000).4 But because the motivation for the individual to protest against a political
order or to carry out oppression against others is set by distributive policies, I
consider repression to be a function of distribution.
The existing literature has focused on diﬀerent societal actors as the main threat
to political leadership. In contrast to Wintrobe (2000), who assumed the whole
2Actors, in this sense, are not necessarily individuals, but rather collective actors consisting of
groups of individuals. The political collective actors referred to in the following are deﬁned by
their function as government or opposition or, in cases where there is no government, groups
competing for the power to form the government. If the net-beneﬁt or the utility of an action
is known or can be assumed, rational choice models oﬀer a micro-foundation to explain and
even predict political events.
3For a comprehensive overview on this literature see Davenport (2007).
4There is, however, dissent in literature about when and under which circumstances repression
actually is the most attractive strategy (Gartner and Regan 1996; Moore 2000).
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population to potentially challenge the leaders in power, Bueno de Mesquita et al.
(2003) diﬀerentiated between two societal subgroups, the selectorate and the win-
ning coalition which they considered to be most important. According to Bueno de
Mesquita et al. (2003) the selectorate is the subset of all residents `that has a for-
mal role in expressing a preference over the selection of the leadership that rules
them, though their expression of preference may or may not directly inﬂuence the
outcome' (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003, 38). The subgroup that is critical to
keep a government in power - whether they are educational, economic or military
elites, bureaucratic actors or a combination of these - is referred to as the `winning
coalition' (Olson 1965; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). As a consequence of this
distinction, a government is speciﬁcally inclined to oﬀer preferential policies to the
collective actors of its winning coalition. I follow Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003)
in the assumption that elites are particularly important for a regime to survive.
Hence, the political economy perspective sees governments as rational political
actors who pursue their overriding interest of preserving their power by distributing
resources to speciﬁc constituencies and if necessary also to a repression machine.
As the groups of importance to the survival of the governments diﬀer in democra-
cies and autocracies, the domestic incentive systems for democratic and autocratic
governments are diﬀerent.
Both, scholars of regime theory and proponents of political economy have pointed
towards structural diﬀerences in the mechanisms according to which political ac-
tors in democracies and autocracies come to and stay in power (Olson 1993; Lake
and Baum 2001; Bueno de Mesquita and Root 2002; Faust 2007a). Whereas in
democracies, through the mechanism of regular elections, leaders repeatedly must
compete to win the majority's favor, autocratic elites come to power on the base
of support of narrow elite circles. These diﬀering mechanisms to acquire power
have far reaching consequences.
First, in democracies, political actors are more inclined to respond to the de-
mands of wider parts of the population while leaders in autocracies can aﬀord to
be responsive to only a small subset of the society. This structural characteristic is
reﬂected in the size of the winning coalition. This coalition tends to be relatively
large in democracies and small in autocracies (Olson 1982). If support is gener-
ated by privileging the respective winning coalition, then the bigger the winning
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coalition gets, the more expensive it becomes to pay-oﬀ every single member of the
winning coalition. Thus, the bigger the winning coalition gets, the less eﬀective
provision of private goods becomes to generate support. Eventually it becomes
more eﬃcient to provide public goods and thereby making the whole population
better oﬀ. For this reason, democratic governments tend to rely stronger on the
provision of public goods, whereas autocratic governments focus more on the priv-
ileging of a small and exclusive group by providing their coalition members with
private goods in order to generate support. This view is supported by the empiri-
cal fact that democracies produce more public goods and tend to be more resilient
to the interests of the population as a whole (Lake and Baum 2001; Bueno de
Mesquita et al. 2003; Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Faust 2007a; Blaydes and
Kayser 2011).5
Second, not only does the large size of the winning coalition in democracies
require eﬃciency, it also calls for accountability towards the electorate for ef-
fectiveness in the allocation of resources. The request for transparency in the
government's actions minimizes the discretionary power to allocate beneﬁts of
the democratic leaders. Lacking a mechanism of regular evaluation, autocratic
governments, in contrast, are not accountable towards the population which, in
combination with restricted information ﬂows through the repression of free me-
dia, generally oﬀers autocratic governments in general a much larger discretionary
leeway for the allocation of resources. For example, empirical evidence shows that
democratic governments are more willing to report and publish sensitive data such
as unemployment rates or inﬂation (Rosendorﬀ and Vreeland 2006). Moreover, it
appears that the adoption and spread of new communication technologies such as
the internet is often delayed in autocracies. This is not because of lower socioeco-
nomic development, but because of the fears of ruling elites that a better informed
population will cause instability (Milner 2006). In consequence, autocratic gov-
ernments are more self-determined in allocating their budgets than democratic
5Paying-oﬀ coalition members with private rents, however, inheres the problem of how to inhibit
these to use the accumulated wealth to overthrow the dictator, pointed out by numerous
works on autocratic systems. Literature on the `dictator's dilemma' is diverse and various
solutions have been proposed, ranging from institutionalization (Gandhi and Przeworski 2007)
introducing multi-party elections as symbolic contract between the dictator and the coalition
partner (Magaloni 2008), a strategy of terror, of co-optation or of organizational proliferation
(Haber 2006).
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leaders. This mechanism has been cited as the reason why many autocratic lead-
ers succeed in accumulating substantial personal wealth and why corruption in
autocratic countries tends to be more widespread than in democratic countries
(Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003).
Third, the process of regular elections in democracies is not only an incentive for
the incumbent government to convince with good performance, but also a chance
for the opposition to regain power. In non- or weakly-institutionalized autocra-
cies where a clear mechanism for the alternation of governments is missing, losing
oﬃce is connected to insecurity about future possibilities to regain power. Be-
cause political power most often involves material advantages, it is generally also
economically costly to the incumbent government.6 Therefore, losing power impli-
cates much more dramatic consequences for autocratic governments, especially if it
would additionally expose purged leaders to be held responsible for the economic,
political, or societal crimes which the unrestricted monopoly of power allows them
to commit (Tullock 1987).
Consequently, in fear of an uncertain and most likely unpleasant future, auto-
cratic leaders face much stronger incentives and much less restrictions in making
use of every means, including repressive ones, to cling to power. This ﬁnding is
supported by the `Law of Coercive Responsiveness' which states that state author-
ities generally employ repression when challenges to the status quo take place, but
that in highly democratized countries repression is diminished (Davenport 2007).7
To sum up, democratic and autocratic systems diﬀer i) in their production of
public goods in relation to private goods, ii) in the extent to which they are
accountable to the wider population, and iii) in the degree to which they use
repressive means to maintain political stability.
Before I will derive the foreign policy preference for a speciﬁc regime type that
follows from these structurally diﬀerent incentive systems in democracies and au-
6But research on autocracy has shown that patterns of autocratic regimes matter. Single-party
dictatorships, for example, `typically institutionalize turnover within the party structure,
thereby removing uncertainty over succession [. . . ]. Leaders in these regimes are more likely
to leave power by regular means (as opposed to assassination, coup, or exile) than leaders in
other types of regimes [. . . ]' (Wright 2008, 977).
7However, democratization itself does not necessarily lead to decreased repression. `The road




tocracies, I will brieﬂy turn to a second existent approach in literature which
connects domestic politics to the international context as well as to regime type
and regime survival.
3.2. Domestic politics, international cooperation
and leadership survival
The second piece to link autocratic domestic structures to external autocracy
promotion or support for autocratic survival is the literature on regime type and
international cooperation and international cooperation and leadership survival
respectively. Here, I refer to approaches at the conjunction of the ﬁelds of Liberal
Foreign Policy Analysis and International Relations. The logic of political survival
as a barter between preferential policies and support is automatically extended
to international politics as soon as one assumes that diﬀerent policy ﬁelds are
used in an instrumental way to satisfy best a leader's desire to stay in power.8 In
consequence, governments assess their external relations according to the degree
to which they serve their interests, thus their utility to remain in power. Putnam
(1988) has developed the notion of a `two level game' where governments play at
a domestic and an international level simultaneously.
`At a national level, domestic groups pursue their interests by pressur-
ing the government to adopt favourable policies, and politicians seek
power by constructing coalitions among those groups. At the interna-
tional level, national governments seek to maximize their own ability to
satisfy domestic pressures, while minimizing the adverse consequences
of foreign developments' (Putnam 1988, 434).
Against the background of Putnam's two-level game, others have formally mod-
elled interaction at the international level (McGillivray and Smith 2000, 2004,
2006; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2007; Smith 2009). They assumed that lead-
ers are often confronted with requests from other governments to adopt a speciﬁc
8Liberal Foreign Policy Analysis usually perceives foreign policy as an instrument to achieve
domestic objectives (e.g. Milner (1997) and Moravcsik (1997)).
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policy which is not necessarily in their own interest. But, often asymmetries in
power relations exists, so that leaders face negative or positive incentives, such as
sanctions, to comply with these external interests.
More speciﬁcally, by assuming leader-speciﬁc punishment, the survival of an in-
dividual leader is connected to his compliance with external interests (McGillivray
and Smith 2004). Unlike traditional liberal approaches9 that are blind to leader-
ship turnovers, these leader-speciﬁc approaches perceive sanctions and rewards to
be targeted at a speciﬁc government. This conceptualization does not only allow
for the restoration of cooperation after the removal of non-cooperative leaders, it
also implies that external powers can target international cooperation to speciﬁc
actors in another country and withhold it from others.
Based on the selectorate theory presented earlier, Smith (2009) provided a formal
model in which he showed that selective international cooperation disturbs the
domestic balance of power and impacts on the survival of competing political
actors in a country. Recall, the selectoreate theory argued that the redistribution
of resources to crucial societal subgroups is necessary to succeed in the domestic
competition over power. Assuming that international cooperation is in principal
beneﬁcial to a government, external actors can inﬂuence the distributional capacity
of domestic actors by cooperating only selectively. In other words, when external
actors decide to cooperate with only a speciﬁc actor in a country, and not with
another, they support the former and disadvantage the latter. This is because
the former gains from cooperation and can redistribute these gains among his
constituency while the latter cannot.
Studies on the phenomenon of international cooperation have examined the
eﬀect of regime type on international behavior on a wide range of issues from
conﬂict to cooperation. Usually, it was assumed that dyadic interaction is shaped
by regime similarity (Leeds 1999; Mansﬁeld et al. 2000; Russett and Oneal 2001;
Milner and Kubota 2005). In contrast to this approach, the approach here suggests
that dyadic interaction is the cause rather than only a consequence of regime
9In the traditional liberal works on cooperation states are seen as unitary actors. Based on
this assumption, Axelrod (1984) for example, developed the tit-for-tat model, in which states
mirror the cooperative or defective behavior of their counterpart.
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stability (and convergence respectively).10
3.3. Foreign policy - preferences for regime
convergence and autocratic stability
In the previous sections, I ﬁrst illustrated the domestic logic of political survival
and the diﬀerent incentive systems in autocracies and democracies. Second, I
connected foreign policy behavior and international cooperation with domestic
political survival. If foreign policy, as a policy ﬁeld, is assumed to be used in
order to achieve a government's overriding goal of securing its position in oﬃce,
the domestic logic of maintaining power determines foreign policy decisions. Ac-
cordingly, foreign policy is designed to realize the decision maker's desire to stay
in power and tends to follow the domestic strategies to do so.
From this starting point three arguments can be derived which suggest that gov-
ernments are not indiﬀerent with respect to the regime type of others, especially
not to that of their neighbors. The ﬁrst consideration is related to the distribu-
tional means of preserving power. While democratic leaders, in order to satisfy a
rather broad coalition, are more reliant on the provision of public goods, for au-
tocratic governments it is more important to selectively distribute private goods
to their relatively small coalition and to respond to speciﬁc vested interests. In
turn, democratic governments face strong incentives to exploit international rela-
tions in order to improve their performance in the provision of public goods. The
provision of public goods exceeds the domestic borders in many ways and often
they are easier achieved by international cooperation. For example, it has been
shown empirically that democratic governments are less likely to enter war with
each other and are more willing to open their domestic markets for international
trade because peace and free trade primarily favors a large part of the population
(Russett and Oneal 2001; Milner and Kubota 2005). So, democratic incentive
structures elsewhere ease the provision of transboundary public goods, whether
10Actually, within the democratization debate, a similar point has been made by diﬀusion theory
(Simmons and Elkins 2004; Gleditsch and Ward 2006; Brinks and Coppedge 2006) or by
Levitsky and Way's (2005) notion of linkage and leverage. However, as already mentioned,
the focus in these works was predominantly on the spread of democracy.
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peace, free trade, a clean environment or the prevention of uncontrolled migration
and therefore they should be in the interest of democracies.
This argument becomes even stronger when authoritarian states cause negative
externalities which are counterproductive to a democratic government's eﬀorts to
provide good performance. For example, Zimbabwe's devastating humanitarian
situation which caused the spread of cholera in late 2008 has not seriously threat-
ened Zimbabwe's autocratic leader Mugabe, but it might become a challenge to
neighboring governments in South Africa or Mozambique if the epidemic spreads
across borders. As democratic leaders are evaluated by the masses on their per-
formance, they are more vulnerable than authoritarian governments to fall over
crises caused by others. Autocratic leaders, in contrast, are relatively immune
against external inﬂuences as long as they can shield their narrow support groups
against negative eﬀects. Both the fact that cooperation in order to produce public
goods is more likely to materialize between democracies because they are equally
interested in the outcome and the fact that negative externalities are more likely to
be provoked by autocrats are two strong reasons why we would expect democratic
leaders to favor other countries to be democratic as well.
But which preference would we expect for autocratic leaders? The very same
distributional incentives also deliver an argument why leaders in powerful autocra-
cies should be interested in others being autocratic too. According to the domestic
distributional logic, autocratic leaders are likely to use foreign policy to increase
the resources which they can then redistribute among the winning coalition in their
population. Instead of producing public goods, this often involves the distribu-
tion of private goods. As has been argued, democratic government spending and
decision-making more generally underlies relatively high requirements concerning
accountability and transparency. Therefore, it is relatively diﬃcult to inﬂuence
democratic decisions from outside. In autocracies, however, the circle involved in
decision-making is small, accountability to the population is low and the interests
of the decision-makers are narrow. Therefore, it is comparatively easy to manipu-
late an authoritarian government's decision-making. In relative terms, it is easier
for external players to exploit authoritarian states than democratic ones (Bueno de
Mesquita et al. 2003).
Exploitation, in this sense refers to the realization of economic, political or geo-
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strategic interests like the extraction of natural resources, the acquisition of land
concessions, the agreement on transit rights or the deployment of strategic military
bases on foreign territory at relatively low costs.
Clearly, this exploitation argument is theoretically also valid for major demo-
cratic powers. However, as argued above democracies are also more vulnerable
to negative externalities produced by autocracies. So, for democracies the prefer-
ence order may be less clear than for autocracies. Since the incentives for demo-
cratic leaders whether to prefer democracies or autocracies are ambiguous, it is not
straightforward to make a general prediction which type of regime a democratic
power would like best.
Just as autocracies are likely to produce negative externalities for democracies,
democratic spill-over eﬀects from democracies are a cause of concern for autocratic
leaders, especially when democracies are in their close neighborhood (Ambrosio
2009). On the one hand, being less reliant on the use of repression, democracies
are more likely to pressure others for human rights abuses, while authoritarian
governments are more likely to have similar attitudes towards the means of repres-
sion to stay in power. Since autocrats are principally more reliant on repression to
maintain power, they are less willing to criticize and to interfere in the domestic
aﬀairs of others (Burnell 2010).11 Moreover, the liberal atmosphere in democra-
cies with better access to information, more open debates and less human rights
abuses form a potential cause of unrest if they diﬀuse to autocracies and inspire a
demand among the population for similar rights and freedoms as enjoyed in demo-
cratic neighboring countries. Even when such calls do not succeed in mobilizing
enough support to overthrow the dictator, they are costly for the autocrat, because
he needs to respond with increased repression or cooptation.
At the core of this potential to destabilze autocracies is the vulnerability of au-
tocrats to the question of legitimacy. Because the legitimacy question is typically
posed when people realize that autocracy is not inevitable, `autocrats have a stake
in ensuring that additional countries do not `fall' to democracy. For instance,
from a regional perspective, the ability of a country to withstand democratic pres-
sures beneﬁts all authoritarian regimes in the region. If a pattern of democratic
11Werner (2000) argues that this is also a reason why not only democracies, but also autocracies
experience fewer disputes amonst each other.
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transitions is halted, this would undermine a sense of momentum and reverse any
belief that the overthrow of autocratic leaders is inevitable' (Ambrosio 2009, 23).
This domino eﬀect became evident in Latin America where almost all countries
democratized within one decade during the 1980s and then in the states of the
former Soviet Union after 1989. The recent wave of popular upheaval in the Arab
world gives a new vivid example of the strength of neighborhood eﬀects in inspiring
attempts to overthrow authoritarian governments.
From an authoritarian perspective, having a dictatorial neighborhood is desir-
able because it not only reduces the risk of subversive democratic spill-over ef-
fects, but also reduces the likelihood of being punished for using repressive means,
thereby reducing the cost of repression.
It follows from this that governments should for good reasons favor similar
regimes elsewhere especially in their neighborhood. There are clear incentives
for democratic leaders to favor other democracies which are related to the per-
formance orientation of democratic governments. In contrast, autocratic leaders
beneﬁt from authoritarian neighbors because it is easier to extract vital assets from
them. While this incentive, in principal, is a valid one for democracies alike, being
in an autocratic neighborhood is a mixed blessing for democracies as democratic
leaders may suﬀer from the negative externalities caused by authoritarian neigh-
bors more than other authoritarian neighbors. Last, but not least, autocracies
have a strong incentive to favor other autocracies when it comes to their reliance
on repression to enforce their position in power.
Bringing the diﬀerent approaches that have been presented earlier together,
political economy provides a micro-foundation for foreign policy preferences. Ac-
cordingly, democrats are expected to use Putnam's international level to make
others more willing to contribute to the creation of public goods, while autocrats
are expected to make use of the international level to acquire private goods to
maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressure. At the same time, the ad-
verse consequences which governments seek to minimize also diﬀer: For democrats,
this is the negative externalities created by autocracies, while autocrats perceive
the democratic diﬀusion eﬀects and interventionist intentions from democracies
as a threat. From this perspective, a country's interest in a speciﬁc regime type
elsewhere is of a purely instrumental nature.
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Autocratic leaders simply seek to survive in power and while it is beneﬁcial for
their own longevity when others are similarly autocratic this does not necessar-
ily imply that a speciﬁc regime type is actively promoted elsewhere. Empirically,
one can distinguish between the inducement of transition from a democratic to an
autocratic type of regime and the support or stabilization of existing autocratic
leaders. This study focuses on the latter. It should be noted that the exploitation
argument as an instrumental motivation for supporting the persistence of autocra-
cies already implies the very mechanism by which autocracies are stabilized namely
by addressing the autocratic leader and his winning coalition with targeted pri-
vate goods. Whether, and if so in how far, it leads to the erosion of democratic
structures when democratic leaders are similarly addressed with targeted goods in
order to achieve policy concessions is then a question that falls in the category of
autocracy promotion.
3.4. Hypotheses
In the previous sections, I drafted a theoretical argumentation on the foreign policy
preferences of governments in diﬀering political regimes. I discussed why leaders
are beneﬁting from similar regimes elsewhere and why this could eventually lead
to the proliferation and stabilization of a speciﬁc regime type. I will now apply
this theory and test it on the speciﬁc case of China. To this end, I formulate a few
hypotheses which I will test later in this thesis. Considering that China is a major
regional and an emerging global power, one can derive a number of predictions
on autocratic behavior in general, and more speciﬁcally on China's foreign policy
behavior and its interaction with other states.
It is beyond doubt that China's political system has autocratic features. Char-
acterized by a socialist political system with the monopoly of power in the hands
of a single party, China is consistently rated as highly authoritarian by the most
common political indices.12 Certainly, with the change in leadership from Mao
12Freedom House, ranging from 1 (most democratic) to 7 (least democratic), rated China with 6
from 1972 until 1987 and with 7 from then on; and China's score on the Polity index, ranging




Zedong to Deng Xiaoping, China's political system has undergone considerable
changes. These, however, mark a shift from a totalitarian to an authoritarian sys-
tem13 rather than a step towards democracy. And while economic liberalization
since 1978 has been successful, it was not particularly conducive to fundamental
regime change. Attempts to political reforms and liberalization remained limited.
As discussed in the previous section, the very root of the political economy argu-
ment is that the domestic political structure of a state, or more precisely the size
of its coalition, is of interest to the Chinese government, because it aﬀects the ease
with which a government can be inﬂuenced. The core of the argument is that small
coalition governments are easier to exploit from the outside. As a consequence, if
the theoretical argument is right, China should be more successful in realizing its
foreign interests vis-à-vis small coalitions than vis-à-vis large winning coalitions.
This is my ﬁrst hypothesis (H1).
H1 China is more successful in realizing its interests in autocracies than in
democracies.
What immediately follows from H1 is that China should prefer autocracies to
democracies to cooperate with. When the Chinese government decides whether
to cooperate with a country or not, regime type should be one criterion whereby
autocracies should be more likely to have cooperation with China. This proposition
forms my second hypothesis (H2). Moreover, considering cooperation as a reward
for responsiveness to Chinese interests, we would expect that countries are more
likely to become a partner for cooperation when they comply with Chinese foreign
policy objectives (H3).
H2 China prefers autocracies to democracies for cooperation. Therefore, autoc-
racies are more likely to become a partner for cooperation than democracies.
H3 Compliance is rewarded by cooperation. Therefore, compliant countries are
more like to become a partner for cooperation than non-compliant countries.
With respect to the assumed causal mechanism, small coalition governments
rely more on the targeting of goods towards their speciﬁc supporters, while large
13For the distinction within the category of authoritarian systems, see for example: Brooker
(2009) or Linz (2000).
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coalition systems focus more on the provision of public goods to the whole popu-
lation. From the perspective of an external player with its own interest to extract
policy concessions from a government, it seems plausible to adapt to this incen-
tive system if he can observe the size and composition of the winning coalition
elsewhere. So the immediate implication of the theory is that small coalition gov-
ernments exchange policy concessions against targeted goods from external play-
ers. Democrats, in contrast, need a good policy performance to survive and they
should therefore value the provision of public goods for their own survival higher
than the provision of private goods. Therefore, one would generally expect to
see China exchanging more private goods with autocracies than with democracies
and to exchange more public goods with democracies than with autocracies. It is,
however, diﬃcult to empirically diﬀerentiate between diﬀerent types of goods that
are exchanged.
An easier way to test my theory is to look at the volume of goods that are
exchanged. It has been argued that development aid is a strategic tool to purchase
or reward policy support from other countries (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith
2007, 2009a) and some studies ﬁnd that Western aid allocation is driven at least
partially by the self-interst of the donor (Schraeder et al. 1998; Hook and Zhang
1998; Alesina and Dollar 2000; Weder and Alesina 2002). Against this background,
I expect that the Chinese government also transfers resources, for example in the
form of development assistance or ﬁnancial aid, to other governments in order
to make these more compliant with Chinese interests. Because regimes diﬀer in
their willingness and ability to comply with Chinese interests, we would expect
this `price' that the Chinese government has to pay for compliance to vary with
regime type. All else equal, the Chinese government is expected to transfer fewer
resources to autocracies than to democracies in order to realize a given set of
objectives (H4).
H4 China transfers fewer resources to autocracies than to democracies.
Moreover, since governments are primarily interested in resources to satisfy their
coalitions, the argument also implies that countries oﬀering more extractable re-
sources are more prone to be exploited. Speciﬁcally in the case of China, which
has an outspoken interest in assuring the access to natural resources in order to
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maintain its domestic stability, I expect a focus on resource rich countries. There-
fore, all else equal, the Chinese government is expected to transfer more resources
to resource abundant than to resource scarce countries (H5).
H5 China transfers more resources to resource abundant than to resource scarce
states.
As I have argued, the theory also suggests that conﬂict and cooperation of
major autocratic powers are the cause of system convergence and suggests that
cooperation with autocratic major powers increases the likelihood of survival of
autocrats.14 Hence this is the next hypothesis that will be tested (H6).
H6 The more cooperation between China and an autocrat, the longer this autocrat
will survive.
In this section six hypotheses concerning China's foreign policy behavior and its
eﬀects have been derived from the overall argumentation. The predictions made
in these hypotheses are tested in the subsequent chapters. In chapters 4 and 5 I
will quantitatively test H2 to H6. The comparative case studies in chapter 7 to
chapter 9 provide an examination of H1.
14From a theoretical perspective, it would doubtless be interesting to extend the analysis to
conﬂictual autocratic behavior. From a empirical perspective, however, this question seems
less compelling in this context since, to my knowledge, the only country which is threatened
of military intervention by the Chinese government is Taiwan.
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This chapter is dedicated to the investigation of whether China's economic co-
operation with autocrats diﬀers between democrats and autocrats (H2 and H4),
whether economic cooperation rewards compliance with Chinese interests (H3) and
whether China's economic cooperation depends on resource abundance (H5).
I start oﬀ with specifying and operationalizing the relevant variables. Then, I
describe the data and my methodological approach and ﬁnally I present my results.
4.1. Concept speciﬁcation and operationalization
Autocratic cooperation
Hypotheses H2 and H3 predicted that the Chinese government is more likely to
cooperate with autocracies and with governments which comply with China's in-
terests. In some of the later hypotheses this cooperation was already speciﬁed as
`transfers of resources' from China to another government. Studies investigating
similar questions often use data of foreign assistance or development aid as an in-
dicator for the transfer of resources (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2007, 2009a).
In the case of China, this is a diﬃcult task. It is an explicit Chinese policy to
link foreign investment, trade and aid in order to pursue the domestic economic
modernization (Brautigam 2009), but for the ﬁrst and the latter, data is scarce. In
the following, I elaborate in more detail on both variables in the context of China.
Chinese economic cooperation In 1995, the Chinese aid architecture has been
fundamentally restructured to better pursue the goal of domestic modern-
ization. The Chinese `go out' policy that was launched in 2001 and aimed at
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enhancing the global competitiveness of state-owned enterprises by stimulat-
ing China's state-owned companies to invest overseas further complemented
this approach. In addition to a wide range of preferential treatments in the
domestic context, such as tax breaks and cheap land and capital, the Chinese
government strengthened its back-up of its corporations at the international
stage.
Much of China's economic assistance comes in the form of concessional lend-
ing of money that is directly allocated by the Chinese government through
China's state banks to Chinese ﬁrms in order to carry out investment projects
abroad. The recipient country will be invoiced for the loan, but will never
see any cash money. The criteria for a loan generally are plentiful resources,
a large market and favorable economic prospects (Hubbard 2007, 7). From
this, it becomes evident that economic cooperation has a strong focus on
export promotion, and securing access to resources (Davies et al. 2008). Per-
haps exemplary in this respect, there is no Chinese understanding of `aid'
comparable to the OECD deﬁnition of oﬃcial development assistance. The
Chinese `aid' statistics, in contrast to the OECD statistics, not only includes
subsidies on interests, but also military aid, for example (Brautigam 2009).
This aid budget is tiny compared to other donors. Its volume is `lagging
behind that of the overall ﬁscal expenditure' and has been `hovering around
0.01% [of GNI] over the decade since 1995' (Kobayashi 2008, 27). Unfortu-
nately, there is only annual aggregate data available on these expenditures
and no oﬃcial information specifying details on who gets this money for
what kind of projects.1 What is available, is annual data on the turnover
of all projects carried out by Chinese companies during the period 1998 to
2008. More precisely, these statistics `include (1) overseas civil engineering
construction projects ﬁnanced by foreign investors; (2) overseas projects ﬁ-
nanced by the Chinese government through its foreign aid programs; (3)
construction projects of Chinese diplomatic missions, trade oﬃces and other
institutions stationed abroad; (4) construction projects in China ﬁnanced
1There is a database on completed aid porjects which was collected from newspaper reports,
but this data does not contain aid volumes (Hawkins et al. 2010).
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by foreign investment; 2 (5) sub-contracted projects to be taken by Chinese
contractors through a joint umbrella project with foreign contractor(s); (6)
housing development projects' (National Bureau of Statistics of China 2010).
This melting pot of trade, aid, and commercial foreign direct investment ﬁg-
ures is clearly not an ideal measure. And it should not be mistaken as China's
development assistance. However, it is a proxy for China's engagement in
the developing world and as Berthélemy (2009) has argued, this data is most
likely correlated with ﬁnancial engagement, given that Chinese ﬁnancial and
development assistance is tied. The fact that China has been increasingly
successful during the last years in winning tenders of internationally ﬁnanced
construction projects (by the World Bank, for example) and the fact that
these projects are included in this data is a challenge. However, Foster et al.
(2009) estimated that in 2002-2005 only approximately 10% of Chinese eco-
nomic cooperation projects in Africa were not ﬁnanced by Chinese sources,
and the bulk of projects was funded by Chinese money.
Thus, although there is noise in the data, for the lack of availability of a
more reliable proxy (such as purely ﬁnancial transfers from China), I use
this statistic in my variable economic cooperation. Using this data implies
the risk that too much noise in the data cloud my results, however. It should
also be mentioned that the data I use is not in very good shape. One cannot
always clearly distinguish between missing values and non-cooperation.3
2This refers to projects that are carried out i) in China ii) by a Chinese company, but iii)
ﬁnanced by a third country, and iv) that have publicly been procured. In addition to the fact
that this combination of requirements is probably not often meet, information distributed by
China's Ministry of Commerce hints to the fact that the bulk of China's economic cooperation
truly refers to projects carried out abroad. Moreover, the Chinese administrative regulations
for international projects also refer exclusively to projects abroad which also indicates that
projects constructed in China are rather rare (Expert interview, Bonn 22 May 2011).
3Originally, in the data set all countries are enlisted with the respective amount of economic
cooperation for each year a project was completed. When no economic cooperation took
place countries do not appear in the data and the true value for these countries is zero. The
problem is that there are a number of countries in which economic cooperation projects were
completed in many years, but which do not appear in the original data set in certain years.
In brief, it is not always clear whether no economic cooperation project was completed or
whether some countries were simply forgotten to be put on the list. I am suspicious that some
missing values could in fact very well be explained by a coding error, because the distribution
of these missing values is not equal geographically and over time. For example, in 1998 and
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A solution to this problem is not straightforward. One should keep these




According to my hypotheses, I expect a country's cooperation with China to be
determined by its regime type whereby autocratic countries or small-winning coali-
tion countries are expected to receive less cooperation. Determining a country's
regime type is a complicated and irredeemably controversial undertaking (Prze-
worski et al. 2000), and therefore, I by and large built on two existing approaches
to derive two variables which are both used to measure regime type.
Winning coalition W On the one hand, I operationalize autocracies in the very
same way as Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) by using their variables W
(size of winning coalition) and S (size of selectorate). Basically, a winning
coalition W is considered to be large if the recruitment of the executive
is open and competitive and the chief executive is selected by elections as
opposed to heredity or rigged, unopposed elections. Additionally, military
regimes in particular are considered to depend on a highly exclusive group.
The measurement of W as described in Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003, 134f)
2001, there are in total 15 and 34 countries missing while in other years no more than ten
countries are missing. Also, many of the countries that do not appear in 2001 are located in
Central Asia.
It would be incorrect to simply treat all these missing countries as missing values and drop
them from the sample, because this would imply a non-observed selection bias.
In order to address this problem, I did the following: When countries were only occasion-
ally missing, I replace these values with an estimation (ipolation). Then, I replaced all the
remaining missing values with zero. After having ran my regressions, I compared the results
with regressions in which all missing values were coded zero. Even though only 89 out of 923
missing values could be ipolated, in the regression were all missings were treated as zeros,
coeﬃcients were much more volatile and the higher uncertainties of the estimates in 1998 and
2001 were reﬂected in systematically larger conﬁdence intervals in these years. Therefore, I
decided to work with the ipolated data. However, volatility in the estimates is persistent in
1998, because as the starting year, it cannot be ipolated. For comparison, appendix B.3 con-
tains the estimation results for the regressions when missing values in the dependent variable
economic cooperation were not replaced by ipolation, but recoded as zeros.
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and Mesquita and Smith (2010, 940) is as follows: The size of the winning
coalition W is an composite index based on four equally weighed variables
REGTYPE (Banks 2007), XRCOMP, XROPEN and PARCOMP from the
Polity IV data (Marshall and Jaggers 2008).4 The variable is standardized
to range from 0 to 1 where higher values indicate a larger winning coalition.
To measure S, Mesquita and Smith (2010) refer to the selection process of
the legislative as an indicator of the inclusiveness of the selectorate. The size
of the selectorate S is coded 0 if no legislature exists according to Bank's
LEGSELEC variable, 1 if selection is nonelective, such as by heredity or
ascription, and 2 if the legislature is elected. Again, this variable is stan-
dardized to range from 0 to 1 by dividing it by two. Larger values indicate a
larger selectorate (Mesquita and Smith 2010, 940). I take these two variables
from a replication data set of Mesquita and Smith (2010), which is posted
on Bruce Bueno de Mesquita's homepage.5 The disadvantage of this data
set is that is only covers the years up to 2006.
Autocracy dummy Alternatively, I refer to the works of Przeworski et al. (2000);
Boix and Stokes (2003) and Cheibub et al. (2010) in the operationalization
of the crucial variable of autocracy. I use Cheibub's democracy dummy to
identify whether a country is autocratic or not (Cheibub et al. 2010). Since
Svolik (2010) has used the same dichotomous distinction between democ-
racies and autocracies to compile his data set on power and institutions in
autocratic regimes, which will be the foundation for my later survival analy-
sis, this dichotomous distinction will also determine the sample selection in
my later survival analysis in chapter 5.
In principal, the approach followed here rests on a very narrow deﬁnition
of democracy as opposed to non-democracy which similarly to the above-
mentioned concept of the winning coalition is based on two criteria: 1) free
4More speciﬁcally, one point is added to the index `for each of the following conditions: if Banks'
regime type variable is nonmilitary, if XRCOMP is greater than or equal to 2 (meaning the
chief executive is not chosen by heredity or in rigged, unopposed elections), if XROPEN is
greater than 2, and if PARCOMP equals 5 (indicating the presence of a competitive party
system)' (Mesquita and Smith 2010, 940)
5See http://politics.as.nyu.edu/object/brucebuenodemesquita
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and competitive legislative elections, and 2) an executive that is elected
either directly in free and competitive presidential elections or indirectly by
a legislature in parliamentary systems (Svolik 2010). Alvarez et al. (1996)
refer to Schumpeter (1942) and Dahl (1971) when establishing these two
dimensions as the minimalist criteria for democracy. Regimes are considered
to be democratic if they satisfy both conditions, and as autocracies if they
miss out on one or both.
In the later regression analysis, I use the autocracy dummy as the main instru-
ment to measure regime type. I decided to use this variable, because it covers the
complete period of time. The size of winning coalition W is used to replace the
autocracy dummy in order to test the robustness of the results.
In line with my earlier conceptualization of democracy in chapter 2, both vari-
ables W and the autocracy dummy are based on a minimalist and procedural
deﬁnition of regime type. As Cheibub et al. (2010) argue, the use of such mini-
malistic measures in empirical research is not only adequate when the mechanism
that links political regimes to outcomes such as the provision of public goods,
accountability, human rights protection or economic reforms is the presence or
absence of contested elections. Expanding the deﬁnition to include normatively
desired outcomes might even harm empirical investigations by making it harder to
specify the causal mechanisms and by blurring the line between political regimes
and other political entities. For example, Cheibub et al. (2010) criticize that the
competitiveness of elections is conﬂated with the measurement of political violence
in the Polity data set and that both Freedom House and Polity are in fact not con-
tinuous measures, but categorical. Others have pointed out that these categories
are highly imprecise because Polity's aggregation rules are arbitrary so that only
a tiny share of possible combinations of its numerous sub-components is reﬂected
in the index (Gleditsch and Ward 1997; Treier and Jackman 2008).
Finally, the informational value added of polychotomous classiﬁcations such as
Freedom House and Polity is also questioned, because of their bimodal distribution
with many cases in the low and high ends. This bimodal distribution explains the
high correlation between dichotomous and polychotomous cases, but it is also most
likely the force behind the empirical patterns in studies concerned with political
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regimes. Once the cases in the extreme ends are deleted the correlation drops
signiﬁcantly. The critique here is that there is no agreement on the conceptual
speciﬁcity of the cases in the middle categories and no substantial interpretation
of what a move from one to the other category empirically means (Cheibub et al.
2010). For all these reasons, I chose a dichotomous measure of regime type instead
of a polychomous measure.
Resource endowment
Hypothesis H5 stipulates that resource abundance of a country is expected to in-
crease the transfers a country receives from China. Measuring resource abundance
is not a straightforward undertaking. A variety of attempts has been made to do
so but empirical ﬁndings are highly sensitive to the choice of resource measure
(Bond and Malik 2009; Norman 2009).
The most common approach is to measure the value of primary commodity
exports (or speciﬁc commodities) as a share of national income or total exports
(Sachs and Warner 1999, 2001; Isham et al. 2005). Another export-based approach
is the UNCTAD's export concentration index. The main critic of using these rela-
tive indicators is that they do not directly measure resource wealth, but intensity,
and that the share of primary commodities in GDP may be driven by other fac-
tors such as policy or the degree to which a country processes its mineral resources
instead of merely exporting them (Norman 2009; Bond and Malik 2009).6
It appears that diﬀerent eﬀects are attributed to diﬀerent types of resources
and therefore many authors focus on a speciﬁc type of natural resource depending
on their research interest. The literature on natural resources, political institu-
tions and growth or interstate war, for instance, mostly looks at oil (Herb 2006;
Bond and Malik 2009) while the literature on resources and internal conﬂict often
6The World Bank has made an alternative approach to measure resource abundance based
on the net present value of the stream of natural resource rents (World Bank 1997, 2006).
The World Bank's `natural capital' measure which includes agricultural land, pasture lands,
forests, protected areas, metals and minerals, and coal, oil and natural gas estimates the
natural wealth of a country by adding up the present values of a stream of resource-speciﬁc
rents over the projected life of a given deposit under the assumption of a discount-rate of
4%. The World Bank also delivers a subindicator of subsoil assets that contains only metals,
minerals, coal, oil and natural gas. The disadvantage of this data set is that it comprises only
roughly 100 countries at two points in time, 1994 and 2000.
54
4.1. Concept speciﬁcation and operationalization
takes diamonds as an indicator (Lujala et al. 2005; Snyder and Bhavnani 2005;
Humphreys 2005). With respect to this research, from a theoretical and from an
empirical perspective, the Chinese economy is in need of a wide variety of natural
resources, ranging from mineral fuels, natural gas, ores, iron, and coal to wood and
agricultural raw products. It would thus be desirable to include as many resources
as possible in the analysis.
However, the approach of using production or stocks of natural resources is
plagued by low data quality and the diﬃculty to weight diﬀerent types of re-
sources.7 In consideration of all these diﬃculties, I decided to use two very simple
resource variables oil and an index of mineral wealth.
Oil Firstly, I took proved crude oil reserves in billion barrels (U.S. Energy In-
formation Administration 2010). Because oil reserves are distributed in an
unbalanced way around the world, with a few countries having very large
resoures while many others have nothing, I took the natural logarithm of oil
reserves.8
Minerals index Secondly, I constructed an index of ﬁve strategic minerals. These
minerals are iron ore, chromium, cobalt, copper and manganese (U.S. Geol-
ogy Survey 2008).
Because a couple of years can pass between the exploration and development
and the actual exploitation of natural reserve deposits - particularly in the
case of subsoil deposits - it is desirable to use data on actual mineral deposits
rather than the production of these minerals. However, for many resources
there simply exists no satisfying data - in terms of existing resource deposits
rather than extraction - on the base of which the abundance of diﬀerent types
of resources could be aggregated. Production data are both more accurate
and better accessible even though using production data implies the risk
that Chinese attention in the form of economic cooperation to resource rich
7Summing up present resource stock values and values of past extraction quantities, Norman
(2009) compiled a comprehensive data set on resource stock values comprising oil, coal, gas
and 35 diﬀerent minerals in 1970. She circumvents the problem of weighting diﬀerent minerals
by aggregating them in terms of market value at 1970 prices. Unfortunately, the data available
only refers to resource stocks in 1970 and 1971 respectively.
8For technical reasons, I replaced zeros with a very small quantity before taking the logarithm.
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countries with the prospect to exploit resource deposits in the future might
not yet be highly correlated with extraction data.
To avoid the problem of aggregation, I created dummy variables for each
mineral, coding it `1' if a country was involved in the production of the
respective mineral, and coding it `0' otherwise. Then, I constructed an index
adding up the number of minerals a country possessed and normalized the
index to range from 0 to 1 by dividing by ﬁve.
Compliance
When the Chinese government uses cooperation to increase compliance with its
interests, compliant countries should more likely become a partner for cooperation
(H3). I measure compliance in two ways: a country's adherence to the `one China'
policy and a country's voting behavior in the UN .
Diplomatic relations with Taiwan Adherence to the `one China' policy is the
cornerstone on which the government of the PRC has built its relations to
other states in the past and this is the only explicitly named political condi-
tionality of Chinese foreign aid. It is plausible that this principle also aﬀects
other aspects of China's foreign relations, such as the more commercially ori-
ented Chinese economic cooperation. Variable Taiwan is a binary variable
which is coded `1' for each year during the period of investigation in which
a country oﬃcially recognized Taiwan and `0' otherwise. The variable was
coded based on own research.9
UN voting behavior Variable UN voting gives the conformity of a country's vot-
ing behavior with Chinese votes in the UN General Assembly in percent. It
has been constructed on the base of Voeten and Merdzanovic (2009)'s data
on votes in the UN General Assembly by counting how often a country's
representative voted in the same way - including abstentions and absentees
9Basic information was taken from Wikipedia, Yahuda (1996), and a number of country spe-
ciﬁc sources, and then veriﬁed with the Taiwanese Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs in an email
correspondence.
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- as the Chinese.10 Then conformity was expressed in percentages of annual
voting situations.
Control variables
A number of other factors are likely to have an impact on the density of relations
between states too. For example, it also seems plausible that the transfer of
resources is not only aﬀected by regime type and the resource abundance of a
country, but more generally by its wealth, size and proximity to China. With
reference to a classical gravity model,11 the following variables are included in
order to control for such other factors. All data sources are listed in appendix A.
Economic development A country with low economic productivity is more likely
to rely on the extraction of natural resources and will probably receive more
economic assistance. In order to control for this factor, the natural logarithm
of GDP per capita (GDP/c (ln)) taken from the Penn World Table (Heston
et al. 2011) is included. There are two countries for which I use diﬀerent data:
Myanmar and Turkmenistan. Because of missing data in the Penn World
Table, I use the TED data set for Myanmar (The Conference Board 2011).
For Turkmenistan the Penn World Table contains wrong values, this is why
I use data from the World Bank (2010)'s World Development Indicators.
Size A big country is likely to be more productive in absolute terms. Therefore,
the model contains size in terms of population. The variable is taken from
the Penn World Table (Heston et al. 2011) and the natural logarithm is taken
(population (ln)).
Distance Furthermore, higher interaction is expected between close countries than
between distant states. Variable distance is based on the capital distance
data set (Gleditsch 2008) and denotes the natural logarithm of kilometres
between a country's capital and Beijing.
10Voting situations in which a country or China was coded as `not a member' were ignored.
11In analogy of the concept of gravity this widely used model explains the dyadic economic ﬂows
as a function of the `masses', such as the wealth and size of states, and their distance from
each other (Wall 1999).
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This classical gravity model is extended by three further factors, the volume
of military transfers from China to other countries, the volume of bilateral trade
ﬂows and the degree to which a country receives ﬁnancial transfers from Western
powers.
Military transfers For a number of reasons, I did not use military ties as another
form of cooperation as a dependent variable. First, China is not a prime
arms supplier. In the period between 1998 and 2005, its worldwide arms
exports made up less then 5% of total arms transfers in the world. Its clients,
however, are virtually all developing countries, primarily in Asia and Africa
that seek quantities of small arms and light weapons (Grimmett 2006).
Second, there is a problem of data availability. Statistics such as the one
from Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, for example, are at
best far from comprehensive. Moreover, it could be speciﬁcally misleading to
measure the extend of military support in monetary terms because China's
support materializes in speciﬁc `friendship prices' for military equipment.
Therefore, monetary measures do not reﬂect the actual degree or value of
military support.
However, it is plausible that there is a correlation between the purchase of
military equipment from China and economic cooperation. This correlation
could have two potential sources. Either receiving economic cooperation
from China enables governments to purchase military equipment, because it
frees resources that would otherwise have been spent diﬀerently or purchasing
military equipment is a form of compliance because it feeds one of the most
powerful interest groups in the Chinese winning coalition, the military in
China.
I use the SIPRI Arms Transfer Database (Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute 2008) as the basis for my control variable military trans-
fers. Since this data set contains only values when a transfer was observed,
missing values were recoded as zero, and then replaced by a very small value
before taking the natural logarithm.
Trade Investigating the exchange of goods between countries, it is natural to look
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at trade ﬂows. My control variable trade measures a country's absolute
bilateral trade with China as imports plus exports. Bilateral trade ﬂows are
compiled from the IMF DOT data (International Monetary Fund 2010). I
use the natural logarithm of the accumulated values of imports and exports.
Linkage with Western powers Maybe Chinese economic cooperation is simply
directed to countries where there is demand or where it is expected to have
the highest impact because few alternative sources of income exist. This
would imply that Chinese economic cooperation is also determined by the
behavior and aid allocation of other major donors. It would imply that in or-
der to avoid investing in countries which are not likely to respond to Chinese
interests anyway, because they are heavily dependent on other donors the
Chinese government allocates its money to countries in which Western pres-
ence is minimal. In order to control for this possibility, I include a variable
for the degree of dependence on Western donors of a country (OECD ODA
% GDP). It measures the oﬃcial development assistance (ODA) a country
receives from the OECD donors as a percentage of GDP.
OECD ODA was taken from the OECD DAC database (Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development 2010). Because this database con-
tains only those countries which receive development assistance, missing val-
ues for all other countries were replaced by zero.12
Table 4.1 gives an overview over the expected inﬂuence of the variables dis-
cussed above on the likelihood that cooperation takes place and on the volume
of cooperation. With respect to the selection as a partner for cooperation (the
second column in table 4.1), I expect that autocracies are more likely to become a
partner. Accordingly, the expected eﬀect of the autocracy dummy is positive and
the eﬀect of the coalition size W is negative, because lower values of W indicate
smaller coalitions, thus more autocratic regimes.
Compliance with Chinese interests should clearly increase the chance for coop-
eration. UN voting behavior should have a positive inﬂuence while relations with
Taiwan should have a negative inﬂuence. Because resource-rich countries are at-
12ODA as set in relation to GDP according to the following formula: ODA/GDP*100
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tractive targets to be exploited, I also expect that resource endowment, that is oil
and minerals should increase the likelihood that cooperation takes place.
With respect to the gravity variables, I expect that wealth and population have
a positive eﬀect on the likelihood for cooperation, because wealth and size make
countries potentially more important in the international system and it might sim-
ply be diﬃcult or counterproductive to China's interests to completely ignore or
avoid them. With increasing distance, I expect fewer cooperation. Both, military
transfers and trade are expected to have a positive impact on the likelihood that co-
operation takes place while the dependence on foreign aid from Western countries
should have a negative impact. I expect the Chinese government to avoid targeting
countries that are already highly aid dependent, because this existing dependency
is assumed to make a country responsive to the donor's interests. Targeting these
countries would therefore imply to compete with alternative donors. When con-
fronted with the decision whether to enter into competition or to search for partner
countries in which Western donors are less dominant, the latter would clearly be
more desirable.
Table 4.1.: Expected inﬂuence of the independent variables on the likelihood that
cooperation takes place and on the volume of cooperation.
Variable Expected inﬂuence on
likelihood volume
Autocracy dummy + -
Size of Winning coalition - +
UN voting + +
Taiwan - -
Oil reserves + +
Mineral index + +
Gdp/capita (ln) + +
Population (ln) + +
Distance(ln) - -
Military transfers + +
Bilateral trade + +
OECD ODA - +
As to the volume of cooperation (the third column of table 4.1), the theory sug-
gests that autocracies are actually disadvantaged in comparison with their demo-
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cratic fellows. Consequently, the autocracy dummy is expected to have a negative
sign, while coalition size W should be positive. As hypothesised in chapter 3.4, it
is assumed that resource endowment should increase the volume of economic coop-
eration, thus oil and minerals should positively aﬀect the volume of cooperation.
The positive expected eﬀect of GDP might appear counter-intuitive at the ﬁrst
sight, but follows from an earlier argumentation of Bueno de Mesquita and Smith
(2007, 2009a). Higher GDP implies that a government has more domestic resources
and can act more independently. Against this background, I assume that a richer
country can demand larger `investments' or in other words a higher price from
China in exchange for compliance with Chinese interests. Accordingly, GDP should
have a positive impact on the amount of economic cooperation. The population
size of a country should clearly have a positive impact on economic cooperation.
Geographic proximity should increase economic interaction because on the one
hand transportation cost are assumed to increase with geographic distance and
on the other hand, proximity should increase the interest to carry out projects,
for example in the infrastructure sector, that serve the broader Chinese goal of
regional integration.
Again, military transfers and trade are expected to have a positive impact on
the volume of economic cooperation. Also, dependence on Western donors should
be correlated with higher amounts of economic cooperation. This is because China
has to compete with Western inﬂuence in countries that are dependent on other
donors. If the Chinese government wants to make these countries comply with its
interests it has to oﬀer more economic cooperation.
4.2. Sample, descriptive statistics, and estimation
procedure
The examination of what determines Chinese cooperation and trade is done by
several cross-section regressions with between 105 and 138 non-OECD countries in
the sample. I start oﬀ this section by presenting my data and a brief descriptive
analysis of the dependent variables. Table 4.2 enlists the summary statistic of all
variables in the regressions on Chinese economic cooperation.
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Table 4.2.: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Economic cooperation (ln) 1.31 5.21 -13.82 8.26 1639
Autocracy dummy 0.49 0.5 0 1 1639
Winning size W 0.6 0.25 0 1 1088
Proven oil reserves -7.3 6.92 -13.82 5.59 1532
in billion barrels (ln)
Mineral wealth index 0.1 0.19 0 1 1639
Dummy for dipl. rel. with Taiwan 0.16 0.37 0 1 1639
UN voting with China in % 70.37 20.84 0 100 1600
Population (ln) 15.38 2 9.84 20.85 1577
GDP/c (ln) 8.24 1.2 4.91 11.92 1577
Distance in km (ln) 9.02 0.54 6.71 9.87 1639
Military transfers from China (ln) -12.65 4.28 -13.82 5.7 1639
Absolute trade with China (ln) 5.05 3 -13.82 10.98 1468
ODA % of GDP 2.2 4.7 -1.61 56.57 1577
Figure 4.1 illustrates the absolute distribution of Chinese economic cooperation
over all non-OECD countries and over time. As can be seen, from 1999 onwards
Chinese economic cooperation to the developing world has dramatically increased.
In 1998, Chinese projects in other countries averaged less than US$50 million
annually; in 2008, this amount had reached almost US$300 million. This increase
in disbursement becomes also obvious at the country level: In 1999, the average
amount received by country was little more than US$40 million, in 2008, the
average amount received was more than US$4 billion. The distribution among
countries varies considerably: the biggest recipient, Singapore, received projects
worth more than US$1 billion annually. Next to a number of countries which did
not receive any economic cooperation at all, Costa Rica received on average the
smallest amount with a volume of around US$100,000.
In accordance with my hypotheses, I have run two types of regressions. The ﬁrst
type is a probit regression which is designed to examine why the Chinese govern-
ment disperses economic cooperation to some countries, but not to others. This
type of regression requires a binary dependent variable, which is why economic
cooperation is recoded to take on only two values, `1' when economic coopera-
tion takes place and `0' otherwise. The second type of regression examines what
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Figure 4.1.: Average amount of Chinese economic cooperation (in constant US$
million) by year and country.
determines the volume of economic cooperation. Here, the dependent variable is
continuous and I have run cross-section tobit regressions.13
For this second type of analysis, a number of cross-section regressions were run
which were then compared over time. I decided to estimate and compare cross-
section regressions instead of doing a time-series analysis for two reasons. First,
from a methodological point of view, panel data causes speciﬁc challenges and
exploring the additional information comes at the cost of not being able to estimate
the eﬀect of variables that do not or only slowly change over time. For example,
the eﬀect of distance, regime type, or resource endowment - all variables that do
13The tobit model was chosen, because the data is left-censored. That is, either economic
cooperation is given or not, but there are no observations below zero. In this case, ordinary
least squares (OLS) could lead to biased coeﬃcient estimates (Long 1997).
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change only in rare circumstances or only very slowly - could not be explored.14
Second, the standard procedures to estimate time-series assumes that the eﬀects
of the explanatory variables are constant over time. But given that there have
been policy changes in China's foreign policy speciﬁcally with the introduction of
the `go out' policy it is likely that some of the determinants for Chinese economic
cooperation have become more important while others have lost weight.
4.3. With whom does China cooperate and what
determines economic cooperation?
From the theory, ﬁve speciﬁc expectations were derived predicting to whom the
Chinese government should give economic cooperation and how much. First of
all, it was expected that the Chinese government selects autocracies to deliver eco-
nomic cooperation (H2). Second, the allocation of economic cooperation should be
conditioned on political considerations of whether or not a country adheres to the
`one China' policy and how it behaves in the voting situations in the UN General
Assembly (H3). With respect to the question of what determines the amount of
economic cooperation a country receives, it was assumed that autocracies should
actually receive smaller amounts of economic cooperation than democracies (H4),
resources-rich countries should receive more economic cooperation (H5). In the
following, I investigate whether these predictions are correct.
Let's start with the question whether autocratic countries are more likely to
receive economic cooperation. Model 1 (second column in table 4.3) is the baseline
model. As can be seen in model 1, the autocracy dummy is positive. In line with
14In panel data, observations are typically correlated over time and across units. If the procedure
of OLS regression is employed under these circumstances, heteroscedasticity and autocorre-
lation lead to ineﬃcient estimates. A lengthy methodological debate on how to avoid the
described problems has resulted in the wide application of the Beck-Katz standard which
suggests including the lagged dependent variable, ﬁxed-eﬀects and time dummies to com-
pute panel-corrected standard errors (Beck and Katz 1995, 1996; Beck 2001). Unfortunately,
the Beck-Katz standard has the potential to cause new problems. First, as Plümper et al.
(2005) show, in instances of persistent eﬀects and a trend-ridden dependent variable, the
coeﬃcient of the lagged dependent variable will be biased upwards thereby absorbing most of
the variance. Second, and even worse, when the regression contains time-invariant variables
or variables that are only slowly changing over time, this procedure is inappropriate because
ﬁxed eﬀects simply make it impossible to estimate time constant variables.
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Table 4.3.: Probit regression of whether China provides economic cooperation to
non-OECD countries
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Economic cooperation Economic cooperation
Coop. > 0 Coop. > 0.01 % GDP
Autocracy dummy 0.145 0.152 0.483** 0.450**
(0.392) (0.453) (0.191) (0.204)
Dummy for dipl. rel. Taiwan -1.209*** -1.164*** -1.028*** -0.977***
(0.299) (0.306) (0.282) (0.296)
UN voting with China in % 0.007 0.008 0.007 0.007
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Proven oil reserves 0.045 0.040 0.026 0.026
in billion barrels (ln) (0.033) (0.035) (0.020) (0.020)
Mineral wealth index 2.310 1.816 -0.168 -0.180
(1.446) (1.368) (0.431) (0.428)
Distance in km (ln) 0.539* 0.225 -0.053 -0.186
(0.305) (0.286) (0.211) (0.173)
Population (ln) 0.015 -0.044 -0.201** -0.269***
(0.094) (0.102) (0.083) (0.089)
GDP/c t-1 (ln) -0.208* -0.277** -0.509*** -0.565***
(0.122) (0.134) (0.121) (0.139)
Military transfers (ln) 0.043**
(0.017)
Bilateral trade (ln) 0.014 0.040
(0.029) (0.030)
ODA % of GDP -0.016 0.007
(0.038) (0.053)
Constant -1.577 2.793 7.930** 11.766***
(4.070) (3.681) (3.164) (2.780)
Observations 1497 1312 1497 1421
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
Robust standard errors clustered by country
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my expectations, this ﬁnding indicates that autocracies receive more economic
cooperation. However, in model 1 the regime type variable is not signiﬁcant.
Accordingly, at the ﬁrst sight, regime type does not seem to be a selection criterion
when the Chinese government decides to allocate economic cooperation projects.
This ﬁnding does not support hypothesis H2.
With reference to the compliance hypothesis H3, my results indicate that com-
pliance with Chinese interests signiﬁcantly increases the chance to receive economic
cooperation from China. However, only one indicator for compliance, adherence
to the `one China policy' is statistically signiﬁcant. The negative coeﬃcient of
the Taiwan dummy indicates that countries that recognize Taiwan have a lower
likelihood to receive economic cooperation from China. Also, the positive sign of
the UN variable suggests that voting in accordance with Chinese voting is likely
to be rewarded by Chinese economic cooperation, but the eﬀect is close to zero,
however. This ﬁnding supports my prediction that economic cooperation is used
by the Chinese government to reward compliance with its external interests.
However, it is important to note that the punishment for non-compliance or
for the recognition of Taiwan is not very strict. Most of the 263 observations in
the sample that did have diplomatic relations with Taiwan still received economic
cooperation from China. Only in 52 cases no economic cooperation was delivered
when Taiwan was recognized while 211 cases received economic cooperation even
though Taiwan was recognized.
These results are evidence in favor for my theoretical prediction that economic
cooperation is given to reward compliance, even though the ﬁnding also seems to
suggest that punishment or reward is transmitted more subtle through the quality
and volume of cooperation rather than through the decision to completely cease
cooperation.
Interestingly, a country's resource endowment seems to have no eﬀects on the
decision of the Chinese government to engage in projects of economic cooperation.
Both coeﬃcients of the resource variables are positive. Neither of the coeﬃcients
is signiﬁcant. Hypothesis H5 that Chinese cooperation targets at resource rich
countries is not supported.
Turning to the control variables of the gravity model, a counterintuitive ﬁnding
is the positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient of the distance variable. Despite its foreign
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policy agenda with its particular focus on regional integration, the further away
a country, the more likely it will receive Chinese economic cooperation. This
surprising ﬁnding is in line with similar results found by Dreher and Fuchs (2011)
when examining the distribution of Chinese aid projects between 1990 and 1995. It
suggests that the Chinese government, in contradiction to its low proﬁle rhetoric,
in fact does have aspirations to become a global player.
With respect to the remaining control variables, the negative sign of GDP in-
dicates that poor countries have a higher likelihood to receive Chinese economic
cooperation, and a country's income is a signiﬁcant predictor of whether the Chi-
nese government decides to allocate economic cooperation. This result is also
consistent with earlier ﬁndings (Dreher and Fuchs 2011; Berthélemy 2009). How-
ever, this ﬁnding is not exactly what I expected in table 4.1. Assuming that the
international status of a country is partly deﬁned by its income, my expectation
was that richer countries are more likely to become a target of Chinese economic
cooperation. As a consequence, it would be counterproductive to the realization
of China's foreign interests if the Chinese government avoided cooperating with
these countries. Empirically, this argumentation is not supported.
Against the background of the theoretical argument, a reason for the ﬁnding
that economic cooperation is targeted at poor countries could be that the Chinese
government is expecting that it is comparatively easy to convince governments
with few domestic resources to accept a policy deal. A government with higher
domestic resources at its disposal should have a better bargaining position and
therefore be able to demand more in return for compliance with Chinese interests.
The coeﬃcient of population is positive in model 1 which indicates that big
countries receive more economic cooperation, but it is not statistically signiﬁcant.
In a second step, this baseline model was enlarged. In model 2, I added the
three additional control variables introduced in section 4.1 to the model: military
transfers from China, bilateral trade volumes and a country's dependence on other
international donors. For reasons of collinearity, variable military transfers is
dropped by Stata and cannot be estimated in this model. None of the remaining
variables trade or OECD ODA is signiﬁcant. The positive coeﬃcient of trade
indicates that countries with higher bilateral trade volumes with China are more
likely to receive economic cooperation from China.
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With respect to the dependence on Western donors, the coeﬃcient of ODA from
Western donors is negative. My theoretical expectation was that countries that
are highly dependent on Western donors should be less targeted by the Chinese
government. Assuming that high aid dependency implies that a country is more
likely to be compliant with the donor's foreign policy objectives, the Chinese gov-
ernment should shy away from highly aid dependent countries. These countries
are diﬃcult to `win over' for a newly emerging donor such as China. The empirical
evidence suggests that this argumentation does hold.
When trade and aid dependence are added to the model, the eﬀect of the distance
variable loses its signiﬁcance.
In a next step, I relaxed the assumption that non-compliance is punished with
zero cooperation. Instead the dependent variable cooperation was recoded so that
also very low amounts of cooperation were treated as zero.
The underlying idea to introduce an alternative threshold for non-cooperation
other than zero is that non-compliance could also be punished with very low
amounts of cooperation rather than the complete withdrawal of cooperation. First
of all, it is plausible to assume that complete withdrawal is considered to be coun-
terproductive to the achievement of Chinese objectives. But keeping cooperation
on a very low level, so as to `safe face' seems a viable alternative. Second, noise
in the dependent variable could produce such an eﬀect. Recall that the data also
comprises projects ﬁnanced by third parties or the construction of Chinese diplo-
matic facilities abroad. Both could lead the Chinese statistic to show activities in
a country in which the Chinese government has decided not to allocate projects of
economic cooperation anymore. I assume that when the Chinese government is in
fact not willing to cooperate with a country, but wants to `safe face', the volume of
economic cooperation provided is small enough to be meaningless relative to the
country's own resources. Therefore, a threshold relative to a country's GDP was
chosen. Accordingly, in models 3 and 4 (fourth and ﬁfth columns in table 4.3), the
dependent variable is coded zero when Chinese economic cooperation does not ex-
ceed the threshold of 0.01% of the recipient's GDP. This threshold is considerably
lower than the medium (0.4% of GDP) or median (0.1% of GDP) amount in the
sample, so it can be considered a conservative threshold. Accordingly, 25% of the
observations are coded zero (against 8% when only `true zeros' are counted).
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In terms of results, this model 3 with the modiﬁed dependent variable delivers
quite interesting results. More speciﬁcally, the results diﬀer from those of the
previous models in the following respects:
First of all, when the assumptions of what deﬁnes intentional allocation deci-
sions are relaxed, the coeﬃcient of the autocracy dummy becomes signiﬁcant. Au-
tocratic countries are more often the target of those Chinese cooperation projects
that have a substantive weight relative to a country's overall resources. In line with
my prediction that autocracies are more likely to become partners for cooperation,
the Chinese government seems to speciﬁcally select autocracies to distribute eco-
nomic cooperation. Assuming that economic cooperation is only meaningful when
its volume exceeds a certain threshold, this ﬁnding supports hypothesis H2 that
autocracies are preferred targets for cooperation from China.
While the results of model 3 are very similar to the baseline model 1, the coef-
ﬁcient of the mineral wealth index now turns negative. The negative coeﬃcient of
the minerals index indicates that countries which received economic cooperation
projects were actually less rich in minerals or, to be more precisely, countries that
received economic cooperation were less active in mineral production. Recall that
the minerals index was composed of data on minerals production. This factor
could drive this ﬁnding, because a time lag is expected before one can observe a
correlation between economic cooperation and mineral production.
Also, two of the control variables yield diﬀerent results: The coeﬃcients of the
distance variable and of population which were positive in model 1 now become
negative. Diﬀerent from model 1, distance is not statistically signiﬁcant anymore,
but population (which was not signiﬁcant in model 1) becomes signiﬁcant. This
ﬁnding suggests that countries in China's regional vicinity and small countries are
more likely to receive projects of economic cooperation. While the former is now
in line with my theoretical expectation, the small country bias is not. However,
measuring Chinese engagement diﬀerently, Dreher and Fuchs (2011) also found a
small country bias in China's allocation of aid projects.
Finally, I added the three additional control variables, bilateral trade volumes,
military transfers and dependence on aid from Western donors to this model with
the modiﬁed dependent variable. Most surprisingly, it can be seen in model 4 (ﬁfth
column in table 4.3) that higher military transfers are correlated with the alloca-
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tion of economic cooperation projects. The coeﬃcient of military transfers was
positive and signiﬁcant. When countries receive military assistance, the chance is
signiﬁcantly increased that they will receive economic cooperation too. A possible
explanation for this ﬁnding could be that economic cooperation from China en-
ables governments to purchase military equipment, because it frees resources that
would otherwise have been spent diﬀerently.
Whether a country is selected as a cooperation partner is not dependent on
its trade relations with China. The coeﬃcient of the trade variable was positive,
but insigniﬁcant. And, in contrast to my theoretical expectations, the Chinese
decision to allocate economic cooperation is not determined by whether a country
has close linkages to Western donors in terms of aid ﬂows which is also reﬂected
in the coeﬃcient of the aid dependency variable that is very close to zero.
Finally, I checked the robustness of my ﬁndings by using a diﬀerent measure
to deﬁne whether a country is autocratic or not. In the models in table 4.4, the
autocracy dummy was replaced with Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003)'s alternative
measure of political regime type W and the size of the selectorate S.15 As can be
seen in model 5, the coeﬃcient of W is negative, but just as in the baseline model
1 in 4.3, the coeﬃcient is not signiﬁcant. The negative sign is in line with my
theoretical prediction, because more autocratic countries have lower values in this
indicator W. So, the coeﬃcient suggests that smaller winning coalitions are more
likely to be among the recipients of Chinese economic cooperation. However, when
the threshold of what was considered to be no economic cooperation was lifted to
above 0.01% of GDP, this coeﬃcient turned to become statsitically signiﬁcant only
when all control variables were added (model 8).
While the results of the remaining variables in the models 5 to 8 in table 4.4
were relatively similar to the previous models in table 4.3, there are two noteworthy
diﬀerences. In model 5, the coeﬃcient of population was positive and signiﬁcant
and the level of development in terms of GDP was insigniﬁcant. More interestingly,
in the fully speciﬁed model 8, the negative coeﬃcient of the minerals index is
signiﬁcant. This indicates that countries with fewer mineral resource production
were actually less likely to be among the recipients for economic cooperation.
Also, the negative coeﬃcient of the distance variable becomes signiﬁcant with
15In model 5 and 6, size of the selectorate S was dropped because of collineartiy.
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Table 4.4.: Probit regression of whether China provides economic cooperation to
non-OECD countries
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Economic cooperation Economic cooperation
Coop. > 0 Coop. > 0.01 % GDP
Winning size -0.137 -0.179 -0.677 -0.914*
(0.576) (0.559) (0.490) (0.506)
Selectorate size -0.094 0.170
(0.464) (0.412)
Dummy for dipl. rel. Taiwan -1.140*** -1.096*** -1.026*** -0.970***
(0.305) (0.294) (0.328) (0.353)
UN voting with China in % 0.004 0.005 0.008 0.007
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Proven oil reserves 0.022 0.018 0.008 0.008
in billion barrels (ln) (0.033) (0.036) (0.022) (0.022)
Mineral wealth index 2.356 1.676 -0.648 -0.753*
(1.543) (1.306) (0.453) (0.442)
Distance in km (ln) 0.591** 0.302 -0.182 -0.306*
(0.276) (0.257) (0.210) (0.180)
Population (ln) 0.269** 0.172 -0.048 -0.096
(0.115) (0.118) (0.101) (0.109)
GDP/c t-1 (ln) -0.200 -0.297 -0.459*** -0.457***
(0.145) (0.183) (0.129) (0.156)
Military transfers (ln) 0.035*
(0.020)
Bilateral trade (ln) 0.024 0.040
(0.034) (0.031)
ODA % of GDP -0.031 0.035
(0.053) (0.075)
Constant -5.822 -0.853 7.310** 8.934***
(3.832) (3.673) (3.000) (2.839)
Observations 940 830 1023 973
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
Robust standard errors clustered by country
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closer countries being more likely to recieve economic cooperation. Recall that
the variable for winning size W was only available until 2006. Therefore, the
regressions in table 4.4 can only cover a shorter period in time. Given this, it is
diﬃcult to judge what could explain these results. They could well be driven by
the shorter time frame or the slightly diﬀerent sample.
To summarize the result of this ﬁrst probit regression, I ﬁnd that there is empir-
ical evidence for hypothesis H2 that the Chinese government prefers autocracies
over democracies when it decides where to engage in projects of economic cooper-
ation. However, this ﬁnding is sensitive to the operationalization and speciﬁcation
of the model. It holds only when a certain threshold is introduced to deﬁne mean-
ingful economic cooperation as opposed to any economic cooperation.
Second, a robust ﬁnding is that the decision of whether a government receives
Chinese economic cooperation is taken on the basis of whether a government ad-
heres to China's key foreign policy interests. Hypothesis H3 is clearly supported.
Third, hypothesis H5 that the allocation of cooperation is driven by a country's
resource endowment is thus far not supported. There is even some empirical
evidence suggesting to reject this hypothesis.
Fourth, with respect to the control variables, poorer countries are more likely
to receive economic cooperation. Whether and how population size and distance
aﬀects the allocation decision does not become entirely clear from these ﬁrst pro-
bit regressions, but small and close countries appear to be more targeted and a
correlation with military transfers seems to exist when meaningful cooperation is
allocated.
It becomes clear that there are a number of inconsistencies in these ﬁrst ﬁndings.
Further investigation of China's economic cooperation is needed. In the following,
I complement my ﬁrst analysis with a second approach that shifts the attention
from the selection of cooperation partners to the allocation of Chinese economic
cooperation. Keeping my ﬁrst ﬁndings in mind, I now turn to the second question,
what determines how much economic cooperation a government receives? Recall
the prediction for this regression was that all else equal, autocracies should receive
less economic cooperation from China (H4) and countries with natural resources
should receive more economic cooperation (H5). Recall also that the empirical
test of this hypothesis is as much theory testing as exploring the determinants of
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China external behavior.
Therefore, in an explorative attempt, I used a simple cross-country design and a
tobit model to estimated the eﬀects of the independent variables on the amount of
Chinese economic cooperation. Using exactly the same independent variables as
before, I ran regressions for each year separately. Thus, I ran eleven regressions,
then I repeated the same procedure and ran a second series of regressions, but
exchanged the autocracy variable with the size of winning coalition W and the size
of the selectorate S. Then I graphed the coeﬃcients and their conﬁdence intervals
over time for all of the regressions.
This procedure, simple as it is, allows detecting variations in the strength of
speciﬁc coeﬃcients over time which is helpful given the introduction of the Chinese
`go out' policy during the period of observation. The results of this procedure are
graphed in ﬁgure 4.2 and 4.3. The graphs in ﬁgure 4.2 and ﬁrgure 4.3 show the
point estimates (the regression coeﬃcients) illustrated as dots and the respective
90% and 95% conﬁdence intervals (illustrated as vertical lines in thick and thin)
for each variable. When the vertical lines - that is the conﬁdence intervals do not
comprise the value of zero - coeﬃcients are considered signiﬁcant at the 10% and
the 5% level. The Y-axis displays the value of the coeﬃcients, the X-axis indicates
the respective year.
It becomes clear by eyeballing that for many variables the strength of their eﬀect
varies over time, so their impact on the amount of Chinese economic cooperation is
not constant over time, and some determinants have been decisive only in speciﬁc
years. Also, problems in the data which I have described earlier become apparent.
In 1998, the year with the most prevailing missing data, the graphed conﬁdence
intervals are considerably larger. Therefore, I interpret the results of the year 1998
with caution.16
Again I begin with the question whether or not the Chinese government prefers
cooperation with dictators. Do autocrats receive less economic cooperation from
China than democrats as was stated in hypothesis H4? Examining the ﬁrst graph
that shows the coeﬃcients of the autocracy dummy, it can be seen that the point
16In comparison to the estimation results in the appendix B.3, where missing values in the
dependent variable economic cooperation were not replaced by ipolation, but recoded as
zeros, the procedure of ipolating considerably decreased the volatility and the uncertainty of
the estimates.
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Figure 4.2.: Coeﬃcients and conﬁdence intervalls of the determinants of Chinese
economic cooperation over time, 1998-2008 (1).
estimates all lie above the zero line. The coeﬃcient is positive, indicating that
autocracies received more economic cooperation during this period. In 1998, 2005
and 2006 this correlation was statistically signiﬁcant at conventional signiﬁcance
levels. As indicated by the point estimate of around 1.8, in these years, coun-
tries that switched from democratic to autocratic regime type received on average
around 1.8% more economic cooperation from China.
This ﬁnding is robust when autocracy is replaced in the regression with the
size of the winning coalition W. As becomes evident in graph 2, the coeﬃcient of
winning coalition size W turns negative, indicating that smaller coalition systems
receive more economic cooperation.17 It follows a downward trend over time, and
in the later years, in 2005 and 2006, the same years in which autocracy seemed
17This graph is taken from the second series of regressions. All other graphs are taken from the
ﬁrst series.
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to play a determinant role this indicator is almost statistically signiﬁcant. This
ﬁnding suggests that regime type has gained in importance over the years and
that in recent times autocratic regimes received more economic cooperation than
their democratic fellows. Though consistent over both measures of regime type,
this result contradicts my theoretical expectation. According to hypothesis H4, I
expected that autocrats receive fewer transfers, because all else equal it should be
easier to convince autocratic leaders to respond to external interests. Hypothesis
H4 that autocracies should receive less economic cooperation is rejected.
Graph 3 delivers a very interesting picture of how the impact of oil resources has
developed over time. Until 2005, a country's oil reserves did not play a particular
role in the allocation of economic cooperation. The coeﬃcient itself was close to
zero - with the exception of the year 1998, in which it was actually even negative
and oil resources reduced the amount of economic cooperation a country would
receive. But from 2001 onwards, the role of oil has increased constantly and after
2005, a country's oil resources have become a signiﬁcant determinant of Chinese
economic cooperation. According to the coeﬃcient of around 2.5 in 2008, a 10%
increase in oil reserves increased economic cooperation from China by approxi-
mately 2.5%. This ﬁnding is in line with my theoretical expectation that resource
endowment increases the transfers a country receives. However, when resource
endowment is measured in terms of mineral wealth, the picture is mixed as graph
4 shows: The mineral wealth of a country is not decisive. The coeﬃcient has been
relatively stable around zero.
To sum up, in recent years Chinese economic cooperation has increased accord-
ing to the oil wealth of a country, while it was neutral with respect to mineral
wealth. So, hypothesis H5 that resource-rich countries receive more economic co-
operation is supported for recent years, but only with respect to a country's oil
reserves and not with respect to its mineral wealth.
Hypothesis H3 that compliance with Chinese interests is rewarded by Chinese
economic cooperation was tested by the inclusion of the dummy for diplomatic
relations with Taiwan and a countries' voting behavior in the UN . As illustrated
in graph 5, diplomatic relations certainly have the clearest impact on the amount
of Chinese economic cooperation a country receives. The dummy is negative and
signiﬁcant throughout the whole period even though the strength of the eﬀect
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varied somewhat. In 1998, for example, a government that switched its diplomatic
relations from the PRC to Taiwan, saw economic cooperation decreasing by more
than 5%, while in 2003 the same behavior was sanctioned with a reduction of only
roughly 3% of economic cooperation from China.
The eﬀect of the other compliant variable, a county's voting behavior in the UN
is less strong and was a signiﬁcant determinant only in speciﬁc years (2003 and
2004) where voting in line with China in an additional 1% of voting situations in
the UN General Assembly resulted in higher economic cooperation by China by
less than 0.1%. Both measures of compliance - diplomatic relations with Taiwan
and UN voting - support, albeit to varying degrees, the theoretical prediction
of hypothesis H3 that compliance with Chinese interests is rewarded by higher
transfers of resources.
Finally, the model contains a number of control variables, such as trade relations
or arms trade more speciﬁcally, the size of a country in terms of population, its
economic development and distance to Beijing. The coeﬃcients of these variables
are displayed in ﬁgure 4.3.
I tested whether China is especially active in countries that purchase Chinese
weapons (graph 7). But that was only the case in 2000. The coeﬃcient of military
transfers was almost always close to zero, but in this year, a 10% increase in
military transfers from China to a country was accompanied by on average 1%
higher ﬂows of economic cooperation.
Somewhat surprising, graph 8 shows that the eﬀect of bilateral trade relations
is relatively volatile. Overall, countries that trade more with China receive more
economic cooperation on average. In 2003 and 2004, this eﬀect was statistically
signiﬁcant even though the eﬀect was not very strong. An increase in bilateral trade
volumes of 10% was reﬂected in an increase of Chinese economic cooperation by
less than 1%.
Also somewhat unexpected, the level of development is a relatively strong, but
not very stable predictor for the amount of Chinese economic cooperation (graph
9). According to the overall trend, less developed countries receive more economic
cooperation, but only in 2003, 2004, 2006, and 2007 this eﬀect was statistically
signiﬁcant. An increase in GDP per capita of 10% resulted in 2004 in a reduc-
tion of China's engagement by approximately 10%. This ﬁnding suggests that the
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Figure 4.3.: Coeﬃcients and conﬁdence intervalls of the determinants of Chinese
economic cooperation over time, 1998-2008 (2).
allocation of economic cooperation is oriented towards the needy. This is in con-
tradiction with the theoretical argument as far as the theory would rather suggest
that the higher the development level or the bigger a country's own resources, the
more `expensive' it gets to make it comply with external interests and the more it
can demand in exchange for compliance.
As can be seen in graph 10, the eﬀect of population size was mixed throughout
the decade, with sometimes a negative, and sometimes a positive impact. Only in
1998 signiﬁcantlly more economic cooperation was allocated to bigger countries.
Moreover, grahp 11 indicates that the regional focus of the Chinese government
of where to allocate its economic cooperation was relatively stable oriented towards
its neighbors.Interestingly, in 2008 this became particularly strong. However, the
coeﬃcient was never signiﬁcant.
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Finally, from graph 12 it becomes evident, that in earlier years, Chinese economic
cooperation was allocated to countries that were targets of Western development
assistance. From 2004 onwards, however, countries with lower aid dependence
on the West received more economic cooperation. In the mid 2000s, aid depen-
dence signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced the allocation decision. This ﬁnding suggests that
while Chinese cooperation competed with Western inﬂuence in earlier years, a
new strategy was established from the mid 2000s onwards. Instead of competing
with Western donors, cooperation was now focused on countries where Western
inﬂuence was low and Western donors were less inﬂuencial.
4.4. Discussion of ﬁndings
In this chapter, I explored the determinants of China's economic cooperation and
tested several of my hypotheses. To conclude this investigation, I summarize
the ﬁndings from both regression analyses, discuss the results in the light of my
theoretical predictions and conclude what can be learned from the investigation
about China's engagement more generally.
Let me start with the most robust relationship which I detected between com-
pliance with Chinese foreign policy objectives and economic cooperation. Among
the most important determinants for economic cooperation is a country's relation
to Taiwan. Countries that do not acknowledge Taiwan diplomatically are more
likely to receive economic cooperation from China and the volume received also
tends to be higher. There seems to be a political conditionality of adherence to
the `one China' policy which is reﬂected in the allocation of economic cooperation.
However, non-compliance with this requirement does not necessarily lead to com-
plete withdrawal of Chinese economic cooperation. The Chinese strategy has been
to maintain cooperation at very low levels rather than cutting ties completely if a
country does not fully respond to Chinese interests.
Overall, this empirical evidence is in line with the theoretical prediction of hy-
pothesis H3. Cooperation is given in reward for compliance. The eﬀect of other
forms of compliance, such as voting behavior in the UN, was also consistent with
this prediction, even though it was found to be less strong. Voting in line with
China in the UN slightly increased the volume of economic cooperation projects in
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speciﬁc years, but did not impact on the chance to receive economic cooperation.
Furthermore, both types of regression analysis revealed a relation between regime
type and economic cooperation. Acknowledging that cooperation is meaningful
only when it exceeds a certain threshold, autocracies are more likely to be ad-
dressed by Chinese economic cooperation. Moreover, the empirical evidence sug-
gests that regime type has become more important over time. Autocracies received
signiﬁcantly higher amounts of economic cooperation in recent years. This ﬁnding
supports the theoretical prediction stated in hypothesis H2 that autocracies should
be a preferred partner for cooperation.
With respect to hypothesis H4 that fewer transfers of resources go to autocracies,
the conclusion is less clear. Obviously, H4 is rejected, because autocracies received
more rather than less economic cooperation. The possible implications that follow
from this rejection of H4, however, could point in two diﬀerent directions.
On the one hand, the ﬁnding that autocracies receive more transfers could be
driven by the measurement of Chinese cooperation. Variable economic cooperation
may simply not capture what it was supposed to measure. Given the composition
of this variable which comprises projects ﬁnanced by the Chinese government as
well as commercial investments, it is quite possible that this data is less a mea-
surement of `transfers' between two governments that it was thought to be than
of commercially driven investment projects.
If this is the case, the fact that autocracies received more economic cooperation
would indicate that it is easier for Chinese investors to make arrangements in au-
tocracies than in democracies. If Chinese investments and economic cooperation
is allocated to autocracies because there are fewer administrative regulations, en-
vironmental standards or time-consuming participatory processes in autocracies
than in democracies, Chinese companies beneﬁt from the fact that arrangements
are made in a more discretionary way in autocratically governed countries. As a
consequence, even though rejecting one speciﬁc hypothesis, the empirical ﬁnding
would still support the overall argument that autocracies are easier to be inﬂuenced
and exploited from outside.
However, interpreted diﬀerently, the rejection of H1 could also point at a weak-
ness in the overall argument. If the ﬁnding was not driven because of measurement
issues, but because it is more diﬃcult to convince autocratic leaders to comply with
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external interests, then a core assumption of the theoretical argument was chal-
lenged. In this sense, the rejection of H4 raises the question whether autocracies
are indeed easier to exploit than democracies as was assumed in hypothesis H1.
Clearly, this is a valid objection which needs more attention. I will dedicate the
case studies in the later parts of this thesis to qualitatively investigate this question
in more detail.
As to hypothesis H5, the allocation of Chinese economic cooperation seems to
be less guided by resource endowment than expected. The theoretical prediction of
hypothesis H5 that economic cooperation follows natural resources is only partly
supported. It depends on the type of natural resources and on the time frame.
The decision whether to cooperate or not is not primarily guided by the resource
endowment of a country. Chinese economic cooperation is given to a wide range
of countries that are not necessarily attractive in terms of their natural resource
endowment. However, the importance of resources has clearly increased over time.
In recent years, countries that do have oil reserves have received systematically
more economic cooperation than others.
With respect to the other determinants, a country's economic development
seems to be the strongest and most stable predictor with poor countries being
more likely to be addressed by Chinese economic cooperation projects and also to
receive higher volumes on average. So, Chinese economic cooperation seems to be
oriented along the needs of the recipients rather than being oriented solely along
the interests of the Chinese government.
Furthermore, the impact of military transfers and trade more generally on the
allocation of economic cooperation is mixed. It has inﬂuenced the allocation deci-
sion only occasionally while classical determinants such as distance and population
play a much less prominent and less distinct role than one would naturally assume.
More precisely, smaller countries are more likely to become recipients of projects
of economic cooperation of meaningful size. However, population size does not
seem to systematically determine the size of economic cooperation projects.
Overall, the previous exploration of the data delivers some useful insights as
to the determinants of the provision of China's economic cooperation. Most re-
markably, I found only few clear and stable predictors for the provision of Chinese
economic cooperation that hold throughout the entire period. Some patterns in
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the data also pointed to the need for more investigation in the data collection and
for improvements in data quality.
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survival
In this chapter, I will assess the impact of China's rise on the longevity of autocratic
regimes. Hypothesis H6 stated that cooperation with China is expected to increase
autocratic survival. By the means of a survival analysis covering all non-democratic
countries, I will test this claim in a quantitative analysis for the post-Cold War
period.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.1 begins with
deﬁning what is understood by autocratic survival and how this concept can be
measured. It then explains how Chinese cooperation can be measured and presents
a number of alternative determinants for autocratic longevity which will be in-
cluded in the model as control variables.
In section 5.2, I describe the data and in section 5.3 I explain the estimation
procedure. The actual analysis and their results are presented in section 5.4 along
with a number of robustness tests. I conclude this chapter with a discussion of the
ﬁndings in section 5.5.
5.1. Concept speciﬁcation and operationalization
Autocratic survival
Since H6 makes a proposition on China's impact on the survival of other autocrats,
it is crucial to deﬁne what is understood by autocratic survival. First of all, I deﬁne
the term `survival' as a yes or no answer to the question whether an autocrat stays
in power from one year to the next. That is, whether he remains in power or
not. When an autocrat remains in power, he `survives'; when he is removed from
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power, he `falls' or `fails'.
But what precisely is meant by `autocratic survival' is a more diﬃcult concept
to address in a clear-cut manner. Does it denote the survival of an individual or
the survival of a regime? To ﬁnd an appropriate operationalization, it is helpful to
consider how others who worked on similar questions have proceeded. In principal,
three ways of operationalization have been suggested: 1) a more structural; 2) a
more actor-centred; and 3) a coalition-centred one.
The structural perspective measures regime durability indirectly through regime
change. In its measurement of regime change it is most often based on the Polity in-
dex (Smith 2004; Morrison 2009; Ulfelder 2007; Gandhi 2008). This structural op-
erationalization is relatively crude, because only when heavy institutional changes
occur during a short period of time this is perceived as regime change and as a
regime failure respectively.1 But when the institutions of a country change grad-
ually over a longer period from autocratic to democratic or the other way round,
this is not captured. As a consequence, this measure is not sensitive for slower,
incremental changes in regimes.
The actor-centred perspective, in contrast, is based on change in governments or
leaders and perceives individual leaders to `fail' whenever they are removed from
oﬃce and to survive otherwise (Przeworski et al. 2000; Bueno de Mesquita et al.
2003; Goemans et al. 2009; Cheibub et al. 2010; Mesquita and Smith 2010). But
just as the structural approach might underestimate the incident of autocratic
fall by overlooking regime changes which are not quick enough or do not aﬀect
existent insitutions strong enough, looking at actor-centred leadership changes also
encompasses the potential of a bias. This is because individual leadership turnover
may denote the fall of a speciﬁc dictator, but it does not necessarily indicate the
collapse of a speciﬁc dictatorship or regime. In monarchies, for example, where
the succession is determined by heredity, leadership succession after the monarch
dies does not implicate that the dictatorship as such has failed.
1This refers to a operationalization on the base of Polity IV's durable variable which counts
the age of a regime and is coded `0' whenever regime change occurs (Marshall and Jaggers
2008). Regime change is deﬁned by a three point change in the polity score over a period
of three years or less or the end of a transition period deﬁned by the lack of stable political
institutions (denoted by a standardized authority score). Regime failure can then easily be
coded `1' for each year subsequent to a year in which a regime change occurred.
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Moreover, a number of non-monarchic dictatorships, for example in China or
Mexico during the Cold War, have developed considerable routine with respect to
leadership transition and have therefore dramatically increased the frequency of
leadership turnovers without substantial changes to the regimes governing these
countries. For this reason, it is actually an indication for the durability of a
regime - especially in autocracies - when leadership transitions are both smooth
and frequent. For example, the timing for leadership turnover in China has become
scheduled by internal rules such as age restrictions.2 These have lead to shorter
tenures for the party leaders and more frequent leadership turnovers to party-bred
successors. With the next leadership turnover to be expected in 2012, the tenures
of Hu Jintao and Jiang Zemin, the fourth and third leadership generations in
China, have been limited to two ﬁve-years terms against 16 years of rule under
Deng Xiaoping and 27 years of dictatorship under Mao Zedong. However, these
leadership turnovers are far from indicating the collapse of the party's rule. Hence,
it would be misleading to conclude that the increased frequency of transition of
power from one leadership generation to the next is a sign of weak durability of the
CCP 's rule. As a result of this, unless a good instrument to account for the degree
of institutionalization is found, using the turnover of leaders as such to measure
autocratic durability is questionable.3
The third approach, the coalition-centred approach is a novelty. It builds on
leader-based data, but tries to correct for the above mentioned shortcomings by
identifying whether a leader belongs to the ruling coalition when coming to power
or not, thus whether he is politically aﬃliated with the previous leaders or not
(Svolik 2010). This approach tries to account for the eﬀect of autocratic insti-
tutions which are likely to inﬂuence the survival of individual autocratic leaders
and therefore might bias the ﬁndings. However, a ﬁnal inaccuracy in measurement
2Another classical example of internally regulated leadership turnover is Mexico, where an
autocratic regime endured from the 1940s until the 1990s. Here, a core element of the highly
institutionalized authoritarian regime consisted in a succession mechanism , which restricted
the president's time in power to one electoral cycle of 6 years. At the end of each cycle, the
president had the privilege to nominate his successor, an arrangement which gave continuity
to the regime (Faust 2007b, 322).
3Another objection is that theoretically, regime transitions do not need to involve leadership
turnover, but could occur during the incumbency of one leader. Przeworski et al. (2000) for
example observed in total ﬁfty-four regime changes (in 141 countries) under one incumbent
in the period from 1950-1990.
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remains, in cases when leaders from the same political aﬃliation compete over
power or when leader change happens unconstitutionally.
As has been mentioned in 4.1, I use Svolik (2010)'s dataset on power and in-
stitutions in autocracies to test whether China is a cause of autocratic longevity.
Based on Przeworski et al.'s collection of individual leaders' entries to and exits
from power, this data set also contains information on the political aﬃliation of
leaders in autocratic countries. Therefore, it gives me the possibility to investigate
both the survival of individual leaders in power and the duration of authoritarian
ruling coalitions. Variable leaderfall is coded `1' whenever a leader change occurs
in the following year. Following Svolik, I consider an autocratic coalition to fail
whenever a leader coming to power is unrelated to the government, a government
party, the royal or ruling family, or a military junta under the previous authori-
tarian leader. Variable coalitionfall is coded `1' when both a leader change occurs
and Svolik's political aﬃliation variable indicates that the new leader has no po-
litical aﬃliation to the previous regime. If one of the conditions does not hold
coalitionfall is coded `0'.
Independent and control variables
Having discussed the dependent variable autocratic survival, I will now turn to the
presentation of the independent and control variables. Most importantly, I will
present three alternative measures of Chinese cooperation. In addition to that, a
number of variables will be presented which have been discussed in the literature
as being determinants for autocratic durability. They are therefore included in the
model to account for potential alternative explanations of autocratic survival.
Autocratic cooperation: Hypothesis H6 expects that cooperation with China
increases the survival propensity of autocrats. This claim will be tested for
three cooperation variables. The determinant of interest is the intensity of
bilateral cooperation with China with respect to the following three variables.
1. Economic cooperation: The economic cooperation variable from section
4.1 is transformed to a relative measure. It will be included in the
analysis as economic cooperation in % of GDP.4
4The formula of transformation was: (economic cooperation/GDP)*100
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2. Trade: Bilateral trade with China is measured as percentage of a coun-
try's total trade (trade % of total trade).5
3. Diplomacy: `Prestige diplomacy' makes a substantial contribution to
China's foreign policy. My variable diplomacy measures this diplomatic
linkage. It is a categorical variable indicating the frequency of high
level visits between China and a given country. I compiled this variable
from the `China aktuell' monthly Data supplement6 which, based on
several Chinese newspapers, enlists all Chinese agreements with foreign
countries and thereby also gives detailed information on the statesmen
signing or announcing these agreements.7 The diplomacy variable was
normalized to range from 0 to 1 by subtracting the minimum value and
then dividing by the maximum value.
Moreover, a number of alternative explanations for regime stability have been
identiﬁed in the literature. In order to control for these potential explanations, I
incorporate several control variables on which I will elaborate in the following and
which are summarized in table 5.1. All data sources are listed in appendix A.
Economic development and wealth: The correlation between regime type and
economic development is one of the most robust ones that has been found
in literature on democratization (Barro 1999; Boix and Stokes 2003). The
natural logarithm of GDP per capita lagged by one period is included as a
control variable (GDP/ct−1(ln)). This variable is taken from the Penn World
Table (Heston et al. 2011).
Economic growth: According to the selectorate theory, the continuous inﬂow of
resources for redistribution among the coalition members is of utmost impor-
tance. This relationship has also empirically been shown by earlier research
5Trade shares have been calculated as: (bilateral trade/total trade)*100
6See Liu (1994) and in later years.
7Since the source explicitly refers to accomplished agreements there is a risk of underreport-
ing bilateral visits without any agreements. However, to the extent that China's prestige
diplomacy strategically announces bilateral agreements during high level visits even when
the documents have been signed long beforehand, this bias should be small. Bilateral agree-
ments as such would be a compelling indicator, but the data source does not allow for a
diﬀerentiation between diﬀerent types of agreements and their varying legal implications.
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which indicated that the likelihood to survive economic crises diﬀers among
diﬀerent regime types (Przeworski and Limongi 1997). Economic growth
must thus be considered as a determinant for autocratic survival. Economic
growth, measured as GDP growth lagged by one period accounts for this
(GDP growtht−1).8
Non-tax revenues: Several studies have examined the impact of resource abun-
dance on regime type, and regime stability more speciﬁcally. The ﬁnding
was that oil or other non-tax revenues increase survival expectancies of a
government (Ross 2001; Smith 2004; Morrison 2009; Mesquita and Smith
2010). To control for this phenomenon, I include two alternative measures
of non-tax revenues besides economic cooperation from China: oil revenue
(% GDP) and ODA (% GDP). Both variables measure resource income as a
percentage of GDP. Oil revenue is taken from Ross (2008), but unfortunately
contains data up to 2006 only.9
OECD ODA was taken from the OECD DAC database (Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development 2010). Because this database con-
tains only those countries which receive development assistance, missing val-
ues for all other countries were replaced by zero.10
Autocratic fall in the region: Diﬀusion theory has stressed the spatial depen-
dence of autocratic collapse and democratization. Countries are more likely
to experience regime change when neighboring countries undergo regime
transformation as well (Gleditsch and Ward 2006; Brinks and Coppedge
2006; Simmons and Elkins 2004; Levitsky and Way 2005; Leeson and Dean
2009). I account for this correlation by including a variable that measures
how many of a country's neighbors experience autocratic collapse in a given
year. Variable autocratic fall in the region expresses the number of auto-
cratic falls as relative to a country's total neighbors. In order to identify
a country's neighbors, I used the direct contiguity data (Correlates of War
8Growth was calculated according to the following formula:GDPt −GDPt−1/GDPt−1 ∗ 100
9Ross' oil rents variable was transformed according to the following formula: (oil
rents/GDP)*100
10ODA as set in relation to GDP according to the following formula: ODA/GDP*100
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Project 2007).
Social interaction: Several variables that are connected to social interaction and
collective action have been discussed in the past as determinants for the
stability of political regimes. It has been reasoned that rapid urbanization
rates destabilize political regimes (Huntington 1968). Urbanization is often
driven by precarious living conditions in the countryside which stimulate
rural dwellers to search for a better living in the cities. However, when it
happens quickly, urban areas become a catchment basin for the desperate
often ﬁnding themselves even deeper in poverty than before. This happens
for instance when the number of often poorly educated newcomers pouring
into the cities is higher than what the urban labor market can absorb. Such
situations create a potential for urban mass protests.
Another plausible reason for urban protests challenging the regime could be
that people living closer together are better able to organize which also ex-
plains why political actors tend to be more responsive to the vested interests
of the urban middle classes at the cost of the development of the overall
country and the rural population (Lipton 1977). Closely connected to the
former argument, this would suggest that it is population density rather
than urbanization which is crucial. However, more scattered populations are
also more diﬃcult to control, as are populations that are great in number
(Fearon and Laitin 2003; Herbst 2000). Theoretically as well as empirically,
there is evidence for and against the destabilizing mechanism of urbanization
rates, population density and population size. Therefore, I take the natural
logarithm of population density (population density (ln)), of population size
population (ln) and the annual growth rate of population living in urban
areas (urban growth) as reported by the World Bank (2010) and let the data
speak.11
Regime type: Researchers working on autocratic durability have argued that au-
tocratic regimes vary in their ability to institutionalize internal interaction
11Others even suggest to also include a country's area in km2, but I encounter massive problems
of multi collinearity when doing so.
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and to transfer power to the next leadership generation (Gandhi and Prze-
worski 2006; Geddes 1999a; Hadenius 2007). This is the reason why diﬀerent
types of autocracies have been found to vary in their survival expectation
(Gandhi and Przeworski 2006; Geddes 1999b). Therefore, it seems sensible
to include a measure for regime type. Cheibub et al.'s regime variable which
distinguishes between civilian dictatorship, military dictatorship and royal
dictatorship (Cheibub et al. 2010) delivers a ﬁrst starting point. A dummy
for each of the categories was constructed. For reasons of collinearity, how-
ever, only one of which, military dictatorship, is introduced in the regression.
Time in oﬃce: It has been found, that freshly installed leaders are more prone
to be overthrown and have thus a shorter survival expectation (Bueno de
Mesquita et al. 2003). Time in oﬃce signiﬁcantly increases the survival
expectation of an autocrat. I account for this fact by including the durability
of a ruling coalition as a control variable. Variable age of coalition (in years)
is also used to construct cubic time splines which are needed for technical
reasons as described in section 5.3.
Previous coalition durability: From a methodological perspective, it seems plau-
sible to assume a certain path-dependency. The survival duration of a regime
or leader might be aﬀected by the survival duration of previous governments.
I follow Beck et al. (1998) and include variable previous failures counting the
number of previous failures under autocratic rule (Beck et al. 1998; Gleditsch
2008; Goemans et al. 2009).
Table 5.1 summarizes all independent and control variables and their expected
eﬀects on autocratic survival. Because survival expectations are expressed as the
probability to fail, negative signs in the table indicate a reduction of the risk to fall,
thus a stabilizing eﬀect. According to my theoretical argument, all three coopera-
tion variables should have a stabilizing impact on autocratic survival. Cooperation
is expected to generate beneﬁts which then can be redistributed among the dicta-
tor's winning coalition and thereby should enforce loyalty among the members of
this group to the ruler.
All three variables connected to a government's income, GDP growth, oil rev-
enue and OECD development aid should stabilize autocratic rule. The very same
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distributional mechanism as described above should come at work when income is
generated through these sources.
Table 5.1.: Expected inﬂuence of the independent variables on the risk of failure
of the ruling coalition or leader.
Concept Variable Expected eﬀect
Cooperation Economic cooperation -
Cooperation Trade -
Cooperation Diplomacy -
Age of coalition/leader Age -
Previous stability Previous falls -
Economic development GDP/c (ln) -
Economic development GDP growth -
Socioeconomic factors Population (ln) +/-
Socioeconomic factors Population density +/-
Socioeconomic factors Urban growth +
Regime type Military +
Non-tax revenue OECD ODA -
Non-tax revenue Oil revenue -
Diﬀusion eﬀects Coalition/leader fall in region +
Economic development is also expected to have a stabilizing eﬀect on autocratic
rule. This expectation may appear counterintuitive at the ﬁrst sight, because of
the correlation of development and democracy. However, I am not investigating
whether it is more or less likely that an autocracy democratizes, but the likelihood
that it remains under stable rule in more general. When comparing autocracies
with low developed level and autocracies which have reached a high level of de-
velopment, it clearly seems plausible to assume that leaders in autocracies with a
highly developed economy should be more capable to remain in power. In light of
earlier research that found military leaders to be more vulnerable to be overthrown,
the military dummy should have a destabilizing eﬀect on autocratic durability.
Urbanization should have a destabilizing eﬀect on the longevity of autocracies.
As has been discussed earlier, rapid urbanization increases the potential for mass
protests that could challenge the regime. From a theoretical perspective it is not
entirely clear in which direction the size of population and population density
works and whether these variables have a destabilizing or rather stabilizing eﬀect
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on autocratic rule.
Also, the history of an autocracy should play a role. I expect that the experience
of previous autocratic rulers matters. The higher the frequency of previous changes
in leadership, the lower the chance of the present ruler to remain in power. Finally,
autocrats are expected to be most vulnerable in their early years in power. Over the
years, they are more successful in identifying the relevant members of their winning
coalitions and can establishing eﬃcient mechanisms to reward these members.
When the welfare of these members is tied to the survival of the regime, an autocrat
has successfully strengthened his position in power. Since all this takes time, the
age of autocratic rule should stabilize autocracies.
5.2. Sample and descriptive statistics
In this section I describe my data and methodology before discussing the esti-
mation results. I limit the description to the dependent and the most important
independent variables: the cooperation variables. Descriptive statistics for all in-
dependent variables are shown in table 5.2.
The main interest in this part is to investigate how Chinese cooperation impacts
on the survival of autocracies. The data of all survival regressions is time-series
data with country years as the unit of observation and a binary dependent vari-
able: autocratic survival or failure. For reasons of data availability with respect
to the economic cooperation variable, the analysis of this form of cooperation can
only cover the relatively short period from 1998 to 2008. However, studies on the
survival of autocrats reveal that autocrats enjoy a relative long survival expecta-
tion, some even stayed in power for more than 44 years (Przeworski et al. 2000, p.
51). Given this ﬁnding and the need for a longer period of examination in order
to increase variance on the dependent variable, a second regression for the whole
post-Cold War period from 1990 onwards is run without the economic cooperation
variable.
The sample comprises only autocracies as deﬁned by the binary variable autoc-
racy introduced in 4.1. Recall, this measure deﬁned countries to be autocratic
when they fail to meet either of the following two criteria: free and competitive
legislative elections and an executive elected either directly in free and competi-
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Table 5.2.: Summary statistics 1992-2008
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Leader fall 0.09 0.28 0 1 1201
Age of leader in years 12.11 10.11 1 48 1201
Coalitionfall 0.02 0.14 0 1 1201
Age of coalition in years 23.53 16.28 1 63 1201
Chinese ecomomic
cooperation (% GDP) 0.5 0.93 0 10.12 684
Trade with China
(% of total trade) 5.06 6.42 0 55.16 1115
No of diplomatic meetings 0.08 0.21 0 1 1201
GDP/c t-1 (ln) 7.94 1.32 5.05 11.72 1158
GDP growth (t-1) 2.75 10.15 -64.56 122.24 1149
Population (ln) 15.65 1.67 11.19 19.15 1170
OECD ODA (% GDP) 2.2 3.96 -0.4 54.93 1165
Population density (ln) 3.87 1.33 0.71 8.85 1183
Military dictatorship 0.3 0.46 0 1 1201
Urban growth 3.2 2.13 -2.45 20.01 1175
Oil revenue (% GDP) 9.39 28.24 0 370.17 1004
tive presidential elections or indirectly by a legislature in parliamentary systems.
Periods of foreign occupation, civil war or the collapse of state authority are ex-
cluded from the sample.12 Section C.1 in the appendix contains a complete list of
the sample composition. This list also diﬀerentiates between the lenght of ruling
coalitions and the survival duration of individual leaders.
A ﬁrst glance at the raw data delivers the following picture: For each year in
the post-Cold War period starting in 1992, there are between 62 and 81 countries
in the sample.13 With the country year being the unit of observation there are
1201 observations in the sample for the whole period from 1992 onwards. For the
period from 1997 onwards, during which data on China's economic cooperation
is available, there are 754 observations in the sample.14 One dictatorship, North
12According to Svolik (2011a) they were excluded from the dataset on the base of the Polity IV
(Marshall and Jaggers 2008) and the Correlates of War (Sarkees 2000) datasets in order to
identify periods of foreign occupation, the collapse of state authority, and civil war.
13I deﬁne the Cold War period as ending with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.
14Excluded from the original sample are the PRC, Taiwan, and Tuvalu. The latter is excluded
because information on the political aﬃliation of the leaders is missing.
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Korea, drops out because of missing data for almost all variables including the
main variables economic cooperation and trade with China.
In terms of leader based data, the dictatorships in the sample were ruled by
167 diﬀerent leaders. Of these 167 leaders, 105 failed and 62 remained in oﬃce
until 2008. At the level of observation units - the country year - this failure rate
corresponds to 9% of the observations. For the period from 1997 onwards, there
were 134 diﬀerent leaders in power and 72 of these leaders failed. This corresponds
to a failure rate of 9.5%.
The post-Cold War period contains 87 diﬀerent coalitions, 25 of which failed.
For the shorter period from 1997 onwards, the number of coalitions is 79 with 17
failures. Again, 62 coalitions are censored, that is they continue to exist when the
period of investigation ended in 2008. With only 2% the rate of coalition failure
after the end of the Cold War is much lower than that of leader failure.
Figure 5.1.: Frequency and duration of coaltitions and leaders, 1992-2008
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But the failure of coalitions and leaders does not only diﬀer in its frequency. It
can also been observed that, on average, coalitions grow older than leaders before
they collapse. As can be seen in ﬁgure 5.1, coalition duration in the sample ranges
from 1 to 63 years, while the leader with the longest tenure remained in oﬃce less
than 50 years. However, for both coalitions and leaders duration is skewed: almost
30% of coalitions are 10 years or younger, in the group of leaders less than 50%
reach the age of 10 years. Given this age distribution, it comes as no surprise that
the bulk of failures happens in the early years: Half of those coalitions and leaders
that collapsed, did so before they reached their sixth year.
In addition to table 5.2, ﬁgure 5.2 gives an impression on how economic cooper-
ation from China and trade with China have developed during the post-Cold War
period and how economic cooperation and trade is distributed over the sample.
Note that the graphs were produced on the base of average values over time and
over the countries in the sample. This explains the divergence between the abso-
lute maximum and minimum values in table 5.2. As can be seen in graph 1 and 2,
China's economic cooperation as share of the recipient's GDP and bilateral trade
shares with China as share of total trade volumes have been increasing over time
on average. In 1998, Chinese economic cooperation accounted for around 0.3%
of GDP on average. This number fell slightly between 1999 and 2002, before it
continued to increase.
In 2008, the level of Chinese cooperation had reached on average more than 1%
of GDP, but even though the growth rates of Chinese economic cooperation look
impressive, it should be noted that in absolute terms this is still a relatively minor
source of income. Also, as shown in graph 2, average ﬁgures of the countries reveal
that in the vast majority of countries that received Chinese economic cooperation
from 1998 to 2008, it accounted for less than 0.5% of GDP. Only in two countries,
Guinea-Bissau and Zimbabwe, the received amount of Chinese economic coopera-
tion reached more than three percent of GDP on average. With more than 10%
of GDP in 1999, Guinea-Bissau had the highest aid dependence on China in the
sample.
With respect to bilateral trade, a similar picture can be observed. From 1996
onwards, trade with China has increased in relation to the total trade of China's
trade partners from less than 4% to more than 10% on average. More striking is
94
5.2. Sample and descriptive statistics
the distribution of trade shares as illustrated in graph 4 in ﬁgure 5.2. Again, for
the great majority of countries, trade with China reached only up to 5% of total
trade on average. Less than one fourth of the countries in the sample, exchanged
more than 10% on average of total trade with China. However, Sudan faced a
trade dependency on China which was more than ten times higher as that of the
average. With 55% it had the highest trade share with China in the sample in
2007.
Figure 5.2.: Average amount of Chinese economic cooperation (as percentage of
GDP) by year and country and average bilateral trade with China (as
share of total trade) by year and country.
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5.3. Estimation procedure
Having taken a brief look on the data, the estimation procedure for the survival
analysis is brieﬂy introduced in this section. The data is right censored15 and time-
discrete with country years as the unit of observation. Such type of data is usually
known as event history data where the analyst is interested in examining the time
until an `event' or `failure' occurs. In event or survival analysis, an observation is
considered to `survive' or to be `at risk' until the event occurs or the observation
fails respectively. Most often, the analysis models and estimates the so called
`hazard' rate. The hazard rate is the probability that an event occurs at a given
point in time, given that it has not yet occurred (Box-Steﬀensmeier and Jones
1997).
Beck et al. (1998) argue that most binary data analyses in political sciences in
which the interval of observing the data is usually extended to one year qualify as
grouped duration data. They show that for such kind of binary time-series-cross-
section (BTSCS) data, applying a simple logit regression with time dummies or
splines in order to account for time dependencies is appropriate and makes the
analysis identical to other survival analysis techniques (Beck et al. 1998).16 `There
appears to be little if any cost then to use the more familiar logit link. It is well
understood by researchers, is estimable with any software package, does not require
learning new methods (generalized linear models), and most importantly, can be
extended easily in a variety of interesting ways' (Beck et al. 1998, 1268).
It is important to note that time dependence in the data could imply that the
hazard rate may not be constant, but vary over time. For example, earlier work has
shown that it is most diﬃcult for leaders to defend their position in power when
they are freshly installed, but with the time in oﬃce, their risk to fail decreases
(Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). Hence, the hazard rate may be dependent on
the time, but it is not necessarily assumed that this relationship is linear. To
account for this potential time dependency in the model, Beck et al. (1998) suggest
including time dummies or splines in the model speciﬁcation unless a standard
likelihood test indicates that the observations are temporally independent.
15Right censoring means the survival time is not exactly knwon, because the event is not observed
before the period of observation ends.
16See also (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2008, chapter 8)
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5.4. Does Chinese cooperation impact on
autocratic survival?
This analysis explores the eﬀect of cooperation with China on autocratic survival.
The results of my BTSCS logit regressions are presented in table 5.3. First, I
estimated the eﬀect of the cooperation variables on the likelihood for leaders to
fail (models 1 and 2), then I exchanged the dependent variable and used ruling
coalitions instead (models 3 and 4). For each measurement of autocratic survival
I ran two regressions: one with all cooperation variables for the period from 1997
onwards (models 1 and 3), and one with a longer time frame which contains only
trade and diplomatic exchange (models 2 and 4). All models were estimated with
robust standard errors clustered by countries to account for the likely possibility
that observations in one country are more similar than observations across diﬀerent
countries. Models 1 and 3 do not include time splines or a cubic polynomial
to model the time dependence in the data because likelihood-ratio tests rejected
their inclusion. Negative coeﬃcients indicate that a variable's eﬀect decreases the
likelihood of failure, because the dependent variables leaderfall and coaltionfall
respectively take on the value `1' when failure occurs.
My major ﬁndings are that trade with China increases the survival propensity
of autocratic leaders, while diplomatic relations with China and Chinese economic
cooperation do not aﬀect the time a leader remains in power. In the models 1
and 2 the coeﬃcients of trade are negative and statistically signiﬁcant at the 5%
level. Even though pointing in the expected negative direction, the coeﬃcients of
diplomacy and economic cooperation are not signiﬁcant and they do not seem to
have any eﬀect on the survival of autocratic leaders.
With respect to the survival of ruling coalitions, I do not ﬁnd that cooperation
with China has any impact on their duration. Even though all cooperation coeﬃ-
cients in the ruling coalition regressions (model 3 and 4) are negative, they are all
insigniﬁcant.
It is not straightforward to interpret the estimation coeﬃcients. The estimation
coeﬃcients express the eﬀect on the probability of failure. Therefore, a substantive
interpretation of how much trade relations with China matter for the survival of an
autocracy can only be reached by concrete examples. In order to provide a better
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Table 5.3.: BTSCS logit regression on leaderfall and coalitionfall
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Leaderfall Coalitionfall
1998-2008 1991-2008 1998-2008 1991-2008
Ecomomic coop. (% GDP) -0.125 -0.039
(0.185) (0.205)
No of diplomatic meetings -0.502 -0.677 -0.432 -0.774
(0.676) (0.595) (1.655) (1.433)
Trade (% of total trade) -0.062** -0.054** -0.095 -0.062
(0.026) (0.024) (0.068) (0.057)
GDP/c t-1 (ln) -0.298*** -0.366*** -0.433 -0.767***
(0.113) (0.102) (0.304) (0.272)
GDP growth (t-1) -0.010 -0.007 -0.016 -0.002
(0.012) (0.009) (0.014) (0.011)
Population (ln) -0.077 -0.094 0.220 0.005
(0.111) (0.089) (0.270) (0.211)
Population density (ln) 0.067 0.090 0.187 0.399**
(0.147) (0.112) (0.296) (0.168)
Military dictatorship -0.521 -0.800*** -0.473 -0.333
(0.345) (0.286) (0.710) (0.461)
No of previous failures 0.410* 0.132
(0.245) (0.114)
Age of coalition in years -0.025 -0.158
(0.024) (0.122)
Time spline 1 1.319
(1.248)
Time spline 2 -1.838
(1.770)
No of previous failures 0.164* 0.207***
(0.088) (0.060)
Age of leader in years 0.022 0.307**
(0.018) (0.145)
Time spline 1 -4.620**
(1.960)
Time spline 2 5.790**
(2.426)
Constant 0.868 0.566 -4.064 1.233
(2.434) (1.973) (6.072) (4.524)
Observations 647 1072 647 1072
ll -178.733 -284.617 -59.584 -97.058
chi2 19 69 51 74
Standard errors in parentheses. BTSCS logit estimation with robust standard errors
grouped by country. * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
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understanding of the regression results, I ran two simulations and calculated the
predicted probabilities of leader failure when all variables were ﬁxed to a given
value except for trade. Figure 5.3 illustrates how a leader's likelihood to be disposed
is reduced when the volume of bilateral trade with China in relation to a country's
overall trade is increased. The probability to fall is displayed on the Y-axis; the
X-axis depicts the share of economic cooperation with China and of a country's
trade with China respectively. The line describes the relation between increasing
amounts of trade and the decreasing probability to fail. The area between the
dotted lines constitutes the 95% conﬁdence interval.
Figure 5.3.: The eﬀect of trade on the likelihood of leader fall
Simulations were run for model 1 and 2. All other variables were set to their mean values
except for the military dictatorship dummy which was set to its median value.
In addition, table 5.4, expresses the eﬀect of China's cooperation on autocratic
survival in an alternative way. Again a simulation was run. Here, the amount
of trade was increased in quantities relative to its distribution in the sample. In
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three simulations it was calculated how a leader's prospects to be disposed change
when the amount of trade is increased from the minimum value to the maximum,
from the minimum to the mean and from the mean to the maximum. Then, the
diﬀerence in predicted probabilities to fail was calculated.
The biggest improvement for a leader materializes when trade is increased from
the minimum amount provided in the sample to the maximum value. This leads
the propensity to fail for the leader in the trading country to decrease by 9.5% on
average. When the volume of bilateral trade relative to total trade increases from
the mean to the maximum amount, a leader can still improve his chances of not
being disposed in the following year by 7.1%. However, when a country's bilateral
trade with China relative to its total trade is increased from the minimum to the
mean value, this improves a leader's survival expectancy by only 2.3%.
Table 5.4.: Simulated probabilities
Simulated probability min to max min to mean mean to max
Pr(leader fall=1) -.095 -.023 -.071
(.026) (.011) (.018)
Robust standard errors in parentheses; all other variables were set to their mean values,
the military dummy to its median value.
From the combination of both ways to interpret the eﬀect of trade on the survival
of leaders (the graph and the table), it becomes clear that the marginal eﬀect of
trade is strongest when trade is increased from zero to the maximum or from
medium values to the maximum. This might be counterintuitive, because the
decreasing gradient of the line in graph 5.3 would suggest just the opposite: that
the reduction in the risk to be disposed is strongest when bilateral trade volumes
rise from very low to medium levels. But the analysis suggests that leaders in
countries with relatively high trade dependence on China seem to proﬁt most
from the stabilizing eﬀect of Chinese trade. If one considers that the average
country's bilateral trade with China hovers at around 3.5% of total trade while
the distribution of trade shares ranges from zero to more than 50%, a leader
would need to increase bilateral trade volumes with China considerably in order
to substantially increase his survival prospects. Given this, one could suppose that
the results are driven by a few countries with extremely high trade dependencies
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that heavily inﬂuence the analysis and bias the results. As I will show in the
robustness tests below, this is not the case.
In view of my theory, these regression results suggest that cooperation with a
powerful autocratic patron can indeed stabilize autocratic regimes. However, it
depends on the form of cooperation: There is no empirical evidence that economic
cooperation as a form of most direct support destabilizes the autocrat, whether
on the basis of individual leaders or ruling coalitions. Cooperation in the form of
the exchange of goods, in contrast help autocratic leaders, but not coalitions to
improve the autocrat's prospects to survive and fend-oﬀ competitors. Diplomatic
support, on the other hand, has not been found to observably stabilize the power
of autocratic leaders or authoritarian ruling coalitions.
Before I interpret these ﬁndings in more detail in section 5.5, I brieﬂy discuss
the ﬁndings with respect to the other variables in the regression as well as the
robustness of this model. With respect to the rest of the model, most of the con-
trol variables also inﬂuence the propensity of autocratic survival in the expected
directions. Most importantly, GDP per capita decreases the risk of collapse for
leaders. This relationship is statistically signiﬁcant. GDP growth also points into
the expected direction, but is not signiﬁcant, however. The eﬀect of population
seems to diﬀer between the survival of leaders and coalitions. As the signs indicate,
population size seems to increase the vulnerability of leaders to fall, but stabilizes
coalitions. However, in none of the regressions population yields statistically sig-
niﬁcant coeﬃcients.
As suggested in section 5.1, social interaction and the possibility for collective
action make autocracies more likely to be overthrown. The coeﬃcient of population
density is positive in all regressions, in model 4 even statistically signiﬁcant. This
implies that when people live closely together, it becomes more diﬃcult for ruling
coalitions to maintain power. However, individual leaders are not aﬀected by
population density in their survival.
According to my estimations, military dictatorships seem to have a higher like-
lihood to remain in power than civilian dictatorships or monarchies, even though
existing literature actually found military dictators to be more likely to transition
to democracy (Geddes 1999a). For the post-Cold War period, military leaders
survived on average signiﬁcantly longer than their counterparts in other forms of
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dictatorships.
The remaining variables in the models are more technically in nature and mostly
refer to the time dimension in the models. The more changes an autocracy expe-
riences in its rulers, the less durable its previous ruling generations are: For both
leaders and coalitions, the number of previous failures is a signiﬁcant predictor. As
a consequence, the more often individual leaders and ruling coalitions changed in
the past, the lower is the likelihood that a ruler or the ruling coalition will remain
in oﬃce.
Figure 5.4.: Eﬀect of time on the likelihood of leader fall in autocracies, 1991-2008
In contrast to my expectations, a ruler's time in oﬃce is not relevant in all
models. More speciﬁcally, in models 1 and 3 which cover only one decade, the
variable age of leader or coalition is not signiﬁcant and a likelihood-ratio test
suggested removing the time splines from these models. In these models, the
survival likelihood does not appear to be aﬀected by the time a leader has spent
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in oﬃce. In model 2 and 4, where the models cover a longer time-frame, time is
a more important factor. Because it is assumed that the relationship between a
leader's or coalition's time in oﬃce and his survival is not linear, variable age is to
be interpreted together with the time splines. This is not straightforward.
Figure 5.4 graphically illustrates a leader's risk to fall over time for model 2, in
which the three variables are signiﬁcant. The probability to fall is displayed on the
Y-axis; the X-axis depicts the time in years a leader has been in oﬃce. The line
describes the relation between increasing time in oﬃce and the probability to fail
when all other variables in the model are set to the sample mean values (except
for the military dummy which is set to its median). It becomes clear, that the
relationship is, indeed, not linear. In his ﬁrst ﬁve years in oﬃce, a newly installed
leader faces a continuously increasing risk fail. Once he has survived his ﬁfth year,
however, it gets easier for the leader. A period follows were the probability to be
overthrown actually goes down to a very low level. The second turning point at
around 18 years indicates that staying in power now becomes increasingly diﬃcult
for the leader. The risk to be disposed rises with each year he remains in oﬃce.
Given the very low probabilities displayed on the Y-axis, the overall eﬀect of time
is not very strong.
Robustness
In the following, I carry out a number of robustness tests in order to check whether
the relation between autocratic cooperation and autocratic survival is driven by the
model speciﬁcation, the set of variables that are included, the sample composition,
or the estimation procedure. Since model 1 and 2 delivered the most interesting
results, I concentrated my eﬀorts to check the robustness of my ﬁndings on these
two models. I ran a number of additional regressions to check the robustness of
























Table 5.5.: BTSCS logit regression on leaderfall 1992-2008, robustness
(5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
No of diplomatic meetings -0.490 -0.581 -0.695 -0.662 -0.588
(0.633) (0.645) (0.596) (0.595) (0.588)
Trade (% of total trade) -0.052** -0.063** -0.046* -0.049**
(0.025) (0.027) (0.024) (0.024)
Trade t-1 (% total trade) -0.060**
(0.027)
GDP/c t-1 (ln) -0.286* -0.427*** -0.365*** -0.366*** -0.358***
(0.172) (0.098) (0.101) (0.101) (0.100)
GDP growth (t-1) -0.004 -0.008 -0.007 -0.007 -0.006
(0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Population (ln) -0.164 -0.162 -0.087 -0.093 -0.095
(0.121) (0.111) (0.087) (0.090) (0.088)
Population density (ln) 0.133 0.113 0.088 0.093 0.089
(0.104) (0.119) (0.109) (0.112) (0.111)
Military dictatorship -0.693** -0.960*** -0.746*** -0.803*** -0.775***
(0.314) (0.320) (0.289) (0.284) (0.283)
Urban growth -0.040
(0.104)
OECD ODA (% GDP) 0.038
(0.027)
Oil revenue (% GDP) 0.001
(0.002)










































No of previous failures 0.167** 0.252*** 0.204*** 0.207*** 0.205***
(0.082) (0.071) (0.060) (0.060) (0.059)
Age of leader in years 0.281 0.376** 0.314** 0.311** 0.294**
(0.171) (0.162) (0.144) (0.146) (0.144)
Time spline 1 -3.978* -5.214** -4.707** -4.663** -4.435**
(2.301) (2.166) (1.943) (1.969) (1.938)
Time spline 2 4.996* 6.491** 5.897** 5.843** 5.562**
(2.850) (2.681) (2.405) (2.438) (2.399)
Constant 1.627 1.691 0.434 0.539 0.621
(3.136) (2.123) (1.936) (1.978) (1.951)
Observations 957 920 1038 1071 1072
ll -236.533 -250.673 -283.539 -284.491
chi2 94 66 63 65
df_m 18.000 12.000 11.000 11.000 11.000
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01
BTSCS logit estimation with robust standard errors grouped by country.
105
5. The analysis of autocratic survival
To begin with, I introduced various additional control variables to the model
that have been found signiﬁcant determinants of regime survival in order to check
whether the model suﬀers from omitted variables (Ross 2001; Smith 2004; Morri-
son 2009). Second, I estimated the models without the most extreme observations
to check whether the results were driven by outliers. Thirdly, I checked for endo-
geneity by replacing trade and using a lagged value for trade instead. Finally, I
checked whether the model is methodologically appropriate by re-estimating the
model with a diﬀerent technique for rarly occuring events.
Table 5.5 gives an overview of the regression results when additional explanatory
variables were introduced. First of all, in model 5, I introduced an additional
variable, leader fall in the region. With this variable, I tested whether regime
survival is determined by spill-over eﬀects from a country's neighbors. Variable
leaderfall region measures the number of a regime's neighbors that collapses in
a given year relative to the number of neighbors a country has. Interestingly,
this variable has a destabilizing eﬀect. Autocratic leaders must fear to lose power
when the leaders in neighboring countries are removed from oﬃce. However, the
inclusion of this spatial dimension did not alter the regression results in comparison
to the baseline model.
Second, I introduced the second social interaction variable, urban growth. In
contrast to my predictions, it has a stabilizing eﬀect, but is not signiﬁcant. Thirdly,
I tested whether leaders that receive money from alternative external funds are
generally more likely to survive. This seemed not to be the case. External funding,
measured as ODA from OECD donors, neither principally reduced the risk of
failure nor reduced it the eﬀect of trade from China.
Thirdly, a number of regional dummies were introduced to the model to check
whether the stabilising eﬀect of trade is driven by regional trade patterns. The
result rejects this possibility. Even though countries in the Middle East and North
Africa as well as Central Asia seemed to be generally more stable (as indicated
by the signiﬁcant and negative coeﬃcient), the stabilizing eﬀect of trade was not
aﬀected.
Finally, I checked for another source of non-tax revenue, the revenues of oil
exploitation. However, when I introduced variable oil revenues to the model,
the number of observations decreased dramatically from more than 1000 to little
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more than 900. This is why I tested this variable in a separate model (model 6).
The eﬀect of oil revenues is almost zero in magnitude and not signiﬁcant. The
stabilizing eﬀect of trade is not aﬀected.
With regard to methodological issues, I ran two further regressions to check the
appropriateness of the chosen estimation procedure. In model 7, I checked whether
the results are driven by inﬂuencial observations. As has become clear in section
5.2, most of the countries in the sample exchange less than 5% of their overall
trade with China, but there are two outliers, Sudan and Myanmar whose bilateral
trade with China on average accounts for roughly 20% or more of their total trade
volumes. In order to make sure that the stabilizing eﬀect of trade with China
is not created because of these two unrepresentative, but potentially inﬂuencial
cases, I excluded these two cases from the sample. Even though the strength of
the trade coeﬃcients decreased slightly, their sign and signiﬁcance remained stable
(model 7).
In model 8, the trade variable was lagged for one period in order to make sure
that the eﬀect is not caused by reversed causality. McGillivray and Smith (2004)
found that leadership turnover in autocracies reduces trade ﬂows. If China trades
more with countries that have been under the leadership of an autocrat for a very
long time, the detected correlation between bilateral trade volumes and leader
stability suﬀers from reversed causality. But the coeﬃcient of the lagged trade
variable is consistent with the earlier ﬁndings.
Finally, as already mentioned, leader failures occur in less than 10% of the ob-
servations. Therefore, I also re-estimated the model with an alternative procedure
using the rare events logit estimator proposed by Tomz et al. (1999).17 The re-
sults of the rare event analysis are very similar to those of the ordinary procedure
(model 9).
Neither the inclusion of additional independent variables, nor the exclusion of
inﬂuencial observations nor the estimation with a diﬀerent technique led to major
changes of the eﬀect of trade or reduced its signiﬁcance, but the eﬀect of trade
with China on regime failure remained stable.
17See also King and Zeng (1999).
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5.5. Discussion of ﬁndings
This is a ﬁrst quantitative attempt to investigate China's impact on autocratic
longevity elsewhere in the world. I investigated how three diﬀerent types of coop-
eration impact on the survival of autocratic leaders and ruling coalitions: economic
cooperation, trade and meetings with the highest Chinese leadership. The various
diﬀerent models that have been estimated give a complex picture of the nexus of
regime stability and cooperation with an autocratic major power.
My results suggest that China's rise indeed has an impact. Most strikingly,
trade has a stabilizing eﬀect on leader survival in other autocracies. Trade depen-
dence on China, that is high trade shares with the PRC in relation to a country's
overall trade, improve the prospects to remain in power for autocratic leaders. The
relevance of these ﬁndings is strengthened by the various robustness tests which
conﬁrmed my results. The ﬁndings held when various additional explanatory vari-
ables were introduced, and when diﬀerent estimation procedures were chosen.
On the other hand, I did not ﬁnd evidence that other forms of cooperation in-
creased autocratic stability. Neither Chinese economic cooperation nor diplomacy,
understood as the number of encounters with either the Chinese president or prime
minister, turned out to impact on regime stability.
In view of my theoretical argument, I conclude from this that hypothesis H6
is only partly supported. Obviously, the form of cooperation matters whether
or not cooperation leads to autocratic stability. Against this background, the
question whether there is something speciﬁcally supportive to authoritarian leaders
in China's trade suggests itself. Yet, the exact mechanism behind this robust
correlation between trade and autocratic survival is not entirely clear.
It has been argued that Chinese trade ﬂows, more than that of other states
is subject to political considerations and controlled by political interests of the
Chinese government (Fuchs and Klann 2011). In this sense, trade is a possible
instrument to reward compliant leaders in other states.
Another plausible explanation for this ﬁnding could go via rentier eﬀects if trade
ﬂows with China only reﬂect the export of extractive resources which in turn lead
to prolonged authoritarian longevity (Ross 2001; Smith 2004). However, this kind
of a `resource curse' as the underlying mechanism leading to autocratic stability
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was not directly supported by the data analysis: I did not ﬁnd that oil rents
additionally improved the survival prospects of a leader or weakened the stabilizing
eﬀect of trade.
Against the background of these ﬁndings, a third explanation for the stabilizing
eﬀect of Chinese trade is plausible. That is, maybe the structure of Chinese exports
plays an important role as well. It is possible that the cheap consumer goods which
China exports to the developing world improve a leader's survival expectations,
simply because they are aﬀordable to the masses; increase the living standard of
the poor and thereby bring about social peace and increase their agreement with
the leadership. Being a research project in its own right, it would be worthwhile
to investigate whether Chinese exports have any distinct implications for political
stability elsewhere.
It is important to note that the eﬀect of trade ﬂows on autocratic survival is
not reﬂecting a spurious relationship between trade openness and regime stability.
More open governments may have better prospects to survive in power. However,
it is the intensity of trade relations with China relative to a country's total trade
which is decisive and not absolute trade volumes.
A second aspect of my ﬁnding is that my results suggest that China's impact
is generally weaker than is assumed or feared when a few exemplary cases are
discussed in the media: The trade dependence of most developing countries on
China are low, and at the same time, the improvements of a dictators's survival
prospects through trade relations with China are small, especially if compared to
other domestic factors that might lead to the disposal of a leader.
This leads me to the last point. Still, there is much noise in the data and this
is one reason why researchers face considerable diﬃculties in analysing China's
impact. Not only is China's rise a recent phenomenon, but also data is diﬃcult
to access or does not allow to clearly isolate a speciﬁc component of interest. For
example, as discussed in section 4.1, the Chinese economic cooperation statistics
contains a mixture of aid, trade, foreign investment, and international donors. It
contains Chinese aid components, commercial projects, projects from international
donors for which a bidding took place and many more things. So, the conclusion
we can draw from the fact that Chinese economic cooperation did not have a
signiﬁcant eﬀect on autocratic survival must remain limited, not least because this
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ﬁnding can have many reasons.
Also, China's diplomacy which has often been criticized for being supportive to
autocratic leaders does statistically not make a diﬀerence for autocratic stability
when seen from a macro-perspective. When measured as the mere number of bi-
lateral state visits as a ﬁrst approach to the phenomenon, there seems to be only
little variation between states and the gain of international legitimacy a leader
can obtain through these state visits is not reﬂected in the results. Here, more
qualitative comparative research could be helpful for the development of a quan-
titative measure that better captures the situative importance of high level state
diplomacy.
Before closing the quantitative analysis with this chapter, I brieﬂy recall the most
interesting points which were revealed by the previous investigation in Chinese
economic cooperation and the cooperation-survival nexus.
First of all, as predicted by the theory, I showed in chapter 4 that autocratic
countries, in principal are targets of Chinese attempts to cooperate when we accept
that true non-cooperation is not a viable alternative - that is, when we acknowledge
that a complete pullback from cooperation is not desirable, but that the Chinese
government prefers to continue cooperation at a very low level rather than entirely
cutting ties. Autocratic countries are more likely to become a recipient of Chinese
cooperation, a ﬁrst indication that there might be an intentional selection process
on the side of the Chinese. The rationale behind this selection process is that
autocratic leaders should be easier to convince and easier to `corrupt' or `buy' in
order to make them comply with an external player's interest. Moreover, what
could be shown was that economic cooperation is rewarded for compliance with
the `one China' policy and that the role of resource endowment has increased over
time. These ﬁndings are all plausibly in line with my argument.
Two ﬁndings seriously challenge my theoretical argument, however. First, it
turned out that poor countries receive more Chinese economic cooperation which
suggests that the allocation of Chinese economic cooperation is need-oriented. Ac-
cording to the theory, one would expect wealthier countries to receive more trans-
fers, because with increased domestic resources, it should become more `expensive'
to buy policy concessions from a government. Second, and more importantly, I
failed to proof that autocracies receive less transfers from China. In contrast to my
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prediction, they receive more rather than less economic cooperation which raises
the question whether autocracies are indeed easier to exploit from outside.
In combination, these two ﬁndings challenge an important piece in the theoret-
ical argumentation. Only if the Chinese government is indeed more successful in
pursuing its interests in autocratic countries does the argumentation in favor for
autocratic patronage make sense. Whether this is the case still remains unclear. I
will investigate this question in the following case studies.
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The theory put forward in chapter 3 has many implications. Only several of these,
formulated in the hypotheses H2-H6, have been tested in the previous chapters by
a quantitative regression analysis. So far, I have tested whether China's cooper-
ation depends on regime type or resource endowment of a country and whether
cooperation with China aﬀects the likelihood of political survival. The remainder
of this study explores in an alternative way the validity of my theoretical argument.
The following chapters will test hypothesis H1 by the means of three comparative
case studies.
In the rest of this chapter, I will discuss the case study design in more detail.
Section 6.1 begins with a presentation of the comparative design of the case studies
and puts this in the context of the previous quantitative ﬁndings. To test the
hypothesis H1 as such, of course, a clearer deﬁnition is needed of the Chinese
interests and of the winning coalition. Therefore, I continue this chapter with
section 6.2 on the operationalization of the hypothesis. Moreover, the selection
of countries for the case studies that I will investigate in the next chapters is one
of the most critical conceptual decisions of this analysis and the study's relevance
but also the degree to which its results can be generalized crucially depend on its
plausibility. Therefore, section 6.3 reﬂects on the case selection and the methods
of data collection. Finally, the structure of the cases studies is discussed before the
three cases are presented in chapter 7 to chapter 9. The ﬁndings of all three case
studies are compared in chapter 10 on the basis of which the actual hypothesis
test is taken.
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6.1. The case study design
In this chapter, I will examine another hypothesis H1, a key assumption referring
to the very root of the theoretical argument. Recall the basic consideration which
assumed that the domestic political structures of a state, or more precisely the
size of its coalition, is of interest to the Chinese government, because it aﬀects the
ease with which a government can be inﬂuenced. The core of the argument is that
small coalition governments are easier to exploit from outside. As a consequence,
if the theoretical argument is right, China should be more successful in realizing its
foreign interests vis-à-vis small coalitions than vis-à-vis large winning coalitions,
which is precisely what is stated by H1: China is more successful in realizing its
interests in autocracies than in democracies.
The objective of the following three comparative case studies is to test hypoth-
esis H1 and to investigate whether small winning coalitions - where the winning
coalition is expected to be easier to co-opt - are more resilient to Chinese interests.
As illustrated in ﬁgure 6.1, the dependent variable in the case studies is the realiza-
tion of Chinese interests and the explanatory variables of interest are a country's
coalition size and its interaction with Chinese cooperation.
Figure 6.1.: Case study design
However, one factor of particular interest in the light of the theory and the
ﬁndings of the previous quantitative analysis is the interaction and exchange be-
tween Chinese actors and their counterparts in the case study countries. This
factor is interesting, because the previous quantitative analysis found that auto-
cratic countries receive more economic cooperation from China and that high trade
dependence with China stabilizes the rule of autocratic leaders.
Of course, the theory has clear expectations with respect to the assumed causal
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mechanism why the exchange of goods should help the autocrat to stay in power.
According to the theory, small coalition governments exchange policy concessions
against targeted goods from external players. These targeted goods are then di-
rectly beneﬁcial to the survival of the autocrat, because he can redistribute them
among his supporters. From the perspective of an external player with its own in-
terest to extract policy concessions from a government, it seems plausible to make
use of this incentive system if he has information on the size and composition of
the winning coalition elsewhere. So the immediate implication of the theory is
that external players speciﬁcally target the leaders or the members of the dicta-
tor's winning coalitions in autocracies with goods that suit the speciﬁc needs of
these groups. Targeting the dictator and his coalition is the most eﬀective way to
make the dictator comply with external interests. A similar approach in democra-
cies, in contrast, should be less eﬀective, because the democratic leader has fewer
incentives to accept targeted goods in exchange for such policy concessions. This
is because the democratic leader needs to make his decisions more transparent,
and make the policy concession acceptable to a wider part of the population if he
wants to be re-elected.
Again, while I showed in the previous chapters that autocrats are more likely to
become a target of Chinese economic cooperation and that trade dependence on
China, that is the dependence on exchanging goods with China stabilizes the rule
of autocrats, the previous analysis was blind to the question whether or not these
exchanged goods were narrowly targeted or not. However, a rigorous comparative
analysis of the interaction between Chinese actors and those in the case study
countries with the aim to ﬁnd out whether exchanged goods are targeted or not
and if so, towards whom, turned out to be diﬃcult during the course of my case
study investigations.
Both, observation and measurement of interaction between Chinese actors and
their counterparts in the case study countries is challenging. Firstly, even when
only a few countries are investigated, I found that information on the volumes of
exchanged goods was diﬃcult to obtain, messy and hard to compare across cases.
Comprehensive data on Chinese engagement, for example foreign investment, for-
eign assistance and loans, are diﬃcult to obtain from the Chinese side. Given the
fact that I am dealing with low income countries, the capacity of these countries
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to provide comprehensive data is also expected to be low. For example, oﬃcial
statistics on foreign direct investment - if accessible at all - often contain only
investment approvals of investment boards. Apart from the fact that the majority
of Chinese investments usually does not go through such oﬃcial registration, it is
not clear whether the approved projects are ﬁnally realized.
A second problem consists in the diﬃculty to diﬀerentiate between state and
private Chinese actors. The line between economic assistance tied to Chinese SOE
and state commercial investments as well as between state and private actors is
blurred. Most often, it is intransparent and unclear whether Chinese actors act as
private or state actors and in how far seemingly private actors are in fact controlled
and supported by the state.
Most importantly, also with respect to the key question of who beneﬁts from
the Chinese engagement, information is sometimes scarce. For example, a strictly
comparative investigation would require not only information on whether the Chi-
nese government provides lets say scholarships to a country, but more important is
the question which people are entitled to study in China. Are the students selected
according to their university grades or is it the elite's oﬀspring that beneﬁts from
this opportunity. Clearly, due to the suspected nature of the interaction, there is
a tendency to cloud it. If bilateral exchanges are really beneﬁcial for only a small
elitist group of the society, why should those beneﬁting disclose this out in the
open to the public?
Hence, as can be seen in ﬁgure 6.1, I will investigate in the interaction between
Chinese actors and those of the case study countries albeit in a more descriptive
than explanatory way. Without claiming to comply with the standards of a sys-
tematic comparison, I dedicate a speciﬁc section to the interaction and exchange
between Chinese actors and their counterparts in the case study countries. This
section is particularly designed to investigate who the target groups of Chinese
cooperation in a country are. The Chinese government is expected to reward
small coalition leaders more with goods speciﬁcally targeted to the needs of the
leader and his coalition, while the needs of the population at large should play a
bigger role when the coalition is large. A democratic leader should accordingly
be rewarded with goods or policies that help him to become re-elected. In order
to scrutinize not only the nexus between coalition members in both China and
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the other country but also asking the question whether the larger populations are
addressed diﬀerently depending on whether they are part of the coalition or not,
the section is divided into two sub-sections along the inclusion in or exclusion of
actors in the winning coalition.
6.2. Operationalization
The objective of this comparative case study is to test hypothesis H1, whether
China is more successful in realizing its interests in small coalition countries than
in large coalition countries. In order to do so, an operationalization is needed
which enables me to measure and to compare the coalition sizes (the independent
variable) and the Chinese success in realizing its interests (the dependent variable).
6.2.1. The winning coalition
In this section, I develop a measurement of the coalition size. In contrast to the
previous quantitative analysis in which regime type was measured by quantitative
measures, regime type and the size of the coalition will now be measured qual-
itatively. I thereby refer to the concept of winning coalition and selectorate as
mentioned earlier in section 3.1.
Recall, the selectorate was the subset of all residents with a formal role in choos-
ing the leadership, regardless of whether or not their choice inﬂuences the selection
of leadership. Furthermore, the winning coalition is deﬁned
`as a subset of the selectorate of suﬃcient size such that the subset's
support endows the leadership with political power over the remainder
of the selectorate as well as over the disenfranchised members of the
society' (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003, 51).
In brief, the concept of coalition remains rather vague and the decision which
groups are in or out of the coalition in a concrete case is left to a matter of
plausible argumentation: The size a coalition in a given regime depends on the
`qualities required for membership' - which can vary from lineage to arms to party-
membership - `and on the degree to which those qualities relate to lumpy or broadly
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distributed characteristics within the selectoreate.' (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003,
51).
Against this background, in each case study the qualities on which membership
of the winning coalition is based and the sub-groups of society constituting the
winning coalition are discussed. As the selectorate's formal role is usually deﬁned
de jure in a country's constitution, this is the starting point of the analysis. To
put the constitutional provisions in their right persepctive, the de facto validity of
the constitutional framework will be discussed.
6.2.2. Success in realization of interests
The dependent variable in my case study analysis is China's success in furthering
its interests in a country. For this, I ﬁrst need to deﬁne the most important goals of
China's foreign policy in order to measure China's success in realizing its interests
in a country and to compare the compliance of governments. The following three
interests are deﬁned as key foreign policy objectives by the Chinese government
(Shiping and Yunling 2005).1
1. The `one China' policy and China's territorial integrity,
2. China's access to primary resources in a given country,
3. a country's compliance with context-speciﬁc Chinese geo-political interests
and its behavior towards the U.S. in particular.
The next step is to develop a measurement of success in realizing these inter-
ests. Leaders in all case study countries are confronted with Chinese interests to
which they have to respond. The success of Chinese engagement in realising these
interests is measured in terms of the `responsiveness' of the countries under inves-
tigation. I diﬀerentiate between three categories of compliance along a spectrum
of compliance reaching from one extreme of `refusal' to the other extreme end of
`eagerness'. `Reluctance' denotes a middle position between both ends. Figure 6.2
visualises this spectrum of compliance.
1In the following, the terms `interest', `goal', and `objective' are used interchangeably.
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Figure 6.2.: Spectrum of compliance
I classify China's success in three broad categories according to the respon-
siveness of the respective counterpart on a continuum from unsuccessful to very
successful. Accordingly, a government can refuse to comply with Chinese inter-
est, show formal resilience, or actively promote Chinese interests. Each reaction
corresponds to one of the three types:
1. Refusal: A government publicly disagrees with the Chinese position and
disregards Chinese interests. This means China is unsuccessful in realizing
its interests in that country.
2. Reluctance: A government formally gives in to Chinese interests by respond-
ing on the base of a lowest common denominator. This is the standard way of
dealing with Chinese interests and can, at least from the Chinese perspective,
be considered a success in realizing its interests.
3. Eagerness: A government publicly promotes the Chinese position and pro-
actively pursues the Chinese interests without being asked to do so by China.
This exceeds the Chinese expectations and accordingly, China is very suc-
cessful in implementing its interests.
With regard to each of the three speciﬁc Chinese foreign policy goals which
have been mentioned above, a particular reaction in the spectrum of compliance
is possible. In the following, I brieﬂy elaborate on the nine combinations. Table
6.1 gives an overview on which particular reaction corresponds to which position
in the spectrum of compliance.
The `one China' policy and China's territorial integrity First, with respect to
the interest of territorial integrity the `refuser' resists the Chinese request to
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adhere to the `one China' policy and diplomatically recognizes Taiwan. The
`reluctant' type of reaction is to recognize the PRC as the sole Chinese
state, but to simultaneously maintain unoﬃcial relations with Taiwan. This
is the mainstream reaction of countries to the `one China' policy. The `eager'
countries, in contrast, do not even unoﬃcially cope with Taiwan and support
the Chinese position in international fora pro-actively.
Regarding interaction with the Dalai Lama, reactions are similar: While the
`refuser' gives the Dalai Lama attention and seeks contact with him, the
`reluctant' responds to the Chinese interest by treating the Dalai Lama on a
low proﬁle basis, but is not particularly avoiding contact. He is also willing
to deal with the Dalai Lama as a private person, as opposed to a state guest.
Again, the `eager', irrespective of the Dalai Lama's diplomatic status, treats
him as a persona non grata, thereby not providing him a platform at all.
Chinese access to primary resources in a given country When it comes to the
Chinese interest of acquiring raw materials, I look on how successful Chinese
companies are in accessing natural resources. Here, the three categories de-
scribing the Chinese success refer to the following: The `refuser' marginalizes
or even fends oﬀ Chinese attempts to gain access to natural resources. The
middle position is one in which Chinese companies are treated as any other
investors, resulting in a fair share of Chinese companies active in the re-
source sector. An `eager' government favors Chinese companies over other
investors and, therefore, heavy Chinese engagement in the resource sector is
stimulated.
Resilience to context speciﬁc Chinese geo-political interests Finally, with re-
spect to China's geopolitical objectives and a country's behavior towards the
U.S. in particular, I refer to the concepts of balancing and bandwagoning to
describe a government's behavior to deal with the two hegemonic powers,
China and the U.S. (Waltz 1979). Accordingly, the `refusing' type adopts
a strategy of balancing. Balancing describes a behavior of containing the
rise of the PRC as a challenging power. Hedging is then the typical re-
action of the `reluctant' compliant. Hedging implies to try neither to be
dominated by rising China nor to antagonize it (Chung 2009). The `eager'
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pursues a strategy of bandwagoning, meaning to either siding with China for
proﬁt-sharing and rent-seeking or joining the emerging challenger (China) to
counter dominance by the hegemonic power (Chung 2009).
Table 6.1.: Expected reaction according to type of compliance.
Type of compliance
Issue area Refusal Reluctance Eagerness
`One China'
Taiwan's recognition: oﬃcial unoﬃcial not at all
Dealing with Dalai Laima: oﬃcial unoﬃcial not at all
Resource access
Treatment of
Chinese investors discriminative neutral preferential
Geo-strategy
with/against China balancing hedging bandwagoning
While each case study delivers a valuable empirical evaluation of my theory on its
own, it is their comparison that enables me to infer whether my theory, in its very
core, holds. In chapter 10 I will conclude the case study analysis with a comparative
analysis of the ﬁndings of each of the three cases in the light of my theoretical
argument. Recall, the theory would predict a more successful implementation in
small rather than in large coalition governments. On the base of my comparison
of China's relations with the Burmese, Cambodian, and Mongolian elites, I assess
whether China acts diﬀerently vis-à-vis small and large coalition governments and
whether this interaction results in diﬀerent outcomes as predicted by the theory.
6.3. Case selection
In view of the research interest of this thesis, the case study design requires a
comparison between countries which are diﬀerent in coalition sizes yet similar in
terms of their remaining characteristics. That is, on the one hand, divergence is
needed with respect to political systems in order to check whether China's ability
to pursue and realize its external interests diﬀers with varying coalition sizes.
On the other hand, similarity is desired with respect to the countries' further
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characteristics because this will ease the comparison and reduce the potential for
intervening variables. Due to the explorative purpose of the analysis, the cases are
not selected on account of a speciﬁc characteristic of Chinese cooperation with a
given country and Chinese success in realizing its interests. These variables are
rather left to exploration in the case studies. Burma, Cambodia, and Mongolia
are the result of a selection procedure which tried to account for diﬀerent coalition
sizes and similar values on a number of other parameters.
With respect to their political systems, Mongolia is the most open case with a
large coalition and a large selectorate. In contrast, the governments in Cambodia
and Myanmar are based on small coalitions. All three political orders will be dis-
cussed in detail in the respective case studies. For now, it is important to note that
the starting point for each case study is chosen individually in accordance with
their domestic transformation in the post-Cold War period. In Burma, it starts
with the 1988 military coup and the elections in 1990 respectively. The investiga-
tion on Cambodia focuses on the period after the peace settlement brought about
by the Paris Peace Agreement and the subsequent United Nations Transitional
Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) mission (from May 1992 to November 1993)
and looks at the Kingdom of Cambodia under the constitution of 1993. In Mon-
golia, the period under examination covers the country after the 1992 constitution
was adopted.
Figure 6.3.: Case selection
The selection of these three cases was based on the consideration of their rela-
tive similarity of characteristics other than the sizes of their respective coalitions
and selectorates. It is summarized in table 6.2. First of all, the selection of three
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countries located in continental Asia ensures regional proximity of all three cases
to China. Just as we expected cooperation to increase between close countries
in chapter 3.4, we expect compliance to grow with regional proximity. Leaders
might feel stronger pressure to respond to Chinese interests because of mutual
interdependence related to direct neighborhood or because proximity might cred-
ibly increase threats to national security. Furthermore, world regions often share
similar historical experiences and cultural characteristics. For instance, all three
countries share a communist past until the end of the 1980s, but then embar-
qued on diﬀerent political paths. With Buddhism as the major religion, all three
countries have more or less comparable cultural and religious patterns.
Table 6.2.: Overview of the case selection
Country
Variable Burma Cambodia Mongolia
Political system autocratic hybrid democratic
Location continental Asia continental Asia continental Asia
Religion Buddhism Buddhism Buddhism
Income low low low
Natural resources abundant abundant abundant
Second and third, all three of the nations are poor in terms of national income,
but rich in natural resources that have the potential to increase the countries'
wealth. With respect to their income, all countries belong to the poorest nations
in Asia and classify comparably as lower middle (Mongolia) and low income (Cam-
bodia and Burma) countries in the World Bank's ranking. Again, in chapter 3.4
we assumed a country's wealth to impact its cooperation with China and since we
are studying how cooperation interacts with coalition size, comparing countries
with similar incomes reduces the likelihood of intervening variables.
In terms of resource endowment, all three countries have at their disposal easily
extractable natural resources. Certainly, Mongolia with its wide range of miner-
als of high quality and quantity is leading the list. Mongolia's treasures include
minerals such as copper, tin, nickel, zinc, ﬂuorspar, gold and silver. Most no-
tably, the country has the world's largest untapped copper and gold resources,
the world's largest untapped cok coal deposits of ﬁnest quality and the world's
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largest uranium reserves. Cambodia and Burma, in contrast, are rich in timber,
precious stones, and both have a high hydropower potential. Cambodia has an
estimated untapped reserve of 2 billion barrels of oil and 10 trillion cubic feet of
natural gas (Lum 2007). Burma's oil reserves are almost depleted but its proven
natural gas reserves are estimated a 10 trillion cubic feet in 2010 (U.S. Energy
Information Administration 2010). Most importantly, one can safely assume that
resource deposits in all three countries may be of interest to China, because their
exploration in all three countries only started during the 2000s and a considerable
part of known reserves are still to be developed for exploitation.
6.4. Data collection
With respect to data collection and information about empirical facts, the case
studies are based on the analysis of secondary literature, but also on interviews
and conversations with academics and political actors in the respective countries.
It should be noted that data collection was not equally feasible in each of the
countries. Whereas in democratic Mongolia, it was easier to gather information
through direct contacts with government oﬃcials, in less-democratic Cambodia I
was forced to rely more on interviews with non-governmental organization (NGO),
members of the opposition, emigrants and international agencies. For autocratic
Burma, ﬁnally, the analysis was mostly based on secondary literature and a few
expert interviews. Also the literature discusses Mongolia's relations to China very
much from a strategic point of view, thereby often taking on an academic inter-
national relation perspective. This perspective is much less to be found in the
literature on Sino-Cambodian or Sino-Burmese relations.
To my surprise, this endogeneity also worked quite in the opposite direction: In
some respects, I found it more diﬃcult to gather information on China's actions in
Mongolia than in Cambodia or Burma. This is due to the kind of information that
is dispersed in the three countries. Much of the information on Chinese economic
activities in Cambodia and Burma originated from detailed NGO reports. In their
attempt to shed light on and document the illicit activities of the Cambodian and
Burmese elites, these sometimes very investigative reports name concrete individ-
uals or companies involved and pinpoint where and when the law, human rights,
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or environmental standards in Cambodia and Burma have been violated. This
kind of reports are diﬃcult to ﬁnd in Mongolia, at least in English. In contrast,
diﬀerent from Cambodia and Burma, Chinese economic engagement in Mongolia
remains to a large extent unexplored.
Data has been gathered and analysed during a period of three years beginning
in mid of 2007 to end of 2010. During this period, I conducted more than 80
interviews and conversations with academics, political actors, administrative staﬀ
and international experts in Beijing, Shanghai, Ulaanbataar, Phnom Penh, Hanoi,
Singapore, Berlin and Bonn.
6.5. Structure of the case studies
In accordance with the research question, each case study is structured in ﬁve
parts. The case studies are focussing on the period after the Cold War, but to place
the examination in the context of the historical complexity of bilateral relations,
each case study begins with a brief presentation of the political developments in
the country from a historical perspective. Of course, a special focus lies on the
historical link between a country's political developments and China.
Section two turns to the independent variable, the domestic political structure in
the post-Cold War period. This section describes the domestic political structure
through the lens of the selectorate theory and deﬁnes the members of the winning
coalition.
Section three builds a descriptive bridge between the independent and the depen-
dent variables, thereby shedding some light on the causal mechanism. This section
speciﬁcally illustrates the links between Chinese actors and their counterparts in
the respective country. Against the background of section two, it describes the
targets and instruments of China's external relations from an actor-centred per-
spective and tries to relate the exchange of policy concessions by the leaders in the
observed countries to gains they receive from China.
In section four, the dependent variable is examined. This section investigates
whether and how the Chinese government can realize its foreign policy interests
in a given country. Here, the compliance of a government with Chinese objectives
is examined. As explained in section 6.2.2, three diﬀerent Chinese foreign policy
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objectives are investigated. Accordingly, this section is subdivided into three parts,
each concentrating on one of them.
Finally, section ﬁve summarizes the ﬁndings of the examination. These ﬁndings
will then be compared in chapter 10 where I draw conclusions with regard to the
validity of H1.
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7.1. Historical background
The visit of the Pyu delegeation to Chang-an (the capital of the Tang dynasty)
in 802 A.D. is considered the ﬁrst conﬁrmed diplomatic contact of the Burmese
kingdom with China (Tin Maung Maung Than 2003). During the centuries that
followed, the kingdom of Burma was invaded by Chinese empires several times.
In the 13th century, Burma was occupied by the Mongol Empire for ﬁfteen years,
and in the 17th century, `hostilities between the Ming emperor and the Manchus
spilled over into Myanmar for a short while' (Tin Maung Maung Than 2003).
In the 19th century, Burma fought three wars against the British (1824-26; 1851-
52 and 1885-86) and for half a century it was a `province' of British-ruled India.
In 1937, it became a separately administered British colony. During the Second
World War it was invaded and occupied by the Japanese, later to be re-captured
by the British (Baily 2007). Eventually, it regained its independence from the
British in 1948.
The British legacy left Burma with a parliamentary democracy oriented along
the lines of a socialist development agenda. `Not widely favored in the West after
independence due to its choice of polity, it was, however, expected to have a bright
economic future due to an education system that was, at that time, deemed the
best in Asia, and its bountiful agricultural production' (Baily 2007). But what
was lacking was a common national identity in a multi-ethnical society (Dukalskis
2009). From the beginning, the independent state of Burma suﬀered from ethnic
and communist insurgencies.
The internal treat of communist insurgency and ethnical rebellion were aggra-
vated by the retreat of the defeated Chinese Koumintang troops into Burmese
territory, the Shan State in 1949. Relations with the newly founded PRC thus
126
7.1. Historical background
became delicate and Burma's premier U Nu tried to prevent an adverse Chinese
reaction by cultivating his personal diplomacy to Chinese leader Zhou Enlai (Tin
Maung Maung Than 2003). These friendly relations to the PRC were maintained
throughout the 1950s despite several changes in government in Burma and de-
spite Chinese incursions into the north of Shan State and Chinese support for the
Burma Communist Party (BCP ) rebels (Tin Maung Maung Than 2003). How-
ever, during China's Cultural Revolution, these good bilateral relations between
Burma and the PRC cooled down.
In 1962, against the background of multiple ethnic insurgencies which threatened
the nation's unity, General Ne Win staged a coup (Clapp 2007). The subsequently
established military Revolutionary Council abolished the constitution and intro-
duced socialist-state structures with the hierarchical rule of a single-party (Baily
2007; Tin Maung Maung Than 2003). During the years that followed, Chinese resi-
dents were expelled from Burma being perceived a threat to the well-being of ethnic
Burmans. Anti-Chinese riots also evolved in the late 1960's when ethnic Chinese
tried to extend the Chinese Cultural Revolution to Burma (Clapp 2007). More-
over, `Burma's ruling generals earned their ﬁrst medals ﬁghting Chinese-supported
communist insurgencies along the border between 1968 and 1978' (Clapp 2007, 12).
In 1974, the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma was established under
a new constitution by the Burma Socialist Programme Party, the only political
party under the rule of Ne Win. But the socialist program failed badly. In reaction
to economic failures and harsh repression of dissent public unrest emerged. For
instance, after the government's decision to demonetize large-denomination kyat
bills, student-led mass protests broke out in 1988 (Clapp 2007). The students were
brutally repressed by the military causing an estimated 3,000 casualties (Bünte
2008). With the promise to restore law and order, the military ﬁnally took control
over the government that was by then on the verge of collapse (Tin Maung Maung
Than 2005a, 76). A new military junta emerged. In 1989, the State Law and Order
Restoration Council (SLORC) changed the name of the country from Burma to
the Union of Myanmar.1
After the 1988 coup, bilateral relations with China were rapidly re-established
with the visit of General Than Shwe, SLORC leader number two. This rapid
1I will continue to refer to Burma, not for political reasons, but for practical ones.
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re-establishment of relations was facilitated by the fact that the Chinese support
for the Burmese communists had been phased-out in 1985.
With the intention to return the country to a military-controlled parliamentary
government which had prevailed under Ne Win, the military junta (the SLORC)
held elections in 1990. These were, however, won with a landslide victory by the
oppositional National League for Democracy (NLD). The military was unwilling
to fully transfer power to the NLD, thus admitting the elected representatives
only the authority to draft a new constitution. An agreement `on the terms of
national reconciliation and the modalities of democratization' failed (Tin Maung
Maung Than 2005a, 78). This failure has dominated Burma's domestic politics
since then.
7.2. Domestic politics
In this section, Burma's leaders and their support base, the winning coalition, are
presented. As a matter of fact, the political system in Burma is based on the rule
of a military junta. For a long time, there was no constitutional framework. That
is, since General Ne Win's suspension of the constitution in 1962 the country has
been ruled by decree.
Only in 2008 a new constitution was adopted.2 Though this consitution fro-
mally introduced multi-party elections, it de facto formalized the power position
of the military. The constitution had been drafted by the National Convention,
consisting of 1076 hand-picked representatives with connections to the Tatmadaw,
the Burmese military, or to its mass-organization, the Union Solidarity and Devel-
opment Association (USDA), and was boycotted by the NLD (Matthews 2006).
It clearly aimed at entrenching the power of the military: A quarter of seats in
legislative bodies were reserved for the military and control over a new powerful
security council was assigned to the commander-in-chief, who also controled key se-
curity ministries and other extraordinary powers (International Crisis Group 2010,
1). In addition, the military had the privilege to choose one out of three elected
presidential candidates (Htet Aung 2009).
2The constitution was adopted by referendum which was held under the adverse conditions
provoked by Cyclon Nagris.
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Clearly, the constitutional framework was designed to ensure the military dom-
inance over the country in the future, and the elections were designed to dress the
regime with legitimacy.3 Given the constitutional design which ensured the dom-
inance of the ruling junta over the composition of the government and given the
fact that it did not give substantial power to the electorate, the analysis with or
without the constitution would probably come to similar conclusions. For reasons
of simplicity, the following analysis is based on the political system in place until
the constitutional referendum in 2008.
Until 2008, a small circle of military leaders formed the leadership in Burma.
In 1997, an internal re-shue led to the removal of several corrupt senior military
oﬃcers and the SLORC reconstituted itself as the smaller and more uniﬁed State
Peace and Development Council (SPDC) (Tin Maung Maung Than 2003; Hlaing
2005; Dukalskis 2009). Only twelve high-ranking militaries remained in the SPDC
(BBC News 2007). But the political system in Burma was highly personalized.
Eﬀectively, two men controlled the government which was also staﬀed with mem-
bers of the armed forces. Its number one is 77 year-old chairman Senior General
Than Shwe. He `has managed to acquire unquestioned sway over the country's
military and government structures. He carefully manipulates those around him,
keeping potential rivals oﬀ balance with sudden, unexpected decisions made after
3After a ﬁrst attempt to draft a new constitution in the 1990s had failed, in 2003, General
Khin Nyunt introduced a seven-point road map to democracy, a reform plan aiming at a
gradual transformation to `disciplined democracy'. This road map foresaw the National
Convention to draft a new constitution and its ratiﬁcation in a referendum in May 2008.
Between 2000 and 2003, secret talks between the opposition leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi
and the junta were held about the establishment of a multi-party political system (Clapp
2007). But the purge against General Khin Nyunt on the eve of the National Convention
marked a drawback in the process of reconciliation and was followed by a wave of paranoia
amongst the military ranks. The junta dismissed the agreement General Khin Nyunt had
reached with the NLD. After Khin Nyunt's removal not only the domestic, but also the
international situation immediately became ﬁercer. International NGOs and UN agencies
were denied access or were simply thrown out of the country and the relations with ASEAN
remarkably cooled down (Clapp 2007). In 2005, the capital was removed from Yangon to the
remote and undeveloped Pyinmana, which subsequently was renamed Naypyitaw.
Parliamentary elections were held on November 7 2010, only one week before the expected
release of opposition leader Suu Kyi. The elections allowed the transfer of power to a civil
government in late March 2011. It also stipulated the disarmament of the ceaseﬁre groups
which were supposed to participate in the elections as civil parties. After the 2010 elections
a generational change and power transition to a younger generation within the military was
observed.
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little if any consultation with his colleagues' (Clapp 2007, 4). Number two was 73
year-old Vice-chairman Deputy Senior General Maung Aye, a hardliner.
Even though two reshues took place in 2010 in preparation for the elections,
these two generals were left in their positions while others were deposed and re-
placed by a younger generation. The fact that they stayed in power while other
much younger generals had to resign caused signiﬁcant disagreement within the
military (Wai Moe 2010a).
7.2.1. The coalition: The military, the military, and the
military
With respect to the winning coalition, the armed forces were the crucial instrument
to maintain the government's power. At the level of individual members of the
leadership circle, the personal power of single junta members was based upon
the support of fractions within the armed forces. Seen from a more systemic
level, military personnel was also the backbone to run the state: it was placed in
all relevant structures in the state administration and the bureaucracy and also
controlled the country's economy. Finally, the mass of soldiers and low-ranking
oﬃcials lent itself as an instrument to carry out the junta's orders, to repress the
population and the opposition. The following sections, will elaborate on these
multi-dimensional functions of the military.
First of all, personal loyalties from speciﬁc military fractions were crucial for
individuals within the leading circle to assert their authority vis-à-vis internal
competitors. This point was illustrated by the purge of General Khin Nyunt
who was the third in the top leading circle until 2004. His purge shed some
light on the fragile power balance between diﬀerent competing fractions within
the military - even though it was argued that there was considerable coherence
among the military leadership in Burma (Dukalskis 2009). Khin Nyunt, chief
of Defense Intelligence Organization and former Prime Minister, was considered
the most open and moderate of the leading triumvirate. He was in charge of
negotiating the conditions for the establishment of a multi-party system with the
opposition and he was managing the opponent ethnic rebel groups (both will be
discussed below). In 2004, he was arrested and sentenced to 44 years in jail and
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house arrest respectively by the other leading generals. Observers reasoned that
he was ousted for fear of his growing power acquired through his leading role in the
political reform process (Clapp 2007) and his pro-Chinese policies (International
Crisis Group 2009). The fact that he disregarded the hierarchies of seniority and
did not sanction his subordinates in the intelligence corps when they challenged
a regional commander loyal to General Maung Aye delivered a welcome pretext
for Khin Nyunt's detention (Hlaing 2005). His power base, the secret service, was
subsequently dismantled. Consequently, `more than 30,000 military forces were
discharged, demoted, or sentenced to long jail terms. Several ministers were ﬁred
and threatened with punishment. Many members of the business community, who
had proﬁted from Khin Nyunt's patronage were disenfranchised' (Clapp 2007, 8).
Intelligence units became integrated under the control of regional commanders and
several younger generals loyal to Than Shwe were promoted into the leading circle
(Hlaing 2005). Hence, personal loyalties to Than Shwe were rewarded and thus
strenthened.
The second function of the military was to control all crucial positions to run the
state. Around the leadership circle, several hundred high-ranking military oﬃcers
and their families formed the body of the ruling elite (Niksch 2007, 13) which
controlled the bureaucracy and the economy. First of all, the military controls the
administration. Abolishing the meritocratic system inherited by the colonial rule
of the British, the military leadership initially positioned members of the armed
forces in central ministries. Many civil servants were already forced to leave in the
aftermath of the 1988 coup for political reasons, but a new wave of militarization
of ministries at all levels was observed in the mid 2000s (Clapp 2007).
Of course, control over the state apparatus did not only ensure political loy-
alty and control, but also oﬀered rent-seeking opportunities for supporters. In
principal, salaries in the public administration and the military were meagre, but
oﬃce-holders could abuse oﬃcial positions for rent-seeking and corruption. Perry
(2005, 193) describes corruption as the core component, even a core value for in-
dividual and oﬃcial decision making in Burma. Corruption had a long tradition
in Burma, but had massively increased after the gradual opening up in 1988. In
international comparison, Burma was the third most corrupt country in the world,
outreached only by Somalia and Afghanistan according to Transparency Interna-
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tional's Corruption Perception Index (Transparency International 2009). `To the
extent that individual military oﬃcers are enriching themselves lavishly from their
positions in government, it is largely at the highest levels, both nationally and
regionally' (Clapp 2007, 9).
Also, the ruling military elites had a thorough grip over the economy. The
SPDC reformed the plan economy after it came to power in 1988. However,
instead of fully liberalizing it, the SPDC established new ways to keep control over
the economic activities in the country. For example, it funded new conglomerates
such as the Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings Limited and the Myanmar
Economic Corporation to pursue the military's business interests (Bünte 2008).
High-ranking military oﬃcers also managed these state corporations and formed
joint-ventures with foreign investments (Niksch 2007). For example, in 1991 alone,
`signing bonuses' for contracts in the oil and gas sector have reportedly swept US$5
to US$10 million into the pockets of the military oﬃcials. The gemstone sector
earned US$3.5 million in 1992 (Perry 2005).4
Clearly, the symbiotic relationship between business tycoons and the military
produced strong vested interests in Burma's economy and the clientelist networks.
As a result, `nepotistic practices, which involve patronizing only the army-bred, ex-
military oﬃcers and business-minded civilians who have unquestioningly embraced
the primacy of the military class' ensured a strong loyalty towards the military
junta (Zarni 2010). Accordingly, most of the country's top 10 inﬂuential and richest
`businessmen' were army-bred or the oﬀ-spring of the regime's highest ranking
generals (Zarni 2010).
Taking into account its illegitimate grip on power, the junta's rule rested to
a considerable extent on the use of force and threat. For this, a massive mili-
tary apparatus was created, the Tatmadaw. With almost 500,000 members, the
Burmese armed forces were among the largest in Southeast Asia. The members
of the Tatmadaw enjoyed privileged treatment. Military expenditure was as high
as 30% of the national budget and in addition to the lucrative positions held by
members of the armed forces, the military enjoyed the services of separate health
4In preparation to a new era heralded with the new constitution and the 2011 elections respec-
tively, and under the pretext of privatization a mass sell-oﬀ of and hand-over of public assets
to businessmen close to the generals took place. It was interpreted as an act of uncertainty
of post-election rent-seeking opportunities (Turnell 2011).
132
7.2. Domestic politics
and educational systems (Clapp 2007).
`In a wholly peculiar way, the armed forces have become a kind of
`caste' in Myanmar society, comprised almost completely of BaMa [the
ethic group of Bamar] soldiers. Ethnic minority troops are uncommon,
and it is not possible for a non-Burmese or a non-Buddhist oﬃcer to
rise above the rank of Major. [. . . ] A soldier's entire family (remark-
ably, up to 60 people) is technically part of an ancillary militia, obliged
to undergo some form of fundamental infantry training. With approx-
imately four million Burmese associated with the SiTat [Tatmadaw]
(both personnel and family members), this represents a signiﬁcant sec-
tor of the population with an interest in seeing itself empowered and
with continuing access to perquisites' (Matthews 2006, 213).
Yet the mere loyalty of its military winning coalition generated by patronage
and nepotism did not suﬃce in securing the power of the military regime. Equally
important was the use of force to dissolve dissent. In a nutshell, the broader
population outside the Tatmadaw was not only excluded from the coalition, but
it was also marginalized and repressed.
On the one hand, organized opposition, namely the activists of the 1988 protests
and the members of the NLD, were prime targets of state repression. On the
other hand, systematic violence, human rights violations, rape, forced evictions
and state-forced labor were used to deter the broader population from upheaval.
Political activity was repelled by repressing civil and political freedoms and
media censoring. Many NLD intelligentsia was arrested during the 1990s. Most
famously, opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi has spent more than twelve years
in house arrest since 1990. In 2002, the `lady' was released from house arrest
and embarked on a tour to the ethnic areas to consult with local NLD leaders
and ethnic representatives, but a renewed crackdown on the opposition ended this
newly achieved freedom following the Dipeyin incident, a violent clash between
government mobs and the NLD in May 2003. After that, a decline in political
activism among students and monks was observed in 2005 on the basis of a small
survey (Hlaing 2005).
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When necessary, the junta did not shy away to use pure violence as exempli-
ﬁed by the repression of mass demonstrations in 2007. Demonstrations broke out
following the increase in fuel prices which caused high inﬂation. These demonstra-
tions were triggered by a violent incident between security forces and protesting
Buddhist monks dressed in orange. After a month of growing support among ordi-
nary citizens for the protestors which had changed objectives from the economic to
the political, the `Saﬀron Revolution' was brutally knocked down by the military
(Clapp 2007).
It is noteworthy, however, that in addition to pure repression, the junta also
tried to increase control over the population by less violent means. For example,
the government created the USDA, a mass-organization comprising more than 24
million members. With its community development and educational components
it seeked to make membership attractive and especially tried to co-opt the youth.
Nonetheless, it relied to a large extent on conscripted membership and was thus not
a participatory and inclusive organization. In 2010 the USDA was transformed
into the Union Solidarity and Development Party under the leadership of Prime
Minister Thein Sein in order to participate in the 2010 elections (BBC News 2010).
7.2.2. The ethnic rebel groups
So far, the struggle for power has been described along the distinction between
in- and outsiders of the coalition. It is important to note that this perspective
fails to grasp the full complexity of Burma's domestic politics. In addition to
these lines of conﬂict between the members of the military and the oppositional
forces, a second cleavage along ethnic lines was important. While the former was
a struggle between the powerful and the powerless within the society of ethnically
Burmese, a second dimension of conﬂict arose between the majority ethnic group
of Bamars and several ethnic minority groups. A number of these ethnic minorities
eﬀectively challenged the rule of the military junta and were therefore excluded
from the coalition too.
Burma is inhabited by 135 oﬃcially recognized indigenous ethnic groups. Around
65% of the population is Bamar. The country is divided into 14 administrative
regions comprising seven states which were named after the major ethnic groups in
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that area and seven divisions with Bamar majorities. Due to topography as well as
diﬀering political, economic and socio-cultural practices, a supra-ethnic Burmese
identity has never evolved (Tin Maung Maung Than 2005a, 69). As a consequence,
several ethnic groups have been seeking independence from the Union of Myanmar
even since its independence in 1948.
In 1989 or thereafter, the central government successfully reached a level of un-
derstanding with 27 of these ethnic groups pushing them to collaborate. After the
coup in 1988, the BCP had split into four groups along the lines of ethnic groups
and with the ceaseﬁre agreements they transformed into legal organizations. Far
from being able to control these rebel groups, the central government granted them
wide autonomy in exchange for their collaboration, including the maintenance of
military forces and the allowance to produce gems, lumber and narcotics under a
proﬁt sharing agreement. As a result, some of the minority areas were eﬀectively
ruled by patriarchal organized armed rebels relying on drug production (Hlaing
2005). In 2002 alone, the Wa minority military forces earned an estimated US$250-
US$300 million from heroin smuggling into Thailand and another US$300 million
from methamphetamine production (Niksch 2007, 9).
The road map to democracy with the new constitution that attribute all compe-
tences of national defence to the military - hence requiring the demilitarization of
the armed groups that were in power after the ceaseﬁre (henceforth referred to as
ceaseﬁre groups) - fuelled the issue of ethnic separatism. Only some smaller groups
accepted the SPDC's request to disarm and to transform into lightly armed bor-
der guard militias under Tatmadaw command in 2009. But given the lucrative
business interests at stake, three of the largest groups, the Wa, Kachin and Shan
refused to do so. In spring and summer 2009, in an attempt to consolidate control
over the entire country before the elections and under the pretext of cracking down
on illegal narcotics and arms production, the central government launched military
attacks against two separatist groups, the Karen National Liberation Army and
the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), along the Thai and
the Chinese borders respectively.
The strongest opponent to the border guard proposal was the United Wa State
Army (UWSA) with more than 20,000 troops and great guerrilla potential. In
order to increase its leverage over the ceaseﬁre groups, the junta started to build
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a railway from southern to eastern Shan State to ease the mobilization of military
equipment into the Wa territory (Wai Moe 2010b). It also tried to force compli-
ance with the border guard force plan by closing the border to Thailand, thereby
disrupting cash ﬂows from border trade (Weng 2010). However, after the NLD
announced its boycott of the elections, some of the ceaseﬁre groups also refused to
allow elections in their territory (Weng 2010; Myo Maung 2010; Turnell 2011).
Summary
Lacking any constitutional framework for most of the period under investigation,
the domestic politics in Burma are relatively straight-forward. There was no formal
selectorate. Informally, the survival of the military government was dependent on
loyalties within the armed forces, the higher ranks of which formed the winning
coalition. The military occupied all state bodies, and controled the bureaucracy
and the economy. Many ex-militaries or persons with strong ties to the military
rose as a new class of business tycoons.
Those who were not in the Tatmadaw were excluded from the coalition, reducing
the coalition to a very exclusive, small size elite. Expelled from the coalition were
also the armed ethnic rebel forces who did not accept the rule of the military junta
and managed to bar the central government from their regions.
7.3. China in Burma
The previous sections presented the constituencies of the Burmese winning coali-
tion. This was a small coalition which was very much relying on support from the
armed forces. Against this background, the nexus between Chinese and Burmese
actors is investigated. This section is divided into two subsections: the ﬁrst section
looks at China's engagement with the ruling generals and their military supporters.
The second section investigates China's approaches towards those who are outside
of the winning coalition, the ethnic rebel groups, and the democratic opposition.5
5Much of this section is based on a detailed report of the International Crisis Group (2009).
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7.3.1. China and the Burmese coalition: The military
The relationship between the leaders of the CCP and the Burmese junta was
complicated. Some of the complexity was rooted in the spillovers of China's civil
war to Burma and the subsequent attempts by the Chinese communist regime to
spread revolution, as well as in their support of communist insurgencies in Burma.
As has been mentioned in section 7.1, the CCP started incursions into Burma's
northern Shan State during the 1950s in order to retrieve Kuomintang troops which
had retreated into Burmese territory after their defeat. Later, during the Chinese
Cultural Revolution, the relations to the CCP were severely disrupted. In 1954,
Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai had reassured the Burmese government under Prime
Minister U Nu: `Revolution cannot be exported, and any attempt to export revolu-
tion must suﬀer defeat' (Guo 2007, 30). Yet a decade later, Chairman Mao Zedong
actively encouraged regime change abroad. The Chinese support for the BCP was
covert because both sides had signed a treaty of non-interference earlier. The sup-
port materialized in trainings for communist party leaders, the supply of modern
weaponry, infrastructure support, several hundred advisors from the People's Lib-
eration Army (PLA), and thousands of Chinese soldiers (Guo 2007). When ethnic
Chinese, encouraged by the Chinese embassy, tried to spread the Cultural Revo-
lution further into Burmese society in 1967, violent anti-Chinese riots unlashed.
Diplomatic relation between the two governments nose dived subsequently in the
period thereafter (Guo 2007). Only in 1985, the CCP assistance to the Burmese
communists was phased out (Guo 2007). This record of attempts to export the
Communist revolution fuelled the junta's mistrust of the Chinese leaders.
In the late 1970s, under the rule of Deng Xiaoping, Sino-Burmese relations
formally normalized, but it was often emphasized that it was primarily the inter-
national unpopularity of the Chinese and the Burmese governments in the wake
of repression on democratic upheavals that helped to consolidate the relationship
in the late 1980s (Tin Maung Maung Than 2003). In 1989, General Than Shwe
ﬁrst visited Beijing. In 1994, then Prime Minister Li Peng, outlawed in the West
for his hard stance with respect to the Tiananmen suppression, visited Burma.
The common approach vis-à-vis their domestic oppositions was the foundation on
which a convergence of interests developed between the leaders of the two countries
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in opposing `Western values' that threatened interference in their `internal aﬀairs'
(Tin Maung Maung Than 2003).
Since then, the Chinese along with the Israeli government has become the largest
supplier of weapons and military equipment to the Burmese government. Between
1989 and 1995, the Burmese junta increasingly invested in the military; trippling
the national defence spending while the country experienced economic stagnation
(Guo 2007). In 1990 and 1994, arms deals with China involving weapons and
military equipment having an estimated value between US$400 million and US$1.2
billion were reported. Due to Chinese weapon supply on favorable terms, the
junta was able to expand and improve its military capability (Tin Maung Maung
Than 2003). High ranking PLA oﬃcials often visited Burma (Guo 2007) and the
Chinese military has been involved in improving existing light equipment, and in
upgrading in terms of force multiplication for conventional war ﬁghting. But it
also provided the Burmese army with training in the technical use of weapons and
weapon systems (International Crisis Group 2009; Chenyang and Fook 2009, 21).6
In light of my theoretical approach, the close link between the two militaries
in China and Burma appears as a primary example for the exchange of private
goods between the two small winning coalitions. The Burmese generals received
military assistance at favorable terms from China, a good that was doubtlessly
targeted at their narrow needs and with which they could improve the status of
their supporting winning coalition. Given the desolate condition of the Burmese
economy, this ﬂow of resources to the barracks would not have been possible - at
least not to such an extent - without the favorable deals given by the Chinese.
One can therefore assume that the Chinese proliferation of military equipment
contributed to the survival of the military junta by increasing their capacity to
fend oﬀ domestic competitors and to distribute targeted goods to their coalition
members.
But the Chinese shore up of the junta went beyond military support and also
materialized in high-level diplomacy. In 2000, on the occasion of the 50th an-
niversary of bilateral diplomatic relations, Chinese Vice-President Hu Jintao paid
6Chinese sources usually stress that the Chinese arms sales are focused on missiles, aircraft and
other heavy weaponry, but not on light weapons that can be used to surpress the population
(Chenyang and Fook 2009; Ruisheng 2010). There are diﬀering interpretations on that in the
literature.
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a visit to Burma, just to be followed by President Jiang Zemin in 2001 (Guo 2007).
Premier Wen Jiabao visited Burma in 2010. The Burmese generals have been vis-
iting Beijing almost every year. They were oﬃcially received by President Jiang
Zemin or Hu Jintao or Premier Wen Jiabao respectively in 2003, 2004, 2006 and
2010. The leaders of both countries met on numerous occasions during multilat-
eral conferences in Asia and countless high-ranking Chinese delegations, among
which the State Councillor Tang Juaxuan, members of the Political Bureau of the
CCP Central Committee, the vice chief-of-staﬀ of the PLA and other militaries
visited Naypyidaw. China's foreign minister Yang Jiechi visited Burma twice in
2008 (International Crisis Group 2009).
Importantly, the Chinese government has also protected the regime against ex-
ternal pressure from the UN . In early 2007, the Chinese government, together with
Russia, vetoed a UN Security Council resolution tabled by the U.S. and Britain
on the ground that the issue was an internal Burmese matter (Zhao 2007).7 With-
out doubt, this protection was also intended to prolonging the political survival of
the generals. However, since the Chinese government was not the single force to
act in favor of the junta, it is easy to argue counterfactually that due to Russia's
opposition the generals would have survived a destabilizing UN resolution in any
event.
During the high-level meetings between Chinese and Burmese oﬃcials, a num-
ber of bilateral agreements on cooperation in a wide range of issue areas were an-
nounced, most often, however, without publishing further details. In 1994, a trade
agreement of bridge and railway equipment worth US$50 million was reached. In
2003, a major agreement on US$200 million of preferential loans for a hydro-power
plant was published, and a partial debt relief was announced in 2006 (Liu 1994,
2003, 2006; Maung Aung Myoe 2007). An analyst in Singapore has calculated on
the base of Burmese data that between 1989 and 2006, the PRC government pro-
vided in total over Yuan 2.15 billion and US$400 million in various forms of loans.8
In addition, debt relief of Yuan 10 million and Yuan 200 million in grant aid was
7However, the fact that the Chinese government allowed a critical presidential statement of the
UN Security Council later that year was interpreted as a break with the Burmese government
(Holliday 2009).
8Before 1988, Burma had received Chinese development assistance loans of US$64 million in
1979, US$15 million in 1984 and Yuan 80 million in 1987 (Maung Aung Myoe 2007).
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awarded by the Chinese (Maung Aung Myoe 2007, 19). Maung Aung Myoe (2007)
also found that major development assistance was only paid after general Than
Shwe's 1996 state visit to Beijing.
The Chinese cooperation also extended to projects on the development agenda
of the Burmese authorities (Tin Maung Maung Than 2003). They focused on agri-
cultural technology, agricultural machinery manufacturing, fertilizers and power
plants, but also included the renovation of Yangon National Cultural Theatre and
projects of communications. From 2003 onwards, hydro-power projects became
a prominent entry. Several infrastructure projects such as the dredging of the
Yangon and the Ayerwaddy Rivers to enable navigation of 20,000 tonnage vessels,
several railway connections and a number of roads, were realized with Chinese as-
sistance. Finally, China's interests in Burma's natural resources were reﬂected in
a US$ 200 million loan in 2006, part of which was designated for the procurement
of drilling materials for oil drilling rigs.
`Through bilateral development assistance, since 1988, China helped
the Myanmar government build eight out of nine new sugar mills [US$
158 million], 20 new hydroelectric power plants [US$ 269 million], 13
out of 45 new factories under the Ministry of Industry-1 [US$ 198
million], and 12 out of 21 new plants under Ministry of Industry-2
[US$ 137 million]. In addition, China also upgraded six factories under
the Ministry of Industry-2 [US$ 346 million], supplied six ocean-going
vessels, and built a dry dockyard [US$ 25 million]. In 2006, Chinese
ﬁrms are building 7 out of 11 new hydro-electric plants in Myanmar
[US$ 350-400 million]' (Maung Aung Myoe 2007, 23).
In general, this assistance was uniquely channelled through the SPDC, another
factor that directly improved the survival of the military junta. In the industrial
sector, the Chinese assistance mainly helped to establish Burmese SOEs (Maung
Aung Myoe 2007). For example, the Burmese Ministry of Industry-2 increased
its number of factories from nine to 21 during the period from 1988 to 2006. All
of these factories were ﬁnanced through grants, loans, and bank guarantee notes
from the Chinese government (Maung Aung Myoe 2007). Moreover, the Chinese
state export subsidies played a crucial role in penetrating the Burmese market
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which became heavily dependent on its economic ties with China.9 The strong
motivation to use loans and grants in order to promote Chinese exports becomes
very apparent in Burma.
Again, the exchange of private goods between the two small winning coalition
governments in Burma and China helped to satisfy the crucial coalition members
in Burma. The Burmese leadership could reap proﬁts or extracts assets from
the industrial projects constructed with the help of Chinese, because funds were
allocated under the direct control of the Burmese authorities. These gains could
were then redistributed to the winning coalition members and thereby increased
the political stability of the small coalition.
On the other hand, the proﬁts gained from these exchanges ﬁlled at times di-
rectly the pockets of coalition members at the Chinese side. A prime example was
a grant of Yuan 30 million in 2004 which was given partly to procure a mobile
X-ray container vehicle inspection system (Myoe 2007). The mobile scanners, de-
signed for the custom service to scan containers were most probably sold by the
Chinese Nuctech Co., a SOE which ranks among the world leaders in radiation
and radiation technology. The former president of this company was Chinese Pres-
ident Hu Jintao's son, Hu Haifeng. In 2009, the European Union and oﬃcials in
Namibia investigated against the company because of allegations of price-dumping
and corruption.
Despite this protection and support by the Chinese government to the Burmese
junta and the public show-oﬀ of close ties, it seemed that both the Chinese and
the Burmese governments did not have a very cordial relationship. Analysts in-
terpreted the fact that the Burmese generals never travelled to China for medical
treatment as an indication for their continuing distrust (Wai Moe 2010c). Suppos-
edly, dozens of Taiwanese intelligence agents working in Burma were co-opted by
the regime to provide the generals with information on China (Wai Moe 2010c).
More strikingly, in several instances the Chinese government found itself confronted
with decisions taken by the junta without being informed in advance. It was taken
by surprise by important decisions such as the 2004 dismissal of former Prime Min-
9It was believed that the no or low interests on commercial loans and suppliers' credits from
Chinese SOE and state banks were in reality added to the cost of the project (Maung Aung
Myoe 2007)
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ister General Khin Nyunt, the relocation of the capital to Naypyidaw in 2005, and
the 2009 military attack in Kokang (Jagan 2009; Holliday 2009; Wai Moe 2010c).
At the same time, one of the suspected motivations to purge General Khin Nyunt
was his pro-Chinese stance. As a consequence, the Chinese were subsequently de-
prived of a link to the SPDC and the gap between the Chinese and the Burmese
government widened (International Crisis Group 2009, 32).
From the Chinese perspective, the Chinese government was also dissatisﬁed with
the SPDC's rule, its economic mismanagement and its intransigent dealing with
the domestic opposition which created much international attention and criticism.
This criticism, in turn, also fell back on China. To improve political stability
in Burma, the Chinese government favored political reforms within the existing
structures. This essentially meant a continuation of the small winning coalition,
but with a more civilian face and with some form of participation of the varying
domestic oppositional players. These reforms were envisioned to increase the inclu-
siveness and the legitimacy of the Burmese government. In order to achieve this,
the Chinese government considered necessary domestic reconciliation in Burma
(Chenyang and Fook 2009). This reconciliation was meant ensure that the domes-
tic opposition was involved in the political process in the future, that the central
government would ﬁnd a more sustainable solution with respect to the ceaseﬁre
groups and that it generated more legitimacy among the broader population.
7.3.2. China and the disenfranchised
The democratic opposition
It was the Chinese ambassador who was the ﬁrst to welcome the party to power
after their election victory in 1990 (Ruisheng 2010). However, Burma's democratic
opposition movement and the NLD leader Aung San Suu Kyi in particular did not
enjoy speciﬁc love from the Chinese government. The NLD was considered too
Western oriented. Moreover, a democratic political order, in general, would enjoy
much support from and probably be much more susceptible to Western inﬂuence,
which was generally not in the Chinese interest.
This did not mean that the Chinese government agreef with all policies of the
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military junta. Even though not willing to mediate between both sides, the Chinese
government put pressure on the military junta to enroll in a process of domestic
reforms and reconciliation. On the one hand, it called on the junta to hold direct
talks with the opposition (International Crisis Group 2009, 5). On the other hand,
the Chinese government voiced calls for improved governance and reconciliation at
the international stage by excplicitly supporting visits of UN special rapporteurs
and the UN good oﬃces mission. In 1993, the Secretary-General obtained the
mandate to use his good oﬃces to help implementing the seventeen UN resolu-
tions on Burma which have been passed by the General Assembly since 1991. More
than two dozen visits to Burma have been undertaken by three successive special
envoys since 1995. Additionally, several special rapporteurs on human rights and
other issues visited the country. China assisted these visits by, amongst others, ar-
ranging visas and urging the junta to grant access to the leadership, the democratic
opposition groups and the ethnic minorities.
Even though China's backing of the UN good oﬃces mission signiﬁcantly helped
the UN and thereby willingly or unwillingly promoted the cause of the opposition,
the Chinese government however stayed away from providing the democratic op-
position with the kind of international support that it granted to the SPDC. The
Chinese government approved a Security Council statement and a UN Human
Rights Council resolution after the violent crack-down on the Saﬀron revolution in
2007, but urged the removal of several demands from the initial draft, including
the release of opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi.10
Nonetheless, also direct interaction between the Chinese government and the
Burmese democratic opposition, including the NLD, existed. These contacts
which reportedly increased after the renewed detention of Aung San Suu Kyi in
2003 and the purge of Khnin Nyunt in 2004, were described as `a mix of intelligence
gathering, reassurance and relationship building' (International Crisis Group 2009,
9). Accordingly, the Chinese government used these contacts to gather informa-
tion on the groups themselves, including their funds, their links to the West and
10Moreover, in 2008, Aung San Suu Kyi was sentenced to another eighteen months under house
arrest for violating the terms of her house arrest after an American had swam to her house.
Even though the Chinese representation initially agreed to a press statement of the Security
Council it later opposed a draft presidential statement condemning the verdict. The statement
was later released in a watered-down version.
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the NLD. They served to ﬁnd out the position of the opposition on a number of
issues with the government, their perception of China's engagement in Burma, but
also of U.S. and Thai policies towards Burma (International Crisis Group 2009).
At the same time, the Chinese agents tried to convince the groups to engage with
the military government and to participate in the upcoming elections.
Hence, it appeared that the intention of the Chinese government with regard to
the Burmese opposition was one of co-optation rather than of material support.
The exchange between Chinese oﬃcials and these groups reportedly took place
in Thailand or at the Sino-Burmese border, but also at the provincial capital of
Yunnan or Beijing, to which the representatives of some of the groups were invited.
`The groups are treated very well during trips to Kunming or Beijing, hosted in
top hotels and treated to tourist attractions. The opposition groups note that the
level of sophistication of the dialogue is much greater in Beijing than in Kunming'
(International Crisis Group 2009, 10).
To a certain extent, China's support for the current small winning coalition and
its preference to stabilize the given regime through reform was also reﬂected in
its dealings with the democratic opposition. Not only did it try to convince the
opposition to participate in the elections, the Chinese reportedly also asked Aung
San Kyi whether she `could be ﬂexible and whether she might be able to accept
a role less than head of state, in which she could exercise inﬂuence but could
also be reconciled with the army's position' (International Crisis Group 2009, 10).
Obviously, the Chinese approach tried to make the democratic opposition more
willing to accept its inclusion in the existent winning coalition and to let go its
aspirations to displace the current government. It was therefore not surprising that
no transfer of resources from China to the Burmese opposition was observed.11
The Chinese strategy targeted at increasing the incentives for the opposition to
participate in the existent coalition rather than increasing its capability to reward
its own loyalists. The latter could have challenged the current government in the
long run.
11In the personal reﬂections of a former Chinese ambassador to Burma, he acknowledged that
back in 1988, he did not consider Aung San Suu Kyi's request to close border trade with
the Burmese military under the pretext of technical problems. However, he confronted the
military government with a call for national reconciliation between the military and the
democratic oppostition (Ruisheng 2010).
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The ceaseﬁre groups
Just as the democratic opposition challenged the power of the central government,
so did the ethnic ceaseﬁre groups. The Chinese government had connections to a
number of rebel groups. The relationship between the Burmese ethnic rebel groups
and the Chinese communist leadership dated back to the 1960s when the CCP
actively supported communist revolutions elsewhere. At that time, several ethnic
minority groups, several of which are ethnical Chinese located along the Sino-
Burmese border, fought together under the umbrella of the BCP . After China
had stopped its assistance to the BCP in 1985, the party disintegrated into ethnic
rebel groups that ﬁnanced themselves through poppy cultivation, opium trade,
and lumber and gem production. As mentioned in section 7.2.2 these armed mili-
tias never submitted to the Burmese Central government, but negotiated ceaseﬁre
agreements in which they were granted a degree of autonomy.
The Chinese government claimed to maintain no direct relations with the cease-
ﬁre groups in order not to trouble its relations with the Burmese central govern-
ment. However, the former comrades-in-arms in Burma had not been dropped.
First of all, it is the Yunnan provincial government and intelligence agents that
reached out to the ceaseﬁre groups (International Crisis Group 2009). There were
more than a dozen minority nationalities living in China's south western Yunnan
province that were also dwelling in neighboring Vietnam, Laos, and Burma (Guo
2007).12 `Owing to geographic proximity and kinship, parts of the Shan State,
in particular the Wa-controlled territory and Kogang, have a closer relationship
with Yunnan than other parts of Myanmar' (Guo 2007, 51). It was reported that
Chinese oﬃcials and companies had better access to some of the ceaseﬁre areas
than the Burmese central government, which often needed Chinese help to access
these areas (International Crisis Group 2009, 11).
By the means of controlling the borders, the Chinese government had an eﬀec-
tive leverage to decide upon the survival of the ceaseﬁre groups along their borders.
It allowed cross border trade even though the ceaseﬁre groups targeted some of
12With respect to Burma, there were the Chinese Dai nationality with its counterpart of Burma's
Shan nationality, and the Chinese Jingpo nationality corresponding to Burma's Kachin na-
tionality. In both countries there were Miao, Yao, Yi, Wa, Hani, and Lisu nationalities, who
shared the same origins and speak same languages (Chinese Embassy 2010b).
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their illicit activities such as drug trade and gambling at Chinese consumers (In-
ternational Crisis Group 2009, 11).13 The Chinese also supplied many Burmese
cities along the Chinese borders with electricity, water and telecommunications.
Most crucially, China did not close the border during the Burmese attack against
the rebel groups in the Kogang area in the summer of 2009 and allowed the rebels
along with the population to ﬂee into the Chinese territories. In late 2009, bilat-
eral relations between the Chinese and the Burmese central governments reached
the bottom when the Burmese military junta, in an attempt to disarm the ethnic
rebel groups in preparation of the 2010 elections, attacked the Chinese speaking
Kokang ceaseﬁre group. This triggered a wave of more than 4,000 refugees into
Thailand and some 37,000 refugees into China's Yunnan province (Storey 2009;
Seekins 2010). The Chinese government was `extremely upset' by these spillover
eﬀects and `furious' that it had not even been forewarned by the Burmese central
authorities about this military operation (Jagan 2009).
Moreover, contrary to its oﬃcial statements, the Wa minority which had the clos-
est contact with China and was also the most powerful among the ceaseﬁre groups,
was supplied with Chinese arms. Observers asserted that the Wa were furnished
with heavy weapons from China. The Chinese government did not prohibited its
own SOE to sell arms to the Wa and while `oﬃcials deny that it is China's pol-
icy to sell weapons to the Wa, they admit that a few `rogue elements' from the
People's Liberation Army (PLA) have done so' (International Crisis Group 2009,
11).
Given China's own problems with separatist minorities, it could hardly be in the
interest of the Chinese central government to see the Burmese ethnic minorities
achieving independence. To the contrary, this could potentially trigger minorities
on the Chinese side to demand independence too. However, observers pointed to
the diverging interests of the governments in Beijing and in Yunnan's provincial
capital of Kunming. The provincial government of Yunnan and its businessmen
were primarily interested in the economic development of the province and private
proﬁts and therefore prefered a weak central government in Burma. As will be
13At the same time, as drug addiction and the spread of HIV/Aids became a serious problem in
China's southern provinces, the Chinese government started increased programmes to ﬁght
narcotics.
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discussed in section 7.4.2, they negotiated projects for the depletions of Burmese
timber and mineral resources against the opposition of the Burmese central gov-
ernment directly with the ceaseﬁre groups (International Crisis Group 2009). The
Yunnan government therefore endorsed UN measures to pressure the military
central government (International Crisis Group 2009). With these activities, Yun-
nan's provincial government hazarded the negative consequences for the bilateral
relations between the two central governments.
The Burmese population
As has already been mentioned, China's economic assistance was uniquely chan-
nelled through the Burmese government. It seemed there was no attempt to reach
out to the broader Burmese society. Some payments for disaster relief after the
tsunami in 2004 and in reaction to Cyclon Nargis were made. Other than those
payments, no evidence was found of any philanthropic development assistance, do-
nation or any other investments targeted at the broader population. In early 2005,
diﬀerent Chinese state organizations, through the Chinese embassy in Burma, do-
nated more than US$300,000 of disaster relief. But the fact that US$100,000 of
this was directly handed over to the Ministry of Defense of the Union of Myanmar
suggested that at best only a fraction of this assistance reached the Burmese peo-
ple. In the aftermath of Cyclon Nargis, the Chinese government sent a 50-member
medical team and donated ﬁrst US$1 million and then another US$30 million and
US$10 million of disaster relief (Xinhua 2008a; Chenyang and Fook 2009).
In addition, a student-exchange program existed between China and Burma
(Chinese Embassy 2010a). But given that only 50 students were involved in this
exchange annually, in a country with more than 48 million inhabitants, this pro-
gramm seemed to be very limited in nature and was probably targeted at the
elite.
With respect to the Chinese economic engagement in Burma, only few bene-
ﬁts accrued to the population. `Local Chinese businessmen openly admit that
what they are doing is not better than previous colonial powers' (International
Crisis Group 2009, 23). Since Chinese companies focused on the extractive sector,
economic development was not enhanced in the country. Moreover, even the large
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infrastructure projects were carried out by thousands of shipped-in Chinese labors,
creating only very few jobs if at all for the Burmese population.
`The lack of transparency and available information on land acqui-
sition, environmental impact and displacement caused by Chinese hy-
dropower and mining projects as well as oil and gas explorations un-
derscore the concerns of environmental and human rights groups. Chi-
nese companies that operate abroad often do not conduct the required
assessments that are standard for international operations. Chinese
infrastructure and construction projects are often accompanied by in-
creased military presence in project areas, frequently leading to large
scale forced labor, forced relocation and human rights abuses' (Inter-
national Crisis Group 2009, 23).
The above-mentioned negative eﬀects of Chinese investments in Burma were
rather indirect. However, the Chinese anti-narcotic policy exemplyﬁed that the
Chinese did not have the intention to further the position of the Burmese pop-
ulation. Within the framework of the Chinese anti-narcotic policy, they directly
exploited and harmed the interests of the Burmese society. In response to the
growing drug and HIV/Aids problem in Yunnan province, the Chinese government
adopted an anti-narcotic policy including an alternative crop project targeted at
the farmers in the poppy-growing ethnic rebel groups regions. In 2003 and 2005,
under pressure from the Chinese government, opium bans were enforced over the
Kokang and Wa regions. Because up to 80% of the population was living on poppy
cultivation in these areas, many subsistence farmers faced serious loss in income
and a worsened food security situation as a consequence of the prohibition to grow
poppy.
In the context of the opium ban, the Chinese government provided Chinese
companies with soft loans through a national alternative development programme
for investment in agriculture in these regions (Kramer 2009; Chenyang and Fook
2009). Instead of mitigating the negative eﬀects of the opium ban on the livelihood
of farmers, `they have promoted Chinese investment in monoplantations, especially
in rubber. These projects have created many undesired eﬀects and do not signif-
icantly proﬁt the population' (Kramer 2009, 1). Many Chinese companies made
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arrangements with the local warlords, to provide seedlings, fertilizer, expertise,
and payment for labor, while the Wa authorities provided the land and the man-
power. As a result, forced evictions, relocation of people and forced labor were
spurred. Other Chinese businessmen used the scheme to invest in tea or sugarcane
production in these regions. They provided the seedlings, fertilizers and pesticides,
charged for the road construction to the ﬁelds and forced the farmers to sell their
crops back. `Many farmers say they were forced to work on plantations, or forced
to grow these crops on their land, without clear agreements on payment. Nobody
had seen a contract' (Kramer 2009, 9).
Summary
To sum up this section, the Chinese government heavily probed up the military
junta in Burma. It maintained good state-to-state relations with the military
government in Burma and protected the junta against international diplomatic
pressure, sanctions and interventions. In economic terms, the Chinese government
provided no and low interest loans and grants to the Burmese military junta. In
doing so, it created a win-win-situation. That is, this way the SPDC was enabled
to both upgrade its military capacities and to pursue its domestic development
strategy, where state industries under the control of the military and strategic
infrastructure were constructed. The Chinese elites managing the Chinese SOE
in a variety of sectors, including the military, also proﬁted from this policy by
acquiring contracts.
At the same time, the Chinese government directly or indirectly maintained
relationships to the two challengers of the SPDC, the democratic opposition and
the ceaseﬁre groups. It is noteworthy, that the ethnic rebel groups enjoyed a
close relationship with Chinese state actors, albeit not at the central, but at the
provincial government level. Between the leaders of the ceaseﬁre groups and the
Yunnan provincial government a convergence of interest similar to that between
the two central governments evolved. With respect to the opposition groups, the
relationship appeared to attempt to co-opt individual Burmese opposition leaders
without involving material support, in an eﬀort to make these groups more willing
to collaborate with the central government.
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Finally, the Chinese decision-maker did not pay attention to the Burmese pop-
ulation at large. It was not speciﬁcally addressed by the Chinese government, and
agreements between the two governments were often harmful to the local popula-
tion. It was also indicative, that the Chinese government allowed Chinese business
interests and the leaders of the rebel groups to hijack its crop substitution policy,
the only policy that was targeted at the population.
7.4. Realization of Chinese interests
This section deals with the question whether China was successful in realizing its
interests in Burma. The section is divided into three parts according to the three
issue areas under investigation. The ﬁrst subsections discuss the Burmese reaction
to China's `one China' policy, the Taiwan question and its dealings with the Dalai
Lama. Subsection two illustrates how Chinese companies have sought access to the
Burmese energy sector. Finally, subsection three investigates whether the Burmese
government is compliant with China's geo-strategic interests in Burma.
7.4.1. Territorial integrity and the `one China' policy
In both issue areas concerning the territorial integrity of the People's Republic of
China, the government in Burma accommodated China's interests. It completely
ignored the Dalai Lama, and only unoﬃcially dealt with Taiwan, thereby taking
on a position on the eager end of the compliance spectrum.
Burma had no oﬃcial diplomatic relations with Taipei and its adherence to the
`one China' policy was reiterated regularly. Until 2000, the Taiwanese government
maintained economic and cultural oﬃces in Rangoon and Mandalay, but since
these unoﬃcial representation oﬃces were closed down, the Taiwanese representa-
tion was driven further into the underground. It was said that a representation of
their interests through informal trade oﬃces and Chinese temples continued (Wai
Moe 2010c). This was despite strong business relations reﬂected in the high num-
ber of direct ﬂights between both countries (Wai Moe 2010c) and an estimated
100,000 Taiwanese citizens of Burmese origin living on the Taiwanese island. Even
though in June 2009 a trade agreement between Taiwanese and the Burmese gov-
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ernments was signed, with no representation facilities any more, the relationship
between Taiwan and Burma has weakened.
With respect to the Dalai Lama issue, the Dalai Lama has never visited Burma.
Theravada Buddhism was used by the military junta to strengthen its grip on
power and to dominate over minorities, especially Islamic groups. Interestingly,
the Chinese government facilitated the visit of Buddha's Tooth Relic from Beijing
to Yangon and Mandalay in 1994 and 1996 (Chenyang and Fook 2009). The junta
used these visits as an instrument to increase its legitimacy by showing its piety
and religiosity (Tin Maung Maung Than 2003). Both visits were `enthusiastically
welcomed by the masses who ﬂocked by tens of thousands every day to pay their
respect' (Tin Maung Maung Than 2003, 207).
The Burmese junta always complied with the `one China' policy. In 2004, the
Fourth World Buddhist Summit was held in Burma without the Dalai Lama. Be-
longing to a diﬀerent strand of Buddhism, his holiness was certainly only of limited
use for the Burmese government. Yet, the Burmese government demonstrated a
certain political motivation in its dealings with the Dalai Lama: For about two
decades the Dalai Lama was not even mentioned in Burmese state-controlled me-
dia. But in 2009, widely interpreted as an expression of disagreement over the
Chinese reluctance to stop support to the ceaseﬁre groups, an article over the
Dalai Lama was released just after the junta's crack-down on one of the armed
rebel groups located along the borders to China (Jagan 2009).
7.4.2. Access to natural resources
To a signiﬁcant extent, Burma's economy was dominated by China. Even though
the military government started to liberalize Burma's socialist economy after its
takeover in 1988, strategic industries remained nationalized. A distorted economy
with direct and indirect subsidies to members of the military and state oﬃcials,
control over exchange rates and the banking sector proved a valuable means to pay-
oﬀ loyalists. Seemingly in preparation of the 2010 elections, the junta started to
swiftly privatize the state sector, and eﬀectively turned state assets into the private
pockets of the military and its cronies. In addition to the distorted economy, the
military also relied on the natural resources of the country to ﬁll its coﬀers.
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Burma's oil and gas sectors did not only illustrate vividly how the exploitation
of natural resources in autocracies translates into private revenues that could be
redistributed among the members of the winning coalition. It also showed how
external players tried to make use of this mechanism and how mutually beneﬁting
policies were exchanged between the leaders in both small winning coalitions in
China and Burma. China has been very successful in extracting resources from
Burma in exchange for crucial support to the leaders and their winning coalition
in Burma.
To begin with, the mechanism to transform national wealth into resources for
the leading junta was fairly simple: Oil and gas investments legally required a
50% joint-venture with the state-owned Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise. `For-
eign companies receive a contractual right to explore for oil and gas, and bring
the capital and expertise the junta lacks. In the event of a commercially viable
discovery, MOGE [Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise] steps in at the production
phase to collect revenue, having risked nothing in the process' (Smith 2007).
Since almost all of the natural gas was exported, the economic concessions given
by the Burmese government to foreign exploitation companies did not improve the
domestic energy supply, but were directly transformed into monetary resources at
the junta's discretionary disposal. The SPDC rejected a proposal by French Total
and American Unocal to build an additional gas pipeline to supply Rangoon with
energy, and instead opted for exclusively exporting the gas to Thailand (Clapp
2007). The foreign investments were often heavily protected by the Burmese mili-
tary forces. This was the reason why oil and gas exploitation companies in Burma
were frequently accused for being involved in serious human rights abuses such as
forced relocation, forced labor, killings or rape in relation to oil and gas projects.14
Burma's gas ﬁelds were the second largest in Southeast Asia. The interest in
exploiting these gas ﬁelds of all its neighbors was so high that it has been described
as an `intense bidding war' between Thailand, India and China (Zhao 2007, ii).
Investments in Burma's oil and natural gas sectors from abroad more than tripled
from 2006 to 2007. In 2010, it even represented 100% of all oﬃcially decleared
FDI (Turnell 2011). Even though foreign investors from South Korea, Thailand,
14These accusations ﬁnally led British Premier Oil to sell its stakes in Burma (The Shwe Gas
Movement 2010).
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Singapore, France, the U.S., Malaysia, India, and China were operating in this
sector (Tin Maung Maung Than 2005b) and South Korean Daewoo seemed to
play a key role, the struggle over access to Burmese gas is usually described as
a competition between India and China. In this respect, it seemed that Chinese
companies gained privileged access to the Burmese reserves.15
Both, Chinese and Indian companies were involved in joint gas exploitation with
the Burmese. However, initially it was a Korean-Indian joint-venture that started
oﬀshore gas exploration in Burma's Shwe ﬁelds (Block A1) in 2001. India was
planning to export the extracted gas through a pipeline via Bangladesh to India,
but it faced diﬃculties to reach an agreement with the Bangladeshi government.
Determined to increase its energy security, the Indian government was prepared
to construct a much longer and much more expensive alternative pipeline (Lall
2006). To the surprise of the Indian government, however, the Burmese junta
swiftly decided to sign an export Memorandum of Understanding with PetroChina
instead when it became clear that the Bangladesh pipeline would most likely not
be realized. Instead, gas exploited by the Korean-Indian consortium was expected
to be exported to China's city of Kunming via a pipeline for which construction
has started in late 2009 (Zhao 2007; Seekins 2010).
Not only did China prevail over India as an end-consumer for Burmese gas,
since the late 2000s. Chinese companies succeeded in buying exploration rights
to seven blocks covering an area of over 9.58 million hectares (Lall 2006), thereby
crowding-out Indian bidders. In 2006, the Korean-Indian consortium announced
the discovery of a huge gas ﬁeld in Block A3, adjacent to Block A1 (Lall 2006). The
general conclusion was that although China was not involved in the exploitation of
gas in the early stages, it later won exploitation concessions over India. In 2007 for
instance, even though outbidden by an Indian competitor, China was rewarded a
major oil and gas concession just three days after it had vetoed a UN resolution on
15Observers contended that the Burmese government granted China privileges in the exploita-
tion of its oil and gas reserves against the infrastructure investments of Chinese companies,
especially in the hydropower sector in Burma (Guo 2007; International Crisis Group 2009).
They did not, however, provide more detailed evidence of this claim. In 2001, Chinese and
Burmese authorities signed a Memorandum of Understanding to encorage scientiﬁc research
institutions and enterprises in geology and mineral resources and to establish and conduct
the cooperation to promote investments on exploration, mining and utilization of mineral
resources (Liu 2001).
153
7. Case study I: Burma
sanctions on Burma (Kleine-Ahlbrandt and Small 2008). Moreover, while China
could increase it stakes, the Burmese authorities enforced a contractual provision
to reduce Indian stakes. In 2008, two Indian share-holders, ONGC Videsh and
GAIL were forced to reduce their stakes from 20%t to 17% and from 10% to 8%
respectively in the A1 and A3 Shwe blocks in order to increase the shareholdings
of the state-owned Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise (60% of the shares in this
ﬁeld is held by South Korean Daewoo) (The Shwe Gas Movement 2010).
Nothing could illustrate the logic of political survival better than this devel-
opment. In exchange for its protection of the Burmese military regime at the
international level, the Chinese government obtained desired concessions in the
oil and gas sector. Despite the fact, that the Chinese UN veto might not even
have been vital to the junta's survival, because Russia vetoed the resolution too,
the Burmese junta appreciated that China had shown its willingness to act as a
protector.
In addition to these disputed ﬁelds, Chinese companies now hold a range of
concessions in deep-sea and onshore gas blocks. In 2010, Chinese companies, with
more than US$ 8 billion of investments in Burma's hydropower and oil and gas
sectors further strengthened their grip on the Burmese energy sector. `The drastic
ﬂow enhances Beijing's strong position, which until the start of this year [2010]
saw Chinese investment total US$1.8 billion, or 11.5 per cent of Burma's total
FDI' (Burma News International 2010).
With respect to the natural resources located in the regions under the control
of the ethnic ceaseﬁre groups, entrepreneurs and oﬃcials from China's province of
Yunnan, also speciﬁcally proﬁted from the chaotic situation in the country. Many
agreements between Yunnan entrepreneurs and local war lords circumvented the
Burmese central government and were made without Beijing's knowledge.
This is particularly so in logging business. Even though illegal according to Chi-
nese law, Chinese companies from Yunnan were heavily involved in logging and
exporting timber from Burma to China (Chenyang and Fook 2009). Despite a do-
mestic logging ban, China evolved as a major exporter of timber products with the
wood-processing industry located along the Burmese border. Low prices for im-
ported wood were attributed to the fact that 98% of China's imported timber from
Burma was estimated to be illegally logged woods (Global Witness 2005; Maung
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Aung Myoe 2007). In this illegal timber trade, `Yunnan authorities, regional army
commanders and ethnic ceaseﬁre groups were all directly involved. Local business-
men admit that Chinese companies have `special cooperation and consensus with
the local ethnic groups' (International Crisis Group 2009, 40). The central gov-
ernments in Beijing and Naypyidaw opposed this trade relationship: The Chinese
because it damaged its reputation vis-à-vis the Burmese central government, the
Burmese because it was losing out on revenues.
In a nutshell, it appeared that Chinese companies have secured privileged access
to Burma's natural resources. On the one hand, Chinese SOEs prevailed over other
international competitors in the gas and oil sector primarily because the Chinese
government was able to provide the Burmese central government with a feeling
of security against external intervention. On the other hand, Chinese companies
beneﬁted from a power vacuum situation between competing Burmese authorities
at the central and provincial level to gain access to Burma's natural resources.
China's investors thereby proﬁted from arrangements made under the incumbent
small-winning coalition in the country which evolved in the course of Burma's post-
colonial history. The heavy Chinese investments connected to the exploitation of
these resources in Burma, created a very strong incentive for maintaining the status
quo in the distribution of power.
7.4.3. Geo-political interests in Burma
At the core of China's strategic interests in Southeast Asia as a whole, and Burma
in particular, was the desire to keep the U.S. out of Southeast Asia. At the
same time, the Chinese government seeked to increase its own inﬂuence vis-à-vis
other regional players, particularly India, in order to secure strategic access to the
Indian Ocean (Chenyang and Fook 2009; Ganesan 2011). The Chinese government
successfully achieved this objective and was considered to occupy a privileged
position (Zhao 2007, ii). However, in contrast to the conventional perception of
Burma as a client state of China, the relationship was troubled by mutual distrust
and the Burmese government tried to diversify its strategic relations (Storey 2007a,
2009). In the follwoing I explain why I classify the Burmese foreign policy strategy
as one that tries to hedge, but eﬀectively ends up to bandwagon with China.
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On the one hand, China was quite successful in the implementation of its strate-
gic goals. With respect to the strategic access to the Indian Ocean, Chinese com-
panies developed the ports in Hainggyi, Coco, Sittwe, Zadetkyi Kyun, Myeik and
Kyaukphyu where they assisted in the construction of radars, communication and
refuelling facilities. Also, they were involved in a series of airﬁeld construction
projects in north and north-western Burma (Selth 2003, 4). These Chinese ac-
tivities in Burma reached such an extent that Indian observers claimed that the
Burmese government had allowed the Chinese to establish several intelligence sta-
tions to oversee India's naval activity (Selth 2003). The Burmese authorities, for
their part, consistently denied `any Chinese military presence in Burma or es-
tablishing a strategic alliance in China's favour' (Tin Maung Maung Than 2003,
208) despite their strong reliance on the Chinese supply of military equipment and
weapons. These Indian allegations eventually proved to be untrue (International
Crisis Group 2009).
This leaves unaﬀected that the Chinese government sought not only to use
Burma's strategic location to improve Chinese access to the Indian Ocean from a
geo-strategic perspective, but also as a transit country to facilitate trade relations
with the rest of the world. About 80% of the Chinese oil imports was shipped from
the Middle East and Africa through the Indian Ocean and through the Strait of
Malacca, a chokepoint controlled by U.S. naval forces. This made China vulnera-
ble. The Chinese government was worried that a blockade of the Strait of Malacca
due to conﬂict over Taiwan for example, would have devastating consequences for
the Chinese economy. This vulnerability could be mitigated by aquiring direct
access to the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Bengal through harbors in neighboring
countries. Direct access would improve the security of major sea lanes for Chi-
nese oil tankers, and in the long run, even help to avoid the passage through the
Malacca Strait entirely if oil would be further transported to China by pipelines
(Chenyang and Fook 2009).
In the past, the Burmese government was sceptical about these Chinese inten-
tions to extend the Burmese infrastructure (Tin Maung Maung Than 2003; Clapp
2007). But in the mid 2000s, `China has ﬁnally succeeded in wearing down this
reluctance, probably with the lure of very large ﬁnancial returns' (Clapp 2007,
12). Finally, in 2009, constructions of a more than US$1 billion twin pipeline for
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oil and gas through Burma connecting the Burmese port of Kyaukphyu with the
Chinese provincial capital Kunming began. At the same time, confrontations in
Sino-Burmese relations persisted pushing the government of Burma to search for
alternative partners. As elaborated in section 7.3, the generals, even though able
to strengthen their power due to Chinese military assistance, dislike and distrust
the Chinese government because of the Chinese interventionist policies in the past.
Thus, even though China achieved major strategic objectives, the bilateral relation
was not without contradictions and persistent distrust and insecurity about the
Chinese willingness to back the junta vis-à-vis the ethnic ceaseﬁre groups moti-
vated the military government to diversify its foreign relations.
Moreover, the Burmese government disagreed with the Chinese on how political
stability in Burma could be achieved. The Chinese government is interested in
Burma's political stability, not only because of the above mentioned heavy Chi-
nese investments in Burma (the mentioned pipelines ran through areas controlled
by ethnic rebel groups), but also because of the ethnic minorities living on both
sides of the Sino-Burmese borders. Behind the scenes, China tried to push for the
reconciliation between the central government and the armed rebel groups and for
political and economic reforms in order to increase the government's legitimacy.
Given its close relations to the ethnic Chinese rebels in Burma, the Chinese gov-
ernment was reluctant to cut its support to the ceaseﬁre groups. Only during a
state visit of General Than Shwe in September 2010, the Chinese government gave
its approval to the Burmese central government's initiative to disarm the rebel
groups by declaring not to support any group that carries out anti-government
activities along the Sino-Burmese border (?).
Given these disagreements, the Burmese central government attempted to bal-
ance China's inﬂuence by diversifying its external ties. It is noteworthy that there
has been great interest on the side of other Asian states to engage the junta. In ad-
dition to economic interests, a major concern of all these states was the perception
that isolation would drive the military junta further into the arms of China (Selth
2003). Apart from a number of regional players such as Thailand, Singapore,
Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam, Japan, and South Korea as well as the ASEAN
as a whole, it was particularly India that lent itself as a counter-weight against
overdependence on China. The Indian government was relying on the Burmese
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government to tackle its own separatist insurgencies, and was competing with
China for inﬂuence in the Indian Ocean and access to natural resources. Against
this background, the Indian government shifted its approach towards Burma from
criticism over human rights issues during the 1980s to pragmatic engagement in-
cluding military assistance (Zhao 2007). India's ambassador tried hard to convince
the Burmese junta that India would not interfere in Burma's domestic aﬀairs: `I
wish to reassure my Myanmar friends that while India is proud to be a democ-
racy, we are not in the business of exporting it' (Ambassador R.K. Bhatia cited in
Matthews (2006, 216).
Moreover, the Burmese junta began to proactively diversify its external rela-
tions to other weapon suppliers such as North Korea, Iran, Israel, Ukraine and
Russia. In 2001, Russia agreed to supply the junta with jet ﬁghters and in 2007,
to provide assistance with an air defence missile system. `Reportedly, the Russian
MIG military aircraft company has maintained a representative oﬃce in Myan-
mar since October 2006 and helped upgrade the country's main military airstrip'
(International Crisis Group 2009, 29).
In addition, the junta was keen to improve its ties to the U.S., which were far
from normalized. Since 1990, no U.S. ambassador was dispatched to Burma, but
representation continued by chargés d'aﬀaires ad interim. The U.S. unilaterally
imposed sanctions on investments in Burma in 1997. These were gradually ex-
tended to imports from Burma and to restrictions on ﬁnancial transactions and
visa bans for members of the junta. It was the U.S., together with Britain, that
tabled a UN resolution to impose UN sanctions on Burma in 2007.
Against the calculation that improved relations between Burma and the U.S.
would be beneﬁcial to China by averting an U.S. aggression or international inter-
vention in Burma, the Chinese government brokered talks between representatives
of the two nations to facilitate incremental improvements of bilateral relations
under the Obama administration and backed the eﬀort of the UN special envoy
Ibrahim Gambari to promote national reconciliation between the generals and the
democratic opposition in Burma (Lee et al. 2009; Holliday 2009; Steinberg 2010).
But suspicious of the Chinese, the military junta interpreted the Chinese media-
tion as an attempt to use Burma as a bargaining chip in the Sino-U.S. relations
(International Crisis Group 2009).
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To sum up, even though not much was known about the Burmese junta's strate-
gic calculations it appeared that Burma was not such a vassal of China as is usually
assumed. In fact, disagreements between the Chinese and the Burmese leaderships
persisted. Against this background, the generals pursued a strategy of hedging and
tried to diversify their external relations to ease dependence on China. India, in
particular, tried to improve its relations to the junta. In reality, however, the
Indian government could not oﬀer the diplomatic protection which China could
provide with its veto power in the UN Security Council. Only Russia could do the
same. The junta's relations to neither India nor Russia, however, were comparable
to that with China. Given all this, the Burmese government was categorized a de
facto eager compliant with China's geo-strategic interests. Clearly, the generals
prefered hedging against China more actively, but taking into account the inter-
national pressure on the regime there was not much space for manoeuvring. The
junta was left with no real alternative than to bandwagon with China.
7.5. Summary of ﬁndings
This section sums up the ﬁndings on the case study of Burma. With regard to
the junta's compliance with China's interests, China was able to quite successfully
realize its strategic objectives. The Burmese compliance with China's objectives
was high. It took on an eager position.
1. `One China' policy: The Burmese government was the ﬁrst country to diplo-
matically acknowledge the PRC. In 2000, it closed the unoﬃcial Taiwanese
representation in Burma, although trade relations between the two countries
continue to ﬂourish. With respect to the Dalai Lama, the Burmese junta has
completely ignored him and never allowed him to pay a visit to the country.
It even banned him from the state media for reasons of loyalty to the Chi-
nese government. This corresponds to eager support of China's `one China'
policy.
2. Access to natural resources: China was very successful in accessing Burmese
oil and gas reserves, especially when compared with India's attempts to in-
crease its leverage over Burmese oil and gas reservers. Even though Chinese
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companies were initially not involved in the exploration, they gained consid-
erable concessions later. In addition, much of the explored gas was expected
to be exported to China, and not to India although the Burmese generals
initially had been in negotiations with India. Most recently, while Chinese
companies gained new concessions, the shares of Indian stake-holders were
forcibly reduced by the Burmese government. This reaction corresponds to
an eager compliant.
3. Geo-political interests: Not much was known about the junta's strategic cal-
culations. Empirical evidence, however, suggested that China was relatively
successful in realizing its geo-strategic objectives. This was, although the
Burmese government tried to reduce its reliance on China, in reality, it did
not ﬁnd an alternative partner of equal weight which would allow the junta
to hedge against China more actively. The empirical evidence suggests that
the Burmese government falls into the category of eagerness.
Given the very small winning coalition of the Burmese government, this very
high compliance at all these parameters is not particularly surprising. The ﬁnding
suggests that the Burmese government, which had a very large discretionary leeway
in decision-making, could indeed be bought relatively easy by external interests.
Moreover, empirical evidence in the Burmese case was by and large in line with
the theoretical argument. Firstly, it could be seen that policy concessions by
the Burmese government were given in exchange for political protection at the
international level as well as the provision of private goods to the government
and its winning coalition. When assessing whether and how it could proﬁt from
responding to external interests, the Burmese government considered only the
narrowly deﬁned interests of the military and its business associates who formed
the junta's winning coalition.
These domestic incentives that guided the Burmese junta in its actions were
clearly reﬂected in the Sino-Burmese relations. The Chinese government primar-
ily targeted the military junta and its cronies. China virtually disregarded the
Burmese population that was not part of the coalition and therefore had no power
to push for its collective interests. Furthermore, to the extent that the Chinese
government directly or indirectly established channels to reach out to the ethnic
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rebel groups and thereby circumvented the central government, the inability to
eﬀectively control the whole Burmese territory was also mirrored in the Chinese
approach.
Second, policy concessions which the Burmese government is willing to give to
the Chinese in exchange for material investments in the security apparatus and
the economy, and most importantly in exchange for protection of the ruling elite
against foreign intervention include access to natural resources at privileged prices.
Most importantly, the cooperation between the two small winning coalition gov-
ernments in Burma and China helped the Burmese government to stabilize its
position in power in various ways. Because the Burmese government was able to
monopolize the allocation of resources received from China, it could re-distribute
proﬁts or extract assets from industrial or agricultural production sites to its
cronies. The Chinese government also provided military equipment under pref-
erential conditions to the Burmese junta, thereby directly addressing the needs
of the Burmese coalition members and increasing the junta's capacity to fend oﬀ
domestic challengers. Connected to increased Chinese investments in the coun-
try in recent times, the exploitation of Burmese natural resources has created a
path-dependency which will further increase the Chinese incentives to defend the
position of Burma's small winning coalition. This interest in maintaining a small
winning coalition in Burma materialized for example in the Chinese strategy to-
wards the domestic Burmese opposition who attempted to raise their gains from
collaboration with rather than challenging the existing regime.
Consequently, at the international level too, the Chinese government shielded
the Burmese government from international pressure and protected it from in-
tervention by using its veto power in the UN Security Council to prevent the
international community taking measures against the regime.
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8.1. Historical background
Testiﬁed by the impressing remainings of the ancient capital in Angkor, monarchy
in Cambodia is over 1200 years old. The empire declined in the 16th century
and the country was subsequently invaded by its neighbors, the Siamese and the
Vietnamese. Historians argue that Cambodia would have disappeared without
an agreement between King Norodom and the French to place the country under
French protectorate (Tully 2005).
From 1863 to 1953, Cambodia was ruled by the French. During the Second
World War, Cambodia was occupied by the Japanese empire, but it continued as
a French protectorate after the war. In 1953, it gained independence from France
and transformed to a constitutional monarchy under Prince Sihanouk. In the
years that followed, Cambodia's politics were dominated by turmoil and violent
struggles for power: In 1970, Prince Sihanouk was ousted and exiled to Beijing by
a military coup led by Prime Minister General Lon Nol.1 The U.S. supported Lon
Nol, because Sihanouk, who oﬃcially started out with a policy of neutrality in the
Vietnam War, began to increasingly support Viet Cong ﬁghters along Cambodia's
northern borders. In order to ﬁght these, the U.S. bombed Viet Cong bases and
strategic infrastructure in Cambodia. These bombings caused hundreds thousands
of civilian casualities which in turn played an important role in generating support
among the population for the communist Khmer Rouge rebels.
China, in opposition to the newly established U.S.-backed regime in Phnom
Penh, pursued a two-track policy of supporting two competing Cambodian fac-
tions, King Sihanouk and the Khmer Rouge (Hood 1990). Both Sihanouk, the
1Prince Sihanouk had developed a friendship with the Chinese prime minister Zhou Enlai whom
he had met at the Bandung Conference in 1955.
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internationally recognized leader of Cambodia, and the Khmer Rouge who had
the stronger military capabilities formed the National United Front of Kampuchea
in order to ﬁght Lon Nol. When the Khmer Rouge took siege of Phnom Penh in
1975, Prince Sihanouk returned to the capital. However, shortly after the coalition
broke and Sihanouk was taken hostage by the Khmer Rouge. From 1975 to 1979,
during the reign of Pol Pot, Sihanouk was kept under house arrest. Throughout
the 1970s Beijing not only delivered military support to the Khmer Rouge, but
also sent more than 15,000 advisors to the country (Storey 2006).
The Khmer Rouge's rule of terror was brought to an end in 1979 by the inva-
sion of Vietnamese troops together with Khmer Rouge defectors who had ﬂed to
Vietnam. In response and motivated by the ideological competition with Vietnam
and the Soviet Union respectively, China then invaded Vietnam, but could not
stop the defeat of the Khmer Rouge (Ross 1992). The Vietnamese installed a new
government, the State of Cambodia (SOC) which was led by the Kampuchean
People's Revolutionary Party (KPRP ), their Cambodian comrade-in-arms. Due
to support by Vietnamese troops, the SOC was able to control around 90% of the
Cambodian territory.
Meanwhile, the three resistance factions, of Sihanouk nationalists, the Khmer
Rouge and the Khmer People's National Liberation Front of Son Sann, again
agreed to form a Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea in opposition
to the Vietnamese puppet government in Phnom Penh. Sihanouk re-emerged at
the political stage as a popular ant-Vietnamese symbol, but lacking military ca-
pacities, he was not able to marginalize the Khmer Rouge. Again, the coalition
was supported from outside by China, but also by Thailand, Britain and the
U.S.. While the coalition actually legitimized international support for the Khmer
Rouge (Hood 1990, 980 and 987), the continuing arms supply to the Khmer Rouge
weakened Sihanouk's diplomatic eﬀorts and strengthened the Khmer Rouge's bar-
gaining position.
Eﬀorts to solve the civil war in Cambodia did not really take oﬀ until the
international context had dramatically changed after the end of the Cold War.
In October 1991, the Paris Conference on Cambodia resulted in a comprehensive
peace settlement where the four warring factions signed an agreement.
The Paris Peace agreement was negotiated by the permanent members of the
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UN Security Council and included the establishment of a twelve-member Supreme
National Council which should comprise all four Cambodian warring factions. The
UN was given a mandate to enforce a ceaseﬁre and to deal with refugees and dis-
armament. The UNTAC, one of the UN 's most complex peacekeeping operations
to date, was also given the mandate to implement free and fair elections for the
constitutional assembly (An et al. 2008, 8). It was expected that the constitu-
tional assembly, after having approved the constitution, would transform into a
legislative assembly which should then form the ﬁrst government (Brown 1992,
91).
Accordingly, in 1991, Hun Sen's puppet government dissolved and the Supreme
National Council was established. Also in 1991, Hun Sen's KPRP declared an end
to communism and transformed itself to the Cambodian People's Party (CPP )
(Brown 1992, 93). China did not want UNTAC to become a political force in
Cambodia (Richardson 2010, 162), but the settlement that brought civil war to
an end in Cambodia was successful in putting through China's strategic interest
to diminish Soviet inﬂuence in Vietnam and to increase Chinese inﬂuence in a
`balkanized Indochina' (Ross 1992, 54).
Moreover, the agreement did not criticize the Chinese backing of the disastrous
Khmer Rouge regime, but even legitimized the Khmer Rouge's participation in the
new government (Ross 1992, 54). China also participated in the UNTAC peace
keeping mission. In 1992, 15,900 peace-keeping troops, 3,600 civilian police men
and approximately 3,000 civilian administrators were working under the UNTAC
mandate (Brown 1993, 84). Apart from the intimidation and political killings that
kept being reported, a serious limitation of the UNTAC mandate was that it did
not include any democratic institutional engineering beyond the elections (Crois-
sant 2008). Also, UNTAC's inability to dismantle the competitive advantage of
the CPP , its control over the bureaucracy, caused critical opposition. But de-
spite the Khmer Rouge's withdrawal from their commitment to participate in the
elections, in 1993, the Constituent Assembly elections were held under UNTAC's





This section looks at Cambodia's domestic politics from the perspective of the
selectorate theory. The section starts oﬀ with a discussion on who constitutes the
Cambodian selectorate and the respective winning coalition by looking on how
both groups are formally deﬁned by Cambodia's 1993 constitution. It will then
turn to the coalition members in more detail.
The country was a constitutional monarchy with King Norodom Sihamoni2 as
head of the state. He appointed the head of government according to the parlia-
mentary majorities. According to the constitution, legislative competence lies in
the bi-cameral parliament consisting of a lower and an upper house, the 123-seat
National Assembly and the 61-member Senate, respectively. Cambodia's consti-
tution stipulated that all Cambodians aged 18 and older had the right to vote for
the National Assembly. Accordingly, the electorate formed the selectorate.
Based on the Cambodian constitution, the winning coalition formally consisted
of the electorate's majority as further speciﬁed by electoral law. But the consti-
tutional framework and the political reality diﬀered greatly: Cambodia's political
system, in reality, was very personalized. Constitutionally designed checks and
balances were virtually non-functional and laws were most often drafted in the
ministries with both parliamentary chambers powerless against domination by the
executive that most often ruled by edict (Ear and Hall 2008). But also the forma-
tion of the government was repeatedly determined by other factors rather than by
the outcome of the elections.
With respect to their core function of power transfer from one government to
another, elections in Cambodia were little more than window-dressing. Having
experienced four parliamentary elections until 2008, the country was governed by
coalition governments consisting of the CPP and the royalist party. The CPP
under Hun Sen was always the stronger player in these coalitions. Hun Sen ﬁnally
managed to strengthen his position as the leader in a quasi one-party system after
2In 1991, Prince Norodom Sihanouk, the Cambodian King, returned to Phnom Penh after 21
years of exile in Beijing. In 2004, Prince Sihanouk severely ill and highly frustrated with the
political situation, resigned as King. Subsequently, the Throne Council followed his suggestion
and selected Norodom Sihamoni, a former UNESCO-Ambassador and ballet dancer as his
successor.
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a coup on 1997. Alternative parties, such as the Sam Rainsy party, did not succeed
in seriously challenging this monopoly of power despite much ﬁnancial and moral
support from Western donors and steady increases in their share of votes.
Yet Cambodia's politicians came to understand the value of elections as a means
to legitimize their power towards the domestic and an international audience. The
national elections were exploited in order to create legitimacy. Therefore, outright
violence and voter intimidation were transformed into more subtle methods of elec-
toral manipulation allowing the regime to create legitimacy based on a `technically
sound and peaceful Election Day process' (An et al. 2008, 13).3 Moreover, a strat-
egy of decentralization was introduced to replicate the political dominance which
the CPP enjoyed at the national and local levels to the provincial and district
levels (Hughes 2009).
In the language of the selectorate theory, the selectorate in Cambodia was not
included in the winning coalition. For the continued rule of the CPP , not the
majority of votes was decisive, but rather the party's ability to maintain loyalties
among the most important executive state actors on the one hand and economic
elites on the other (Cock 2010b).
According to a `family tree' published by the English speaking Phnom Penh
Post, all important positions to secure political power and internal security were
connected through intermarriage between a few families which were related to
the party leaders. Thereby, control over the armed forces, the police and the
bureaucracy was especially important. This control was achieved by controlling
control the party. Hence, most members of the diﬀerent subgroups belong to the
CPP . In the following, the most important members of this coalition will be
introduced.
3With regard to the oppositional elites, political opponents have been neutralized `by violence
in the past, and by political pressure as the challenges have become less threatening' (Mydans
2008a,b). Overall, indicators of repression such as Freedom House's civil liberties and CIRI's
Physical Rights show gradual improvements in political repression.
166
8.2. Domestic politics
8.2.1. The coalition: The tycoons, the military, the
bureaucracy
The tycoons
The distinction between the ruling party and the Cambodian state is blurred
and the nexus between politics and business in Cambodia is very tight. On the
one hand, political positions are designed to open up business opportunities to
followers and, given the weakness of political institutions and powerful hierarchical
patron-client relationships, personal networks are indispensable for doing business
successfully. On the other hand, the government's capabilities and willingness
to generate income through taxation is limited (Cock 2010b). It rather relies on
non-tax revenues such as foreign development assistance or private donations to
the CPP and the Cambodian Red Cross (which is then channelled to the CPP ,
because the Red Cross is chaired by ﬁrst lady Bun Rany). As a consequence, a
mutually beneﬁcial relationship has evolved in which the political leadership is
ﬁnancially supported by a few super-rich party members who get any political
support needed to increase their business imperia in return.
A few Cambodian families control large chunks of the most lucrative economic
sectors, reaching from tourism to agro-business (logging and plantations), minerals,
oil and gas, infrastructure and the communication and banking sectors. Many of
these tycoons hold the title of `Oknha', a prestigious title rewarded to sponsors
whose donations to rebuild the country exceed US$100,000. Regularly, they are
very close to the government and act as counsellors or senators.4
A vivid illustration of the collusion between business and politics is given by
one of the richest and most powerful Oknhas, Lao Meng Khin, who is said to be
the main sponsor of the Hun Sen fraction. Lao Meng Khin's company Pheapimex
is oﬃcially directed by his wife Choeung Sopheap (better known as Yeay Phu),
who also manages the Cambodian Red Cross together with her close friend Hun
Sen's wife. In several joint ventures with international business partners, pulp and
4The title of Oknha has a historical tradition dating back to the 15th century. It was revived
in 1994 by decree of the two Prime Ministers. Accordingly, donations between US$500 and
US$100,000 are rewarded with speciﬁc certiﬁcates and titles, respectively. Political posts, in
general, are priced too. A position as Senator is said to cost US$100,000 (Mengin 2007).
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paper producer Pheapimex holds a number of economic land concessions and land
concessions for plantations, logging and mining, alltogether covering around 7,4%
of Cambodia's total surface (Global Witness 2007, 77). The company and its
branches have frequently been criticized by civil society organizations, amongst
others because it allegedly has obtained concessions in conﬂict with Cambodian
land law and because of its involvement in land conﬂicts, including forced evictions
brutally carried out by armed security or military forces (Heder 2011).
As a consequence of the strong relations between politics and business, Cambo-
dia is one of the most corrupt countries in the world. Transparency International
ranked Cambodia as number 131 in 2005 and as number 158 out of 180 countries
in 2009 (Transparency International 2009). According to estimations, Cambodia's
losses due to corruption amount ot US$500 million annually. An anti-corruption
law was discussed for 15 years before it passed the parliament in 2010. From
this mere fact, the political will to ﬁght corruption appears limited (Integrated
Regional Information Networks 2010).
It is a speciﬁc feature of Cambodia's winning coalition that a number of those
powerful tycoons which have built inroads into Cambodian politics are of ethnic
Chinese origin. Historically, the small ethnic Chinese minority has always played
a substantial role in Cambodia's society. Many Sino-Khmer and Chinese were well
integrated in society and organized in communities since the 15th century. They
traditionally engaged in trade and were relatively well-oﬀ. In the 20th century,
however, the minority became a target of discrimination and prosecution. The
ethnic Chinese were continuously discriminated against under the rule of Lon Nol
(1970-1975), during the Khmer Rouge regime - when people of Chinese descent
were mainly prosecuted for their urban life-style - and during the 1980s under
the Vietnamese occupation (Mengin 2007). Ironically, they formed a prime target
group of Khmer Rouge aggression which, in turn was supported by thousands of
Chinese advisors at the time.
Today, an estimated 2.5% of Cambodia's population is of Chinese ethnicity
(Burgos and Ear 2010). In 1990 the CPP government allowed the establishment
of associations of ethnic minorities. And speciﬁcally since its relations with the
Chinese government had improved, the CPP `allowed China to actively assist in
the cultural and economic revival of the Cambodian-Chinese community' (Marks
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2000). Sino-Khmer individuals like Oknhas play a key role in China's relations
to Cambodia. As will be discussed in section 8.3, driven by economic incentives,
these elites exploit their political power to channel Chinese political and economic
interests to the Cambodian decision makers.
The military
Claims to power were decided by military capabilities in 1993 and by pure force
in 1997. The ﬁrst parliamentary elections in 1993 resulted in a 58-seat majority
(45%) of the royalist Front Uni National pour un Cambodge Indépendant, Neutre,
Paciﬁque, et Coopératif (FUNCINPEC) against 51 seats (38%) for the CPP .
But the CPP , threatening that it would not accept the election results, forced
the FUNCINPEC into a coalition government with two Prime Ministers (Lum
2007: 3). Prince Ranariddh (FUNCINPEC) became ﬁrst and former Prime
Minister Hun Sen (CPP ) became second Prime Minister, although the latter de
facto managed to control the government on his own. At the time, the formation
of this government was considered to merely reﬂect the military reality of `100000
soldiers and 45000 police under SOC [and thus the CPP 's] command in contrast
to FUNCINPEC's 5000-strong armed force' (Um 1995, 76) rather than the 1993
election results.
The subsequent coalition was doomed to be unstable and most conﬂicts arose
over the distribution of positions between supporters of both parties. The size of
the government increased considerably to also integrate the newcomers from the
royalist party (Roberts 2002, 526). But the CPP successfully refused to dismantle
its organizatioal advantage and to leave suﬃcient positions of authority to the
nominal election winner (Roberts 2002). Thereby it deprived the FUNCINPEC
leaders of the means to reward the loyalty of their followers. In July 1997, the
conﬂict over distribution of state resources to their respective supporters ﬁnally
erupted into armed conﬂict between both parties when FUNCINPEC leader
Ranariddh tried to realign with marginalized Khmer Rouge ﬁghters in order to
oust Hun Sen. Eventually, Ranariddh was exiled, some 80-100 people were killed
and many FUNCINPEC members ﬂed the country (Roberts 2002; McCargo
2005; Lum 2007; Ear 2007).
169
8. Case study II: Cambodia
While the military has become a less visible actor in politics in the 2000s, there
is no doubt about the close ties between armed troops and speciﬁc political leaders,
particularly with Prime Minister Hun Sen. Coming from civil war, the inclusion
of the armed forces in the coalition is a mere necessity and the country's political
stability rests to a great deal upon the integration of former rebel ﬁghters into
the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF ). This results in dis-proportional
size of the Cambodian military. Oﬃcially, the budget for national defence was
stable during the 1990s, but it is said that the RCAF consumed 25% of all gov-
ernment revenues (McCargo 2005). The RCAF was also rewarded with large
extra-budgetary revenues, such as 700,000 hectares of land as `Military Develop-
ment Zones', which generates revenues `from military logging concessions', and
with many other tax holidays (Sok 2005; McCargo 2005).
The bureaucracy
Along with military actors, the bureaucracy is a crucial player in Cambodia's
today's coalition, not only at the state and provincial level, but also at the very
grass-root level in the villages. The strategy of co-opting the bureaucracy in order
to consolidate power dates back to pre-UNTAC times.
At the lower level, the CPP 's loyalties in the bureaucracy were built up during
the early 1990s. They were initiated when Hun Sen anticipated diminishing mate-
rial support from Vietnam and the Soviet Union and started to reform the party
and the country's economy in the late 1980s (Gottesmann 2004, 279). Privatiza-
tio strengthened the party's power position vis-à-vis local civil servants, who had
earlier opposed recruitment for the regime imposed by Vietnam.
In the late 1980s, the ﬂood of supply with luxury goods - such as cigarettes,
detergent, soap, petrol and paraﬃn - from the Soviet Union which had until then
supplemented civil servants' meagre salaries dried up. At the same time, inﬂation
went up. Against the background of these worsening economic conditions and
the decreasing ability of the regime to reward its supporters with goods supplied
by the Soviet Union, the introduction of private economy oﬀered oﬃcials new
discretionary opportunities to amass wealth (Hughes 2003, 41). In the early 1990s,
the CPP leadership coerced civil servants into the party (Hughes 2003, 65). In
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doing so, it bound the access to these material beneﬁts and the well-being of civil
servants to the survival of the party and thus enforced loyalty to the party rather
than the state.
As mentioned before, the UNTAC mission failed to fully control the adminis-
tration (Brown 1993; Um 1994). UNTAC's inability to deprive the CPP from its
control over the bureaucracy was a contentious issue criticized by the other parties
at the time, because control over the Cambodian bureaucracy would have been
crucial to level out the playing ﬁeld of the competing Cambodian factions.
In fact, the loyalty of the bureaucracy was a crucial competitive advantage in
the political competition which has not only been emphasized by CPP leader
Hun Sen himself (Hughes 2003, 81), but was also reﬂected in the inability of
many FUNCINPEC ministers to carry out substantial policies during the ﬁrst
coalition government.5
Summary
Summing up the description of the Cambodian winning coalition, there are per-
sistent gaps between the constitutional framework established under the UNTAC
mandate and the political reality. According to the constitution, the winning coali-
tion should include the electorate, but in reality the Cambodian political system
is dominated by informal structures in which the electorate has no decisive power,
hence, the electorate is de facto excluded from the winning coalition.
Instead, survival in power depends on a working party structure rather than
electoral majorities. With his party, Hun Sen is able to successfully co-opt those
societal subgroups which are of paramount importance to his government's grip
on power. Among his winning coalition are the country's business tycoons. They
play a prominent role in ﬁnancing the party in exchange for the political support
to generate these incomes. It is a noteworthy fact that some of these coalition
members are of Chinese decent. Moreover, the military is an important member
of the winning coalition. This is hardly surprising for a post-conﬂict country in
which the use of force or the threat to do so creates considerable authority. Finally,
the integration of the bureaucracy into the CPP 's networks enables the party to
5Conversation Phnom Penh, 19 November 2009.
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dominate over state structures.
With an increasing authoritarian governance style the country has achieved
political stability over the last decade. Moreover, it appears that the economic
foundations of Hun Sen's reign is self-sustainable. Holding the position of Prime
Minister since 1985, Hun Sen has the longest tenure in Asia to date.
8.3. China in Cambodia
Having discussed the members of the Cambodian winning coalition, this section
takes a closer look on the interaction between Cambodian and Chinese elites. It
should be noted that the case of Cambodia delivers some outstanding insights in
China's engagement. This is for two reasons: First, China's development assis-
tance to Cambodia is somewhat more transparent than elesewhere because the
many international donors active in Cambodia tried to integrate China into the
donor harmonization process. As a result, the Chinese government committed to
Cambodia's ODA database provided by the Cambodian Rehabilitation and De-
velopment Board (CRDB). Second, there is a great variety of NGOs operating in
Cambodia which critically monitor and document what Chinese actors are doing
in the country.
The domestic conﬂict over power in 1997 marks a turning point in China's ap-
proach vis-à-vis the diﬀerent Cambodian political factions. This turning point
coincided with a more active Chinese regional strategy which encouraged Chinese
state companies to invest abroad, including in Cambodia. In Cambodia, the im-
plementation of this policy was greatly facilitated by the existing ethnic Chinese
minority. In the following subsection, I will look in more detail at the Chinese
engagement of the Cambodian leaders and their coalition, before turning to the
question of whether and how the broader population is addressed.
8.3.1. China and the Cambodian coalition: The tycoons and
the military
The 1997 conﬂict between de facto leader Hun Sen and his challenger Ranariddh
clearly marks a turning point in Sino-Cambodian relations. In 1988, Cambo-
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dian Prime Minister Hun Sen, originating from the Vietnamese-backed resistance
against the Khmer Rouge regime, accused China to be the root of all that was
evil in Cambodia (Marks 2000). At the same time, the Chinese government con-
sidered Hun Sen to represent a Vietnamese puppet regime and back in 1979 the
PRC had even evaded Vietnam to punish the latter's invasion in Cambodia. But
hostilities had faded away when in 2000, Prime Minister Hun Sen declared China
as Cambodia's `most trustworthy friend' (Storey 2006).
Hun Sen's victory in the conﬂict with Prince Ranariddh delivered an opportunity
for the Chinese government to reconcile with the CPP and bridge the historic
antagonism between both governments. Already in 1996, during a visit of Hun
Sen to Beijing, an agreement on party-to-party relations between the CCP and
the CPP was made (Richardson 2010). Against the background of the decline
of the two factions on which the Chinese government had relied before, this shift
in alliances was overdue: The Khmer Rouge were outlawed, King Sihanouk was
bankrupt (Peou 2000, 220) and plagued by cancer as a result of which he spent
most of the time out of the country for medical treatment while his son Ranarridh
who had taken over the FUNCINPEC had driven the party to the edge of
dissolution.
Declaring the conﬂict to an internal aﬀair in which the Chinese government
would not interfere, the Chinese government was quick to accept the new balance
of power in Cambodia in which Hun Sen had prevailed over Prince Ranariddh. By
the Western international society, however, the 1997 conﬂict was interpreted as a
coup d'état by Hun Sen. Several donors put assistance ﬂows on hold to express
their disagreement. The U.S., for example, withheld its development assistance to
the government for a decade. ASEAN also tried to push the CPP government
to reconcile with Ranariddh (Möller 1998). Hun Sen was not prepared to this
international pressure and the connected ﬁnancial penalties (Ros 2000).
From 1997 onwards, visits between high-level Chinese and Cambodian leaders
intensiﬁed and they were always `marred by the announcement of a new Chinese
provision of aid or the signature of an economic co-operation agreement' (Osborne
2006, 30). China switched its military support to the RCAF loyal to Hun Sen
and the visibility of the Chinese-Cambodian friendship was further increased by
ceremonies with high level participation from both sides whenever a Chinese in-
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vestment project in Cambodia was completed. In 2002, Zhu Rongji announced
the cancellation of Cambodia's debts to China (Richardson 2010).
It is diﬃcult to assess whether the support from and cooperation with the Chi-
nese government was vital for Hun Sen's political survival, because other external
players tried to mediate in Cambodia's domestic crisis, too. In fact, it was Japan's
mediation eﬀorts which eventually `saved' Cambodia. The Japanese government
ﬁnally managed to convince the Cambodian parties to ﬁnd an arrangement under
which Prince Ranariddh could return so that new elections could be held (Ros 2000;
Möller 1998). Even though the Chinese support doubtlessly lifted the pressure on
Hun Sen, the traditional donor community's pressure was still strong enough to
push Hun Sen to allow Ranariddh's return to Cambodia (Ros 2000).6
China and the RCAF
At the end of 1997, just several months after the end ot the ﬁghting, the Chi-
nese government provided military equipment to Cambodia worth US$2.8 million
mostly to RCAF units (Storey 2006). This deal was claimed to pre-date the July
1997 ﬁghts (Marks 2000) and was oﬃcially given to the Cambodian national armed
forces. However, in the context of Cambodia's post-civil war history, the armed
forces were not neutral. Military ability had observably translated into political
power after the 1993 elections. So, instead of increasing the capacity of national
defense this military support ﬁrst and foremost helped Hun Sen to bolster his
position in power against domestic competitors.
According to a Cambodian defence oﬃcial, China was the biggest supporter of
military aid to the RCAF in 2005, even though the Vietnamese upheld their
strong ties with the armed forces by numerous trainings (Rith and Cochrane
2005). China's annual support to the Cambodian military between 1999 and 2005
amounted to approximately US$5 million (Rith and Cochrane 2005). It is note-
worthy that from 2005 onwards, Chinese military assistence speciﬁcally targeted
6This time, Ranarridh did not accept the overwhelming election victory of the CPP in the
parliamentary elections in 1998. The following stalemate was only overcome by creating
a second chamber, the Senate. New positions were created to integrate FUNCINPEC
members and to dispose the head of the National Assembly (CPP ) allowing Ranariddh to
take this position despite his election defeat (Roberts 2002). The coalition between CPP and
the remaining FUNCINPEC was renewed.
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the Cambodian naval forces to help safeguard projected oﬀshore oil sites in which
Chinese companies have great interest. The Cambodian government purchased six
naval patrol boats from China in 2005 and in 2007 the Cambodian government was
given a preferential loan from the Chinese government to buy another nine vessels
for an estimated US$60 million from China State Ship-building Corporation (Peo-
ple's Daily Online 2007; Burgos and Ear 2010). In 2010, shortly after the U.S.
suspended a military program including the delivery of some 200 military trucks
because of the deportation of 20 asylum-seeking Uighurs to China, the Chinese
government stepped in and provided 257 vehicles to the Cambodian government
(The Associated Press 2010).
In a conversation with me, a former minister of defence praised the arms trade
with China, because China - unlike the U.S. which disposes second-hand equipment
- delivers brand-new arms at `friendship prices'. These are perceived a fairly good
oﬀer and so create a win-win situation. They are beneﬁcial to the Cambodian
government, its military and in particular to the minister in charge, because these
arms deals are usually accompanied by a commission for the government oﬃcial
who arranged the deal.7
Obviously, the Chinese decision to cooperate with the Cambodian government
after the coup de facto improved the position of one of the two competitors for
power, Hun Sen, and thereby stabilized his political rule. Firstly, it helped to
improve the material equipment of the armed forces willing to ﬁght if necessary
in order to defend his rule against domestic competitors. But also the Chinese
military increased Hun Sen's capacity to satisfy this sub-group in his winning
coalition and thereby increasing their loyalty. That is, China's material support
for the RCAF went beyond the mere provision of hardware: By providing con-
struction materials for barracks, schools and hospitals (Storey 2006), the Chinese
government targeted improvements of living conditions speciﬁcally to Cambodia's
military.
Against this background, the provision of military support is better understood
as the narrowly targeted provision of privileges to an important sub-group within
Hun Sen's winning coalition rather than a contribution to Cambodia's national
defence as a whole which would classify as a public good. Also, this exchange
7Conversation, Phnom Penh, 10 November 2009
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beneﬁts narrowly deﬁned Chinese interests. That is, the Chinese arms industry
backed by powerful interests groups with close ties to politics which proﬁts most
from such business opportunities subsidised by Chinese state money.8
China and Cambodia's tycoons
The rapprochement between Hun Sen's CPP and the CCP coincided with the
emergence of a more active Chinese regional policy approach, as China's new pub-
lic diplomacy with its speciﬁc focus on the Asian region was just launched in the
late 1990s. It's goal was to increase the Chinese government's attempts to improve
its reputation among all its neighbors (Medeiros and Fravel 2003). Integrating the
region economically was one strategy to this end, and consequently economic re-
lations between China and Cambodia were built up steadily. In 2004, for the
ﬁrst time, foreign direct investments from China surpassed any other individual
investing country (Burgos and Ear 2010). In the same year, in line with the Chi-
nese `go out' policy, investments to Cambodia were further encouraged by Chinese
Vice-Prime Wu Yi on a visit to Cambodia. Until then, Chinese investments had
typically been concentrated in the garment sector attracted by Cambodia's textile
export quota to the U.S.. Although numerous, these small and medium-sized in-
vestments in garments and retail stood in no comparison to the new type of large
scale investments that were being promoted by the `go out' policy and further
stimulated by pledges of the Chinese government. According to the Council of the
Development of Cambodia (CDC) these investments overtly target on infrastruc-
tural projects such as the construction of roads and bridges amd on the energy
and mining sector. Also, there is one big resort development project. From 2006
to 2010, the Cambodian investment board approved US$ 6 billion in Chinese in-
vestments, and China provided more than US$ 2 billion more in grants and loans
(Heder 2011).
The Chinese state-backed `go out' policy with interests in strategic sectors sheds
a diﬀerent light on the re-emergence of the Sino-Khmer elites in Cambodia. They
now gained a crucial role as facilitators of pro-actively pursued Chinese interests.
8For example, one of the most powerful companies in China's industrial-military complex is
Poly Technologies Corporation, which is closely connected to the Chinese political leadership.
During the 1980s, it was managed by Deng Xiaoping's son in law, He Ping.
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Several Chinese business associations and the Chinese Chamber of Commerce lo-
cated in the Chinese embassy in Phnom Penh oﬀer an institutionalized network
which facilitates investments of Chinese companies. However, individuals with
sometimes shady connections to the underworld maintain a pivotal role in arrang-
ing business deals.
It is a common practice that these key persons with close ties to both the
Cambodian government and oﬃcials of the CCP at various levels host business
delegations from mainland China.9 It is safe to assume that these facilitators are
ﬁnancially rewarded for arranging businesses by the investors. Therefore, it has
been argued that economic assistance and investments from China have catalysed
the accumulation of the Sino-Khmer elite's wealth (Mengin 2007, 28). In this
respect, it is interesting to note that some of the Sino-Khmer Oknhas have also
set up businesses in the PRC. Therefore, they have also become dependent on
the Chinese authorities' support in China. In this way, a business deal made in
Cambodia can also payoﬀ in terms of business concessions in China.10
Obviously, on the Chinese and the Cambodian side, the line is blurred between
when individuals act as state or as private actors. Or to put it diﬀerently, abuse
of public power to pursue private economic interests is common. Many powerful
members of the Cambodian winning coalition are rewarded directly by Chinese
actors for facilitating business interests in Cambodia with private goods such as
provisions or stakes in joint-ventures (Cock 2010b).
Two such elitist joint-ventures in which Cambodia's national wealth is extracted
by Chinese companies against a reward to a few Cambodian individuals are well-
known: Wuzhishan L.S. Group Co. Lt. is a Sino-Cambodian enterprise and one of
Pheapimex's oﬀ-springs. It is directed by Mr. Liu Wei, a representative of the over-
seas Chinese business community in Cambodia, Sino-Khmer Oknha Sy Kong Triv,
and Sino-Khmer and Pheapimex owner Lau Meng Khin himself (Fullbrook 2006;
Mengin 2007; Cambodian Human Rights Action Committee 2009). Cambodian
civil society organizations have, amongst others, criticized that Wuzhishan's total
concessions exceeded the legal maximum size of 10,000 hectares by twenty times.
9The same practice has been reported for Taiwanese business delegations which are promoted
by a maﬁa boss from Taiwan (Lintner 2002, 220).
10Conversation, Phnom Penh, 17 November 2009
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The company was also alleged for forced land evictions and forest-clearance opera-
tion in an area that was six times bigger than the original 10,000 hectares that was
covered by a concession for a speciﬁc pine plantation in Mondulkiri province (Cam-
bodian Human Rights Action Committee 2009). In 2001, in a joint-venture with
Pheapimex under the name of Pheapimex-Fuchan, China Cooperative State Farm
Group established a pulp plantation in Kompong Chhnang and Pursat provinces.
The US$70 million investment was ﬁnanced by a loan to the Cambodian govern-
ment from China's Import-Export Bank (Fullbrook 2006; Mengin 2007).
It has also been argued that the Chinese government approached the Sino-Khmer
elites not only in economic matters, but also in political issues. For example, during
the 1990s, Sino-Khmer Theng Bunma, the president of the Chinese Association of
Cambodia and a famous ﬁgure in Cambodia's underworld was such a facilitator
of Chinese interests in the Cambodian government (Marks 2000).11 The Chinese
government has reportedly ask Bunma through the Chinese embassy `to intervene
on several occasions with his senior contacts in the ruling Cambodian People's
Party when Beijing does [did] not agree with the way the Cambodian government
is [was] handling a particular issue' (Jeldres 2003). Accordingly, Bunma has been
asked by the Chinese government to intervene in the context of the formalization of
the Khmer Rouge tribunal (Jeldres 2003), but also to control Chinese triad gangs
from the PRC which established themselves in Cambodia and were involved in
human traﬃcking of Chinese illegal emigrants, drug smuggling, illegal capital ﬂight
and arms trade (Lintner 2002).
8.3.2. China and the disenfranchised
China and the opposition parties
Some empirical evidence suggests that the Chinese government is carefully observ-
ing the political developments in Cambodia and pragmatically adjusts its engage-
ment with all those actors who could potentially become powerful. Members of
the oppositional Sam Rainsy Party, for example, explained that they were usually
11Theng Bunma was allegedly involved in drug traﬃcking. It is however, not clear whether he
is a real Sino-Khmer, because of several documents certifying his birthplace in Cambodia,
Thailand, China and Taiwan (Mengin 2007).
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ignored by Chinese oﬃcials in Phnom Penh. However, for a short period in 2003,
when the party emerged as a potential coalition candidate after the elections, they
started to receive calls and invitations from the Chinese embassy. `They'd invite
us to banquet with them [at the Chinese embassy], they'd drop hints about how
they could aid us' (Kurlantzick 2007, 47). Hun Sen ﬁnally succeeded in ending
the political deadlock after almost a year by co-opting some of the Sam Rainsy
Party's allies into his coalition. The Sam Rainsy Party remained excluded from
government and as a resulte calls from the Chinese embassy immediately ceased
(Kurlantzick 2007).
In my own talks with the former Cambodian ambassador to the U.S., a member
of the FUNCINPEC who cooperates with the CPP government, I was told that
during the time of his mission in Washington, he was invited to China once or twice
a year to make a tourist trip arranged by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs.
When I asked whether his visits were of private nature, he explained to me that
his personal relationship with Chinese oﬃcials dated back to their collaboration
during the time of resistance against the Vietnamese and that the Chinese used
the contact to him to gather information on the U.S.'s stance towards China.
China and the Cambodian population
The Cambodia ODA database provided by the Cambodian Rehabilitation and
Development Board (CRDB) of the CDC delivers insight on what is oﬃcially
claimed governmental assistance to Cambodia by the Chinese government (Council
for the Development of Cambodia 2010).12 Several features of Chinese development
12The Cambodia ODA database records details of project and programme assistance provided by
all development partners. It has been developed in an attempt to achieve donor harmonization
and to increase aid eﬀectiveness. The information on Chinese projects is almost certainly
neither a 100% correct nor complete: It generally starts only in the mid 2000s, but I found
that the information on Chinese projects varied between two visits of the database. In 2010,
some assistance that had been claimed in earlier years had been removed from the database.
It concerned mostly in kind donations (excavators, pumping machines, motor cycles, ﬁre
trucks and anti-malaria medicine), materials for election and some donations to the royal
family. Also, in 2006, a unit of a THSCAN Mobile Container System, worth of 20 million
Yuan was transferred to the Cambodian government. The mobile scanners, designed for the
custom service to scan containers were most probably sold by the Chinese Nuctech Co., a
SOE which ranks among the world leaders in radiation and radiation technology. The former
president of this company was Chinese President Hu Jintao's son, Hu Haifeng.
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assistance to Cambodia strongly suggest that the Cambodian population as such
is not the target group.
First of all, civil society and non-state actors, in general, are not partners for co-
operation for the Chinese government. None of the 268 foreign funded development
projects carried out by Cambodian non-governmental organizations gets money
from the Chinese government. All 22 reported Chinese development projects are
implemented by Cambodian state institutions, not a single by a civil society orga-
nization or non-state actor (Council for the Development of Cambodia 2010).
Second, Chinese projects focus on the provision of ﬁnancing for a speciﬁc capi-
tal investment project rather than on human-capacity building. The majority of
Chinese projects concentrate on the transportation sector, concerned with build-
ing roads and bridges. Only one project in the educational sector was listed: the
provision of some US$80,000 for an electronic library to the Royal Academy.
Third, all four projects in the sectors of `environment and conservation' and
`governance and administration' are prestige projects in favor of the Cambodian
government or its cronies. They concerned the establishment of a botanical garden
in the capital, the construction of a new building for the Council of Ministers (the
Cambodian cabinet), and the provision of equipment and vehicles to the Senate as
well as to the Ministry of Parliamentary Relations and Inspection. These projects
directly targeted at increasing the living standard or social status of Hun Sen's
winning-coalition members. Tellingly, the streets of Phnom Penh are crowded by
luxury jeeps tagged with license plates of the government or military while no
public transport for ordinary Cambodians exists. The new Council of Ministers
building which was meant to accommodate the government did not suit the taste
of Prime Minister Hun Sen, who immediately upon completion started with the
construction of a new building next to it (Burgos and Ear 2010). The First building
was constructed and ﬁnanced through a concessional loan from China of roughly
US$33 million. The construction seems to be a complete waste of Cambodian (or
Chinese) public resources, only proﬁtable for the Chinese construction company.
The most prominent example of Chinese support for Cambodian prestige projects
is one of the largest foreign investments in Cambodia: the US$280 million Kam-
chay hydropower station in Kampot Province. It is currently built by Sinohydro, a
Chinese SOE which was ﬁned for poor quality work and downgraded for its 2005
180
8.3. China in Cambodia
performance by the Chinese government itself (Middleton 2008). The `strong sup-
port for the project by the Chinese government appears to be more about gaining
political points with the Cambodian government than Sinohydro making a large
proﬁt' (Middleton 2008, 48). In the past, several international investors rejected
to ﬁnance the dam construction which, located in a national park, is considered a
prestige project and most probably is not economically viable (Middleton 2008).
NGOs reckon that the project is ﬁnanced as part of a 2006 US$60 million package
from China,13 and most likely subsidised by the Chinese government through low
interest rates. Electricity produced by the dam will cost considerably less than
current electricity, although it is expected to be more expensive than imported
electricity from Vietnam (Middleton 2008). The Cambodian government had to
guarantee proﬁts in case the project turned out not to be ﬁnancially viable and
it was reported that Hun Sen received loans from China well in advance to polish
the facility's performance during the start-up phase (Fullbrook 2006).
Cambodian NGOs also criticize the intransparency around Chinese investments
in Cambodia. The Cambodian government itself has no interest in allowing public
discussion, let alone participation of civil society. Environmental impact assess-
ments of major investment projects as required by law are often done only after
the government has already contracted a company.14 The Cambodian govern-
ment also communicates its plans to the general public, aﬀected communities and
citizens badly. Chinese investors and the Chinese embassy very often refuse to
communicate with ordinary Cambodians or NGOs too.15 Alarmingly, even mem-
bers of the regional government that are formally responsible for the area are
often circumvented. For example, the district governor of O'Reang District stated
that although he believed Wuzhishan's plantation to be illegal, the level of politi-
cal interaction between the national and provincial governments and the Chinese
company was out of his reach, so he simply avoided those areas of his district: `I
never went to the sites. The province never informs me about it. I don't want to
be involved' (Plaut and Chan Thul 2006).
Obviously from the above, it follows that China's engagement is in many aspects
13However, it does not appear in the oﬃcial CDC statistic.
14Conversation Phnom Penh, 19 November 2008
15Conversation Phnom Penh, 19 November 2008
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targeted at the narrowly deﬁned objectives of the Cambodian government and its
cronies rather than the Cambodian society. The Chinese government has shown
willingness to support Hun Sen in ﬁnancing and constructing prestige projects
which he perceives meaningful to show his political power. At the same time, the
Chinese government made sure that projects are constructed by Chinese compa-
nies, and so investments are channeled back into Chinese pockets.
There is, however, one way in which the Chinese government was keen to address
ordinary Cambodians. This was in the ﬁeld of education where the Chinese govern-
ments assists, if not controls the Sino-Khmer communities to spread the Chinese
language and culture, and so to channel China's strategic policy objectives.16
Since 1998, more than 70 Chinese language schools opened up in Cambodia,
the largest of which with more than 10,000 students is bigger than any other
Chinese school in any non-Chinese speaking country (Marks 2000). If needed,
the schools run by the Sino-Khmer associations receive assistance from mainland
Chinese governments or language associations (Kurlantzick 2007, 69). They are
reportedly supported ﬁnancially, through teachers sent from China, or in kind
through provision of textbooks (Fullbrook 2006). The Chinese government has
funnelled this assistance through the Cambodian-Chinese General Assembly, an
umbrella organization of the Sino-Khmer associations. By supporting only those
schools participating therein, the Chinese embassy has gained a certain degree of
inﬂuence over the school boards.
The Chinese schools are very popular among Cambodians, because they are
cheaper than Cambodia's public schools. `Because the Chinese-language schools
in Cambodia receive this outside funding, they can charge less than many public
schools, where impoverished (and sometimes corrupt) Cambodian teachers demand
excess payments' (Kurlantzick 2007, 69). But the Chinese schools are also a
16There are 13 family clan (based on a common Chinese family name), and 5 regional (based on
origin from the same region in China) associations in Cambodia, some of which have a history
of more than 2,000 years. These associations are usually fund by donations and they function
as a network and forum to nourish cultural heritage, but also to provide assistance to each
other. For example, often the association has a temple and some property which can be used
for funerals, and run Chinese language schools in Phnom Penh. Rich association members
would usually generously donate in order to help out other members. Apparently family clans
are also connected to communities in other Chinese speaking countries for example Singapore
or Malaysia. (Conversations with several associations in Phnom Penh, November 2009)
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gateway and instrument to promote China's strategic interests. For example, after
the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade by the U.S. in 1999, a `month-
long campaign to `combat Western inﬂuences' among his pupils' was conducted
by one of the school's principals while at the same time that Chinese investors in
Cambodia were protesting in front of the U.S. Embassy in Phnom Penh (Marks
2000).
Summary
In conclusion, support from the Chinese government has helped Hun Sen to over-
come a period of political isolation after the coup. Chinese ﬁnancial assistance
and development cooperation subsequently decreased Western leverage over his
government and thereby it contributed to the skewed distribution of economic and
political resources in the country, or in the words of Levitsky and Way (2010) the
consolidation of competitive authoritarian structures.
The Chinese government has established good state-to-state relations with the
CPP government in Cambodia. When it became clear that Hun Sen had won the
conﬂict against his competitor Prince Ranariddh in 1997, the Chinese government
accepted him as the de facto leader. It subsequently improved its party-to-party re-
lations with the CPP . Over the years, a convergence of interests between members
of the Chinese and Cambodian winning coalitions in the military, the economic
and the political sector has evolved and the needs of these elites are directly ad-
dressed by Chinese state or state-backed actors. Oftentimes, cooperation is in the
best interests of the winning coalitions on both the Chinese and the Cambodian
side. With its military aid to the RCAF , the Chinese government targeted a prime
constituency of Hun Sen's winning coalition.
In the economic ﬁeld, China's economic rise stimulated foreign direct invest-
ments and increased the demand for Cambodia's easily extractable raw materials.
Chinese business interests are often channelled through the Sino-Khmer tycoons
who are also among Hun Sen's supporters. Because these elites are also rewarded
by the Chinese companies in return for their networking and facilitating services,
this has cemented the unbalanced access to economic resources and strengthened
the CCP 's domination of the political process. However, the new Chinese engage-
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ment has probably never been vital for the CCP 's survival in power.
It should be noted that with respect to the third coalition partner identiﬁed in
section 8.2, the bureaucracy, I could not discern a speciﬁc interaction with the
Chinese. This probably reﬂects the dominance of personal ties over institutional
structures in both Cambodia's and China's political systems.
There is only little known about China's engagement with the opposition parties
in Cambodia. Anecdotal evidence suggests that Chinese oﬃcials occasionally tried
to co-opt opposition leaders when they perceived them to have potential to become
powerful.
Concerning the broader Cambodian population, it is interesting to note that
the Chinese government has actively supported the Sino-Khmer associations in
promoting Chinese culture and setting up language schools. There is a clear inten-
tion discernible to reach out to the Cambodian population, even though ordinary
Cambodians are excluded from the winning coalition.
8.4. Realization of Chinese interests
In the last section, I took a closer look on the interaction between Chinese and
Cambodian winning coalitions. In this section, I will investigate how successful
Chinese actors are in realizing their interests in Cambodia. This section is divided
in three parts, each looking at a particular Chinese interest: The ﬁrst part looks on
how the Cambodian government handles the Chinese `core interest' of territorial
integrity and the `one China' policy. The second section investigates the success
in achieving a second Chinese main interest, access to natural resources and raw
materials. Finally, part three focuses on China's speciﬁc geo-strategic and geo-
political interests in Cambodia.
8.4.1. Territorial integrity and the `one China' policy
In both issue areas connected to the territorial integrity of China, the Cambodian
government is extremely compliant with Chinese interests. Exceeding the expec-
tations of the Chinese government, it is located at the eager end of the compliance
spectrum.
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After the Paris Peace Agreement, Cambodia became an attractive destination
for Taiwanese investments. These met increased interest of some FUNCINPEC
members. These business relations with the Taiwanese were later alleged to have
ﬁnanced the royalist's rearmament (Peou 2000, 396). In early 1999, however, Hun
Sen closed down the Taiwanese representative oﬃce, and even though Richardson
(2010) reports that the Chinese leadership had hesitations about Hun Sen, shortly
thereafter the Chinese government provided him with US$18.3 million in foreign
assistance guarantees and US$200 million in no-interest loans, one of the highest
aid amounts China provided to any country in the world at the time (Marks 2000;
Jeldres 2003; Cock 2010b). Until today, there is no Taiwanese representation in
Cambodia anymore, and in 2008 Hun Sen was quoted by saying: `Don't dream to
reopen Taiwan's representative oﬃce in Cambodia while I am in power' (Xinhua
2008b).
But the Cambodian government, internationally and domestically, pursues an
even more pronounced `one China' policy. Internationally, the Cambodian govern-
ment was a `vocal supporter of China's 2005 anti-secession law' (Storey 2006) and
in 2007, the Cambodian government condemned Taiwan's bid to join the UN .
Domestically, the strict stance on the `one China' policy is ensured through
administrative requirements. For example, according to Cambodian regulations,
Cambodian oﬃcials cannot travel to Taiwan with their diplomatic passports pre-
venting them to meet Taiwanese oﬃcials. Furthermore, by Cambodian law, Tai-
wanese migrants need oﬃcial documents issued by the Chinese embassy in order
to marry (Mengin 2007).17 According to a high ranking Cambodian oﬃcial, this
policy aims at undermining Taiwanese statehood and was actually not intended
as a mere measure against human traﬃcking of Cambodian women to Taiwanese
brothels which is the way it is perceived by many Cambodians nowadays (Conver-
sation Phnom Penh, 17 November 2009).18
Cambodia's strict adherence to the `one China' policy also materializes in its
dealings with the representative of Tibet, the Dalai Lama. Chinese interests were
cited by government oﬃcials when the Dalai Lama was excluded from the World
17A Taiwanese national living in Cambodia assured me that the requirement of these documents
- as allegedly everything else in the country - was only a matter of money.
18However, apparently organized crime rooted in Taiwan also played a prominent role in illegal
migration from China via Cambodia to the U.S. and Canada (Lintner 2002, 220).
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Buddhism Conference in 2002. The Cambodian government has never allowed the
Dalai Lama to visit the country and denied him a visa in 2002 despite Buddhism
being the majority religion in the country.
With respect to the `one China' policy, the CPP government clearly is eagerly
complying with China's interests. This means that China is very successful in re-
alising its interests in these matters. The public statements of the government and
its behavior pro-actively promote China's objectives of undermining the Taiwanese
government and marginalizing the Dalai Lama internationally. With regard to the
status of Taiwan, this coincided with Hun Sen's self-interest to weaken the links
between his domestic opponents and their ﬁnanciers from Taiwan. With regard to
the Tibet issue, it is not obvious how the Cambodian government should proﬁt do-
mestically from the rejection of the Dalai Lama. Most likely, pleasing the Chinese
interests is perceived by the government as rewarding in the long run.
8.4.2. Access to natural resources
Cambodian NGOs and civil society have frequently criticized the way in which
Cambodian elites continue to give away the nation's wealth. Illicit timber and gem
trade (mostly with the Thai) had ﬁnanced the resistance against the SOC. With
the current annual rate, deforestation has even increased after 2000 in comparison
to the previous decade during which forested areas diminished at a rate of 1.1%
annually (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 2005). In
addition to timber, the leaders have also found alternative resources to exploit
and the circle of capturing the country's natural resources now continues in the
mining, oil and gas sectors. In 2006, US$403 million of investment was approved in
the mining sector by the CDC (Global Witness 2009). And Cambodia's total fossil
fuel reserves have been estimated as high as 2 billion barrels of oil and 10 trillion
cubic feet of natural gas, although these estimates are being contested (Crispin
2007).
Exemplary for the discretionary mechanisms of redistributing the nation's wealth
by a small coalition is the oil and gas sector, where the requirement of public over-
sight over the distribution of concessions that is laid down in the 1991 Petroleum
Regulation have been systematically circumvented ever since the late 1990s.
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In conﬂict with existing law, the Cambodian National Petroleum Authority was
established by royal decree in 1998 and it puts the process of disbursing oil conces-
sions directly under the control of the prime minister (Cock 2010a; Burgos and Ear
2010). Furthermore, the set-up of the Cambodian National Petroleum Authority
is dysfunctional and due to internal divisions and disrupted ﬂows of information,
`only a handful of individuals at the top of the Cambodian government have any
knowledge, or involvement in, the negotiation of contracts signed with petroleum
companies' (Global Witness 2009, 41). Moreover, it is widely acknowledged that
the distribution of concessions comes with `signature bonuses' which are left out of
Cambodia's oﬃcial government revenue statistics (Global Witness 2009, 49). As
a result, the distribution of exploration concession seems to be at the discretion of
the leading coalition with de facto no checks and balances in place (Cock 2010a).
`In March 2002, the CNPA [Cambodian National Petroleum Au-
thority] awarded oﬀshore Block A to a subsidiary of U.S. oil company
Chevron and its partners. Since that point, the CNPA appears to
have allocated all remaining oil blocks to other petroleum companies
of varying degrees of experience. None of this information has come
into the public domain directly from the CNPA. Instead it has leaked
out in dribs and drabs via oil companies, the media and government
power-point presentations that have been posted online by other or-
ganisations' (Global Witness 2009, 42).
Just as the small ruling elite has brought to perfection its control over what-
ever assets the country may possess, the CPP has ensured to have a hand on the
resources that ﬂow into the country. All larger foreign investments need the ap-
proval of the CDC, a one-stop agency for investments directly under the control
of the Prime Minister. Furthermore, Cambodian land law does not allow non-
nationals to acquire land and therefore stimulates the inclusion of a Cambodian
partner. Under these circumstances, one can assume that Chinese investors can
easily achieve its objective of accessing raw materials.
In terms of directly investing in the country to exploit the raw materials, cor-
ruption and weak rule-of-law in Cambodia is not much an impediment for Chinese
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(and many other Asian) businessmen who are willing and accustomed to pay-
ing bribes and to make informal arrangements as long as this is helpful to their
businesses. Nevertheless, all foreign investors which are ready to accept the invest-
ment environment should be able to operate successfully in Cambodia. The CDC
statistics according to which the volume of investments from mainland China since
2004 exceed the foreign investment from other nations, suggests that the Chinese
are more successful than other foreign investors. Of course, it remains diﬃcult
to judge whether Chinese companies in fact receive a preferential treatment over
other investors in Cambodia due to the intransparency around such deals.
Anecdotal evidence also indicates that Chinese companies are involved in all
kinds of raw material exploitation for export from Cambodia, whether it is timber
or minerals, in the agro-business or energy sector. Many of these companies have
violated Cambodian law. For example, in addition to the Wuzhishan plantations
mentioned previously, Pheapimex has more Chinese business partners. For in-
stance, the Chinese state news-agency Xinhua mentioned that Pheapimex was one
of the two Cambodian companies in a joint-venture of the Chinese SOE China
National Machinery & Equipment Import & Export Corporation. In 2005, the col-
laboration in the iron ore mine started to which Hun Sen was cited to have given
his full support. According to the NGO Global Witness, the mine is guarded
by military personnel and belongs to the Commander-in-Chief of the RCAF and
Chief Joint Staﬀ (Global Witness 2009).19 Moreover, in 2007 it was published that
four Chinese state-owned steelmakers were to set up a joint venture to explore and
develop iron ore mines in Cambodia (Chamber of Professional and Micro Enter-
prises of Cambodia 2007). In addition to that, an unnamed Chinese company, in
collaboration with the commander of the RCAF infantry forces and the head of
Cambodia's military development zones was accused to hold concession rights of
the Southern Mining concession.20 The operation in the chromium mine conﬂicts
with Cambodian environmental law because of its location in the national reserve
of Phnom Samkos Wildlife Sanctuary (Global Witness 2009, 27). Another un-
named Chinese-owned company together with Malaysian and Korean companies
19In 2008, for unknown reasons, a South Korean mining company took over 85% of the mine
as a joint venture with one of the Cambodian parties and, against an upfront payment of
approximately US$1 million, continued exploitation.
20These concessions were passed to Vietnamese ownership in spring 2008.
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was reported to be involved in sand shipping from Cambodia to Singapore for use
in land reclamation. The overall operation is allegedly controlled by a well known
CPP Senator and tycoon (Global Witness 2009, 31) who is the main intermediary
for the sand buyers and sand dredgers.
According to Chinese import statistics, exports of plywood and sawn wood from
Cambodia to China totalled US$50 million between 2003 and 2007 alone. It is not
clear whether Chinese companies are only the buyers of these woods or whether
they are also involved in logging. Since this trade does not appear in Cambodian
export statistics it translates in an estimated loss of tax revenue for the state of
Cambodia of US$4.5 million (Global Witness 2007).
In the oil sector, ﬁnally, a number of Chinese companies succeeded in obtaining
concessions for at least three out of six exploration blocks. Two blocks are entirely
in Chinese hands: According to a report by Chinese news agency Xinhua, Chinese
National Oﬀshore Oil Corp signed a contract for oﬀ-shore oil and gas exploration
of Block F in 2007 (Xinhua Economic News 2007; Cock 2010a). Another block,
Block C, is owned for 100% by a company named Polytec Asset Holdings Limited,
a company incorporated in the Caymans and headquartered in Hong Kong. With
its core business in property, ice and frozen products, and ﬁnance and investment
it has no expertise in oil and gas exploration. The company's executive director
who also owns 59.5% of the company's shares is among the richest men in Hong
Kong. As a member of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, he
is linked to the CCP and in fact also belongs to the Chinese winning coalition21
(Global Witness 2009).
The third block with Chinese involvement, Block D, `comprise one Singaporean
oil software services ﬁrm and a mysterious Cambodian-registered company set up
for the purpose of owning the concession, which in turn is part-owned by another
unknown company, a Chinese investment company and a Chinese state-owned
crude oil import company' (Global Witness 2009, 47).
In conclusion, the empirical evidence suggests that Chinese companies have been
quite successful when it comes to the exploitation of Cambodian raw materials.
The strong involvement in the oil sector, where Chinese companies have stakes in
21At least in the sense that he is a target in the CCP 's strategy to co-opt all potentially powerful
economic and societal actors.
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three out of six exploration blocks even hints on a preferential treatment of Chinese
companies to gain access to natural resources. Given that even rather inadequate
investors lacking the necessary experience in the ﬁeld have been awarded licences to
explore oil, it appears that the decision on the part of the Cambodian government
was based on other criteria than the suitability of the company. For this reason,
I consider the Cambodian government to eagerly respond to the Chinese quest of
gaining access to Cambodia's natural resources.
8.4.3. Geo-political interests in Cambodia
Geo-politically, the Chinese government considers Cambodia part of the Chinese
`soft underbelly', expressing its strategic importance to the Chinese government.
This importance has long been connected to the competition between Vietnam and
China over inﬂuence in Southeast Asia. Even though nowadays conﬂicts no longer
arise along ideological lines, new cleavages between Vietnam and China emerge
with respect to the South Chinese Sea. On the one hand, there are territorial
conﬂicts between China and Vietnam over resource-rich islands.22 On the other
hand, the signiﬁcance of the South China Sea for the Chinese government also lies
in its strategic importance for the Chinese energy security. The strategic objective
here is to secure access to the Indian Ocean in the light of U.S. hegemony over
strategic shipping lines.23 While China has been very successful in realising this
strategic goal, there is not much known about the Cambodian strategic foreign
policy perspective. It is precisely this lack of expressed security concerns with
22It has recently even been argued that the South China Sea, along with Tibet, Taiwan and
Xinjiang is now considered a `core interest' of China's territorial integrity (South China
Morning Post 2010).
23More generally, the Chinese diplomacy has the overall objective to project its peaceful inten-
tions towards its Southeast Asian neighbors in order to overcome the suspicion against China
which resulted from Chinese support for insurgencies and its eﬀorts to inﬂuence Chinese eth-
nic communities in the past (Harris 2005). The task is to prevent the ASEAN member states
as a whole bandwagoning with the U.S. or Japan against China (Harris 2005). Cambodia
plays a speciﬁc role as China's voice in ASEAN to this end (Cock 2010b). In 1999, with
one year delay, because of pressure from the European Union in reaction to the 1997 conﬂict,
Cambodia became a member of ASEAN . From a conceptual perspective, Cambodia was now
dealt with in the context of China's general approach towards ASEAN . But as the impres-
sive density of high level interaction between the leaders of both countries shows, Cambodia's
accession to ASEAN has not diminished neither its prominence nor the attention it receives
from Chinese leaders.
190
8.4. Realization of Chinese interests
China's rise and the intermittent highlighting of solid ties and shared values with
China that characterizes Cambodia's bandwagoning with China (Chung 2009).
Similar to Burma, Cambodia plays an important role in improving China's en-
ergy security, because it can oﬀer access to the Gulf of Thailand. In 2006, Jiangsu
Taihu International, a Chinese ﬁrm, in a joint venture with a Cambodian part-
ner (also connected to Pheapimex (Global Witness 2007)) set up a new 178 ha
Special Economic Zone24 near Sihanoukville, the only city in Cambodia with an
international deepwater port. According to observers, Chinese companies have up-
graded this port (Storey 2006). When the project was discussed for the ﬁrst time
in 1999, the representative on the Chinese side was Wang Jun, chairman of the
China International Trade and Investment Corporation, and of Polytechnologies,
the largest corporate entity owned by the PLA (Marks 2000). At that time, the
set up of a shipbuilding and repair facility was also discussed (Chanda 2002).
Against the background of the Chinese Malacca dilemma (as discussed in section
7.4.3), security analysts have pointed towards the potential military use of ports
like Sihanoukville by the Chinese (Burgos and Ear 2010). Not only in Cambodia,
but also in other countries, the Chinese government has successfully acquired access
to a chain of deep water ports in the region.25 These ports, dubbed the `string of
pearls', are ﬁrst and foremost for commercial use, but their dual-use character has
been stressed and they may be used as `maritime surveillance and listening posts
or as supply and pre-positioning sites for naval deployments' in the future (Job,
B. L. and Williams, E., Eds. 2009, 24). Also the harbor of Sihanoukville would
be helpful for both, securing shipping lanes and pressuring Vietnam if it is used
by visiting Chinese naval forces (Storey 2006). `Situated in the center of mainland
Southeast Asia, the Cambodian port of Sihanoukville would provide an excellent
base for projecting maritime power into the Gulf of Thailand and the Straits of
Malacca' (Marks 2000).
The Chinese have not only succeeded in gaining access to crucial Cambodian
infrastructure, it seems they have also succeeded in winning the loyalty of Cambo-
dia's government and its armed forces. Under circumstances where the possibilities
24The conditions to settle in this Zone with a six to nine years of tax holiday and tax exemptions
on imports and exports are very attractive.
25For example the Sittwe Port, Ramree Island and Coco Island in Burma, Chittagong in
Bangladesh, Hambantota in Sri Lanka, on the Maldives, and Gwadar in Pakistan.
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of siding with the United States were slim, the Cambodian government sought to
consolidate old ties with China and maximize assistance and protection from Bei-
jing (Chung 2009). While the American government suspended all direct bilateral
aid to the Cambodian government following the armed conﬂict in 1997, the Chi-
nese government has constantly shown its support in the provision of arms and -
with numerous visits of high-ranking militaries to Cambodia - its willingness to
act as a close military partner. Until 2007, the U.S. was the only major donor that
did not engage in government-to-government aid to Cambodia, but operated only
through Cambodian or foreign NGOs and local governments (Lum 2007). When
the sanctions were lifted the American government did not only re-establish ﬂows
of economic assistance to the Hun Sen government, but also its military aid. In
2007, the U.S. navy visited the port of Sihanoukville twice. These visits were the
ﬁrst since 1975. Yet, the relation between the U.S. and the Cambodian government
remains conﬂictive, especially with respect to human rights concerns: In 2010, even
though joint U.S.-Cambodian military exercises were held (Heder 2011), the U.S.
suspended the provision of military trucks to the Cambodian government because
the latter had deported 20 Uygur refugees to China. The dropout was swiftly
ﬁlled by the Chinese government which even increased the supply (The Associated
Press 2010).
Against this background, I consider the Cambodian government's behavior as
one of bandwagoning, which corresponds to a position at the eager end of the
compliance spectrum.
8.5. Summary of ﬁndings
The Chinese government has pursued its interest in Cambodia during the last
three decades with great success. The leadership under Hun Sen was open to
the Chinese foreign policy interests in all three issue areas to an extent that even
exceeds Chinese expectations. In my general assessment of Cambodia's compliance
with Chinese objectives, I therefore classify the Cambodian government as an eager
compliant.
1. `One China' policy: Regarding the Taiwan question, Cambodia vocally sup-
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ports the PRC as the only legitimate Chinese state. There is no unoﬃcial
Taiwanese representation oﬃce in Phnom Penh despite signiﬁcant foreign
investments from Taiwan, but the Cambodian government also seeks to un-
dermine Taiwanese statehood with its domestic regulations concerning the
treatment of Taiwanese nationals living in Cambodia. In addition, the gov-
ernment has never allowed the Dalai Lama to visit the country. Both policies
correspond to an eager response to Chinese interests.
2. Access to natural resources: The Cambodian government has welcomed Chi-
nese state and private investments in the country. Several of the most promi-
nent domestic tycoons which are heavily engaged in Cambodian politics, es-
tablished joint ventures with Chinese companies. In the newly developed oil
sector, Chinese SOEs acquired several exploitation concessions. The Cam-
bodian government thus eagerly complies with the Chinese quest for access
to natural resources.
3. Geo-political interests: Against the background of a strategic competition
between China and the U.S. in Asia, the Cambodian government, despite
its oﬃcial policy of neutrality, bends heavily towards China. It has allowed
China to invest in commercial infrastructure which, eventually could turn
out to be of crucial military importance in the event of a conﬂict between
China and other players in the region. Moreover, during the last 15 years, the
Cambodian government enjoyed heavy military support from China, while
at the same time experiencing sanctions from the U.S. during most of that
period.
Thus, Cambodia's leadership has responded positively to all Chinese interests
examined here. It has also become clear that it was rewarded for its compliance.
In some instances, Hun Sen's actions in the favor of China, such as the closure of
Taiwan's trade representation or the deportation of Uygur refugees, were immedi-
ately rewarded by the Chinese government with the pledge of economic of military
assistance.
Also, a closer look at the interaction between Chinese and Cambodian elites re-
vealed empirical support for the overall theoretical argument which predicted that
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the Chinese government would strongly target Cambodia's small winning coali-
tion members. On the one hand, Chinese engagement strongly targets directly
or indirectly the members of the Cambodian winning coalition. Chinese military
assistance did not only bolster Hun Sen's military advantage over his domestic
competitors, but also improved the living conditions for his supporters, thereby
satisfying an important sub-group of his winning coalition. Chinese economic in-
vestments are often channelled through the ethnic Chinese Sino-Khmer business
tycoons in Cambodia, which consitute another important element in Hun Sen's
coalition. These tycoons are usually directly rewarded by gaining business conces-
sions in China or by their participation in joint-ventures.
On the other hand, relatively few eﬀorts have been made to target the Cam-
bodian public. China's engagement reaches the broader population only in two
sectors: when infrastructure projects such as roads or bridges are constructed and
in the educational sector where Chinese language schools have blossomed. How-
ever, China's engagement in both sectors is pushed by China's strategic objectives
rather than by a philanthropic motivation. The Chinese government seeks to eco-
nomically develop the region which requires the construction of transportation
networks and it desires to increase China's reputation in the region and therefore
it invests in the development of soft power.
With respect to the balance of power in Cambodia, Chinese resources helped
Cambodia's leadership to enforce its position in power and to enforce the domi-
nance of informal structures over the constitutional order. In doing so, the winning
coalition consisting of entrenched economic, military and bureaucratic elites was
further empowered while the constitutionally deﬁned selectorate, the electorate,
has further lost the potential to be decisive in appointing the government.
Moreover, a convergence of interests between members of the winning coalition
in China and in Cambodia has evolved, because the exchange of private goods
between the two governments and their cronies was not only helpful to stabilize
Hun Sen's power, but also to achieve China's strategic interests. Also, it was
directly beneﬁcial to the Chinese winning coalition.
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9.1. Historical background
Mongolia shares a long history of common statehood with China as both ter-
ritories were governed commonly for several hundred years. During the Yuan
Dynasty 1271-1368, China was under Mongol rule.1 During the Qing Dynasty
(1644-1911), for more than two hundred years both China and Mongolia belonged
to the Manchurian Empire. It was the Manchus, a Tsungun tribe originating from
North East Asia, who, after having subjected the numerous independent Mongo-
lian princedoms, divided the Mongolian territory into Outer and Inner Mongolia.
This division still separates today's Mongolia from the Autonomous Region of
Inner Mongolia which belongs to the PRC (Agwaandorjiin 1999, 25).
When the Qing Dynasty fell apart in 1911, Mongolia declared its independence,
seeking protection from Russia. During the decade that followed, Mongolia fell into
chaos. It was aﬀected by struggles between Red and White Russians, Chinese and
Japanese (Green 1986). In 1919, China tried to re-establish its rule over Mongolia
by military force. Both the Kuomintang and the CCP considered Mongolia a
`lost territory' that was to be re-integrated into the Chinese territory. Although
Russian forces had helped to defeat the Chinese military in 1921, three years later,
when Mongolia declared its independence as the Mongolian People's Republic,
Russia signed an agreement with China acknowledging that Outer Mongolia was
an autonomous but integral part of China.
In 1945, under pressure of the U.S., China was forced to relinquish its legal
claim to Mongolia for the ﬁrst time as the country's independence was a Russian
condition in the Yalta agreement to enter the war against Japan (Green 1986).
1Russia, on the other hand, has been ruled by a second Mongolian tribe, the Golden Horde,
until 1380.
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However, it took Mongolia another two decades to establish itself as a full member
of the international community. Although Mongolia became a member of the UN
in 1961, most countries fully recognized the country only after they had suspended
their diplomatic ties with Taiwan (Green 1986), which until 2002 constitutionally
considered Mongolia as belonging to the Republic of China (Campi 2004, 8).
During the Cold War the Mongolian People's Republic developed close ties with
the Soviet Union. `Mongolia was so completely integrated both politically and
economically with the Soviet Union that it acquired the label `the 16th repub-
lic (Pomfret 2000, 150). Under the Mongolian president Choibalsan the country
shared Moscow's Stalinist policies such as the destruction of the nomadic economic
structure in the course of socialization and the elimination of roughly 38,000 mem-
bers of the country's intellectual and religious elite.
Mongolia's transformation started in March 1990 when the 1989 demonstrations
for the end of single-party rule eventually provoked a generational change within
the incumbent communist Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (MPRP ) and
its ﬁnal resignation. In 1990, a ﬁrst parliamentary election was held and a new
constitution was introduced in 1992. With the new constitution, the Mongolian's
People Republic adopted the new name Republic of Mongolia.
9.2. Domestic politics
I begin the discussion of Mongolia's selectorate and its winning coalition with look-
ing at the constitution that brought into existence the Republic of Mongolia. The
constitution of 1992 set the foundation of the new political order, `a mixed political
system, resembling a semi-presidential regime loosely modeled on France's Fifth
Republic' (Batbayar 2003, 46). It established a division of power between the exec-
utive, the parliament and the judicative. The executive consists of the government,
which is headed by the Prime Minister, and a directly elected president, the head
of state. The president who's incumbency is limited to two terms has a veto power
which can only be turned down by a two-thirds majority of the parliament. He
nominates a Prime Minister who is picked from the majority party in parliament
and, most importantly, he can propose to dissolve the parliament. This then needs
to be approved by a two-thirds majority of the parliament. Mongolia's 76-member
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parliament is called the Great State Hural. It is elected for a four-years term. In
addition to the usual legislative duties it has the power to remove or relieve the
President and to appoint or replace the Prime Minister (Batbayar 2003, 46). The
constitution requires the judicative to be independently nominated by the highest
court.
According to this constitutional order, all Mongolians of 18 years or older are
entitled to elect the government by universal suﬀrage and this electorate hence
forms the selectortate. Mongolia saw peaceful government turnovers in 1996 and
2000 in accordance with the election results. This suggests that the selectorare is
eﬀectively engaged in choosing the government.
The size of the coalition, in contrast, is legally determined by the election law.
The majority system adopted in the 1992 constitution set the minimum require-
ment for the coalition to represent 50% of the electorate, but it was amended
several times. Elections took place under diﬀerent electoral rules, `including a
block vote system (1992), a party list and candidate list system (1996), and a
ﬁrst-past-the-post system (2000)' (Landman et al. 2005, 27). As in many other
majoritarian systems, this legal requirement repeatedly produced election results
in Mongolia in which the victorious party in parliamentary elections could heavily
capitalize from what was in reality only a small electoral advantage. For example,
57% of the votes translated into 93% of parliamentary seats in 1992 and in 2000
51% of the votes into 72 out of 76 seats respectively. Since only an absolute ma-
jority in the Great Hural is required to form the government, the coalition could
be considerably smaller, however.
Since 1990, ﬁve parliamentary (in 1992, 1996, 2000, 2004 and 2008) and ﬁve
presidential elections (1993, 1997, 2001, 2005, and 2009) have been held. Over
the years, a multi-party system has developed with the more conservative former
communistMPRP and the more liberal Democratic Party (DP ) as the two major
rivals, the latter being a merger of several opposition parties.2 Smaller parties such
2The three major parties emerging from the democracy movement in 1989 as the new political
forces were the Mongolian Democratic Party, the Mongolian National Progress Party and
the Mongolian Social Democratic Party. There have been several alliances, coalitions and
mergers as well as splits and brake oﬀs between them and other minor parties since 1989.
Only in 2004 was the DP found as major and durable merger, embracing `the whole spectrum
of the democracy movement' (Prohl and Sumati 2008, 28).
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as the Civil Will Party, the National New Party, and the Republicans have also
been successful in gaining seats in the Great State Hural.
Since government turnovers in accordance with the election results occurred
twice, observers never questioned the positive political and public attitude towards
democracy despite obvious drawbacks such as the unstable election rules (Land-
man et al. 2005; Freedom House 2006). However, political contest has become
ﬁrmer during the last years: Observers reported numerous irregularities in the
2004 parliamentary elections, including `illegal use of state property and civil ser-
vice workers', police intimidation, fraudulent ballots, multiple voting, the ejection
of political party and foreign observers from polling stations, ballot-box stuﬃng
and the exploitation of `transfer voter' provisions (Landman et al. 2005, 28).3
Even more intriguing is that in the aftermath of the 2008 parliamentary elec-
tions, riots seemed to bring the country at the brink of political chaos. According
to the election results, the DP gained only 20 seats against 40 of the MPRP .
Even though international observers declared the elections by and large free and
fair, the frustrated opposition questioned these election results referring to much
more optimistic forecasts. On July 1, demonstrations spiralled into violent riots.
The MPRP party building was burnt, one of the country's art museums looted
and ﬁve civilians died. For four days the country experienced a state of emergency
(Bulag 2009). Observers suspect that the protests were not entirely spontaneous,
but it is not clariﬁed in how far the events had been planned beforehand and by
whom. Notwithstanding these suspicions, it appears that the political will to truly
investigate and call those who are responsible to account is limited.4
3Due to the nomadic livelihood, Mongolian electoral law allows citizens ﬂexibility in polling sta-
tions. But as many districts are scarcely populated, election results can easily be manipulated
by shipping-in `mobile' voters.
4Until today, there is no clear statement who issued the ﬁring order and from which police guns
the deathly shoots were released. Strangely enough, the doctor who carried out autopsy of
the riots' casualties died only shortly after having conﬁrmed gun death in a house ﬁre.
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9.2.1. The coaltition: The majority of the electorate and
the oligarchs
The majority of the electorate
Despite the ﬁrm competition between the political parties and their attempts to
manipulate the election results, voters still play a crucial role in installing the
government. The government is formed according to the election results, meaning
that the majority of the electorate is part of the coalition.
Therefore, one speciﬁc feature of the Mongolian population, and hence the Mon-
golian electorate is highly relevant for this analysis: This is a historically grown
fear among the Mongolian population of being over-run or even annexed by the
PRC. On the one hand, China's Autonomous Region of Inner Mongolia in which
a Mongolian minority of 6 million people is dominated by a Han Chinese majority
is quoted a precedent for Chinese expansionism. A key concern in this regard is
the diﬀerence in historical views between the two nations: `While Mongolians see
themselves as one of the Asia's oldest ethnic nations like Han Chinese, Chinese
regard Mongolia as a former part of the Middle Kingdom and view Mongolians as
their ethnic minority' (Batchimeg 2005b, 54). Mongolian fears have been substan-
tiated further by the repeated publication of Chinese oﬃcial maps which showed
the territory of Mongolia as a part of the PRC (Campi 2005). On the other hand,
the immense demographic pressure in China constitutes a real threat that migra-
tion from China could turn Mongolia's 2.5 million population into a de facto ethnic
minority on its own territory.
Against this background, a true Sino-phobia has evolved among Mongolians
with sometimes extremist attacks on Chinese immigrants. Politics has reacted
to these emotions. Fees were introduced for companies employing non-national
labor and the newspapers regularly report on roundups of Chinese labor with-
out proper documents. More importantly, however, politicians tried to capitalize
from Sino-phobia in several electoral campaigns. While all major political parties
have relations to the CCP (Batchimeg 2005a), in Mongolian politics, the `China
card' has frequently been played. For example, in 1998, a state-owned Mongolian
newspaper alleged the Chinese ambassador to be involved in the events leading to
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the resignation of the Enkhsaikhan government (The Economist Intelligence Unit
1998a, 49).5 In 2003, the minister of justice and internal aﬀairs, Tsendiin Nyam-
dorj, was accused by the oppositional DP to have connections with the Chinese
intelligence service (The Economist Intelligence Unit 2003, 9). Most recently, dur-
ing the presidential elections in 2009, the incumbent president tried to discredit
his competitor by accusing him of being of Chinese ascendance.
The oligarchs
Observers of Mongolia's democratization process have noticed a trend of `oli-
garchization' in Mongolia's political system (Barkmann 2006b). As a result, it
would be misleading to look at the constitutional setting alone as it would restrict
the analysis of the winning coalition to the phase of democratic transition thereby
overlooking an important trend in the phase of democratic consolidation.
The speciﬁc challenge of post-communist transitions consists of the simultaneous
political and economic transformation. In Mongolia, the institutional setting for
political transformation was introduced relatively quickly with the new constitu-
tion. Much of the political process during the 1990s, in contrast, was dominated by
reforming the socialist economic system. During communist times, the Mongolian
economy was nationalized and deeply integrated with the Soviet Union. When the
Soviet Union withdrew its ﬁnancial support, Mongolian leaders had to ﬁnd ways
to substitute for subsidies from the Soviet Union.6
They pursued a neo-liberal shock-therapy in order to establish a market sys-
tem thereby ﬁnding support from Western donor agencies which stepped in. But
assistance was conditioned on structural economic reforms in line with the then-
dominant paradigm of the `Washington Consensus'. The agreed reform program
was truly radical: Initially, it was planned to privatize 40% of SOEs within two to
three years with the state retaining control over some key sectors such as energy,
mining, transportation and banking (Heaton 1992, 52). In 1993, with US$0.52
5The allegations turned out to be unsubstantiated and in the consequence of heavy objections
on the part of the Chinese government, the editor-in-chief was replaced.
6The demand for payment in hard currency of the Soviet Union and the disrupted transportation
systems resulted in a shortage of goods such as sugar, butter, meat, rice, and matches (Rossabi
2005b, 35). For example, meat rationing in Ulaanbaatar in 1991, limited usual consumption
of 7.5kg per month to 2.7kg per person (Heaton 1992, 53).
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billion or US$236 per capita the country was at its lowest level of real GDP
(Demirbag et al. 2005, 307). It is widely believed that the transition process
was implemented relatively smoothly, because Mongolia's economy traditionally
was based on a large nomadic agricultural sector and Mongolia therefore `did not
confront any major problem in terms of large-scale dislocation of redundant indus-
trial workers' (Demirbag et al. 2005, 308). Nevertheless, unemployment sharply
increased from 31,000 in February to over 80,000 in September 1991 (Heaton 1992,
53).7 While there was considerable ownership on the part of Mongolian reformers,
Mongolia's transition process was dominated by donor agencies which insisted on
democratization together with transition to a pure market system and which en-
forced speciﬁc economic policies. As has been criticized, they thereby eﬀectively
undermined democratic principles (Rossabi 2005b, 111).
Initially designed to ensure equality, the privatization process de facto greatly
contributed to inequality. The distribution of vouchers to buy SOEs overstretched
the ability of many people to fully understand the process while underestimating
their need for cash. Many sold their vouchers for ridiculous prices which de facto
resulted in the concentration of vouchers in a few hands. Moreover, throughout
the process, under-priced sales of well-functioning state enterprises or state banks,
misappropriation and theft of state assets have been reported (Rossabi 2005b, 75).
Privatization of livestock initiated in 1991 led to an increase in the total number
of animals which has dramatically spurred desertiﬁcation because of over-grazing
of the fragile grass-lands. At the same time, many herders reverted to subsistence
farming (The Economist Intelligence Unit 1998b). Similarly the 2003 Private Land
Act that credits 0,7 hectares of land to every Mongolian played into the hands of
insiders because of insuﬃcient information about the quality of land (Bayantur
2008, 44, Rossabi 2005b, 108).
As a result, in the 2000s the struggle over redistribution in the economic ﬁeld
translated into a process of oligarchyzation in the political sphere: Not only has
a small elite succeeded in transferring much of the countries wealth into a few
private pockets, but it has also increased entrance barriers to the political scene
for newcomers. Due to the majoritarian electoral system elections were most of-
ten not driven by programmatic competition, but by personalities. Furthermore,
7True is, however, that economic reforms temporarily stimulated decreasing urbanization rates.
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both major parties are strongly riven by factions (Pomfret 2000, 156). Against
this background, exorbitantly expensive electoral campaigns eﬀectively close the
political contest against newcomers. For example, in the 2004 parliamentary elec-
tions, the reported price for standing as an election candidate in a country side
constituency was Tugrik 20 million to Tugrik 30 million (between US$15,000 and
US$23,000), rising up to 150 million in Ulaanbaatar (approximately US$115,000)
(Barkmann 2006a, 388).
From 2000 onwards, the increase in the number of business men in the political
sphere was considerable, many of whom started to invest massively in political
parties and to join politics primarily in order to increase their business opportu-
nities (Barkmann 2006b) or to obtain parliamentary immunity.8 Since fall 2009,
the oﬃce of the prime minister is held by one of the country's wealthiest business-
men, Sukhbaataryn Batbold (Bulag 2010). Since a controversial 1999 amendment
of the constitution allows Members of Parliament to simultaneously serve in the
government, the engagement of business in politics is more than mere lobbying.
In consequence, numerous conﬂicts of interests of such dual oﬃce holders have
arisen9 spurred by the lack of a Freedom of Information Act as an obstacle to ac-
countability and transparency. Therefore, political parties are increasingly viewed
as corrupt (The Asia Foundation and US Aid 2009), but only few high-level cor-
ruption cases have been brought to justice. Rampant corruption is also reﬂected
in Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index where Mongolia was
ranked 85 in 2004, 105 in 2006, and 120 in 2009 out of 180 countries (Transparency
International 2009).
8Conversation, Ulaanbaatar 25 September 2008
9The constitution that forbid dual oﬃce was amended in 1999. This amendment was ruled to
be unconstitutional by the constitutional court and in addition vetoed by President Baga-
bandi. However, a two-thirds majority of the parliament overturned the presidential veto
(The Economist Intelligence Unit 2001).
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Summary
In conclusion, Mongolia has transformed remarkably peaceful to a parliamentary
democracy after the brake-down of the Soviet Union. In its twenty years of demo-
cratic history, the election results translated into government turnovers twice. The
majority of the electorate eﬀectively participates in the winning coalition. With
respect to its relations to China, the wide-spread Sino-phobia among the electorate
is an important factor in Mongolian politics. But there are also strong vested in-
terests that have succeeded in becoming a permanent member in the coalition: the
Mongolian group of oligarchs that increasingly dominate the political process.
9.3. China in Mongolia
The previous section presented the constituencies of the Mongolian winning coali-
tion. It is a relatively large coalition. Against this background, the following sec-
tions investigate the nexus between Chinese and Mongolians. The section ﬁrstly
discusses China's engagement with the small vested interests and then turns to
China's approaches towards the population who forms the electorate. Because the
coalition is inclusive, this section has no subsection dedicated to the disenfran-
chised.
9.3.1. China and the Mongolian coalition
China and the oligarchs
From the perspective of government-to-government relations, the Chinese govern-
ment very prudently tried to show its goodwill to maintain good relations with
its Mongolian counterparts. In order to do so, it has repeatedly oﬀered to sup-
port the Mongolian government ﬁnancially. In 2003, Chinese president Hu Jintao
oﬀered a US$300,000 soft loan for infrastructure projects (Batchimeg 2005a), but
the Mongolian government was undecided what to do with this oﬀer. In 2007, a
project proposal to use the loan to construct a hydropower project that had been
on the table ever since the 1990s - and then already been evaluated to be un-viable
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- was ﬁnally rejected.10 Nonetheless, it appears that the Mongolian government
was deliberately reluctant to accept Chinese strategic investments and state loans
during the 1990s and until the 2008 global ﬁnancial crisis.
In the framework of government-to-government relations, it is known that the
Chinese government also addressed the Mongolian military. China provided more
than US$1 million of military assistance in total, which consisted of medical equip-
ment supply, two Chinese language teachers to the Mongolian armed forces and
the ﬁnance provision of accommodation for oﬃcers and improved training facil-
ities in 1997 and 2000 (The Economist Intelligence Unit 2000a, The Economist
Intelligence Unit 1997a, The Economist Intelligence Unit 1996a, 47, Liu 2007).
At the individual level, the Chinese government seeks to maintain good relations
with the Mongolian policy-makers, whether they are parliamentarians or members
of the cabinet. Therefore, as the chief of the CCP 's International Liaison De-
partment reassured a opposition party, it is a Chinese policy to cultivate ties to
all important Mongolian parties and their high-ranking party oﬃcials regardless
whether they are in government or in opposition (The UB Post 2003c).
Many of the Mongolian politicians are known for being corrupt and for abusing
their political position for proﬁt-making of their private companies. It seems fur-
ther likely that they are easily manipulated by Chinese actors. It is very likely that
Chinese capital is involved in many of the business imperia of the local Mongolian
elite. On the one hand, it has been suspected that Chinese investors beneﬁted
from the privatization in Mongolia where they are said to have acquired shares
through Mongolian bidders (The Economist Intelligence Unit 1997b, 41). On the
other hand, business collusions between Mongolia's oligarchic elites and investors
from China are likely since companies from Japan, China, and South Korea are
generally more prone to invest in Mongolia in the form of joint-ventures than in
the form of fully owned subsidiaries (Demirbag et al. 2005). In addition, many
local oﬃcials legally and illegally award mining licenses against a bribe to Chi-
nese companies or ﬁnance their own mining activities by Chinese entrepreneurs
who later buy the product (Sieren 2008). In my interviews, many Mongolians
expressed their belief that ﬁnancial dependence of Mongolian decision-makers on
10Conversation Ulaanbaatar, 9 October 2009
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the national level was the entry point for Chinese interests.11
Since national politics in Mongolia have become dominated by oligarchic busi-
nessmen, it is very likely that Mongolian decision makers are pressured by their
business relations. According to anecdotal evidence, the party secretary of the
Civil Will Party, Zorigt, made use of an oﬃcial trip to China to deepen his pri-
vate business connections. He also represented the Golomt group which included
Golomt Bank and payed much of the party's expenses. It is rumoured that much
to the embarrassment of his Mongolian fellows, he continued to discuss his private
business interests with the Chinese counterpart immediately after the completion
of the oﬃcial part of the visit which he led in his function as party secretary.12
It is also simple corruption that makes Mongolian decision makers and oﬃcials
vulnerable and manipulative. Corruption is a home-grown illness in Mongolia.
The country's immense richness in terms of natural resources and the competition
among foreign investors to achieve access to these resources further exacerbated
the problem. As will be shown in the following section, notwithstanding this
high level of corruption, due to Mongolia's democratic structures with a relatively
large winning coalition, Chinese companies face diﬃculties to realize their interests
in Mongolia's natural resource deposits by solely targeting private goods at the
Mongolian business elites or decision-makers.
China and the Mongolian electorate
Due to the strong Sino-phobic emotions among the Mongolian population, Mongo-
lian policy-makers can hardly take on a very pro-Chinese position in public, even
though they may cooperate with Chinese business interest in private.13 It appears
that the Chinese government has begun to understand the incentive system of
Mongolian decision-makers and in particular the image problem that China faces
in Mongolia.
In accordance with this insight, the Chinese government has implemented mea-
11Conversation Ulaanbaatar, 6 October 2008; 14 October 2009
12Conversation Ulaanbaatar, 12 October 2009
13This is also the reason why it is incredibly diﬃcult to obtain data on Chinese engagement in
the country. There is no political will to be transparent on this issue, neither on the Chinese
nor on the Mongolian side.
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sures to increase the receptiveness to Chinese interests in Mongolia. More specif-
ically it tried to address the Mongolian population and to show its goodness to
the population. Even though it is diﬃcult to gain a comprehensive picture about
Chinese ﬁnancial engagement in Mongolia and speciﬁcally its aid to the Mongolian
government14 several Chinese philanthropic activities were cited in local newspa-
pers: In addition to investment related projects for example, the Chinese govern-
ment provided disaster relief in order to mitigate winter livestock disasters from
1997 to 2002 (US$200,000 in 1997; US$240,000 in 2001), and an aid shipment of
2,000 tonnes of wheat in 2007. Moreover, it provided funds for solar-powered gen-
erators, hospitals, and the repair of bridges (Rossabi 2005a). It also abandoned
visa requirements for Mongolian citizens and allowed them to use the Chinese
health care facilities for medical treatment (Campi 2005). In 2003, the Chinese
ambassador donated Tugrik 3 million (approximately US$2300) to handicapped
elderly Mongolians (The UB Post 2003b).
In 1996, an educational exchange program was initiated which enabled Mon-
golians to study in China with Chinese free loans from 2000 onwards. The ed-
ucational cooperation was drastically reinforced during the last decade: In 2008,
a Confucius Institute (the Chinese oﬃcial language institution) was established
at the National University of Mongolia. Symptomatically, this was announced in
Mongolian newspapers with the headline: `Confucius Institute Aims to Change
Famously Frosty Attitudes' (Tucker 2008). `Unlike in the past, in 2009 China
aggressively promoted its culture in Mongolia, trying to charm Mongolia with its
soft power by training large numbers of Mongolian students and teachers of the
Chinese language' (Bulag 2010, 102). While 180 Mongolian trainees and students
received education in China, only 15 Chinese trainees went to study in Mongolia
between 2002 and 2003 (Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs of the People's Republic of
China 2010). On a visit to Ulaanbaatar in 2010, premier Wen Jiabao announced
to oﬀer 2,000 additional government scholarships to Mongolian students during
the next ﬁve years and to invite 300 youths from Mongolia to visit China. He also
initiated the establishment of youth exchange mechanisms (Sumiyabazar 2010b).
14In 2003, China donated $US4 to the Mongolian government to support the construction of the
Mongolian Chamber of Commerce and Industry and the development of the industrial park
of the free trade zone in Altanbulag (The UB Post 2003a). The Chinese provided the funds
for 5 km of the millennium road.
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Given that Mongolia's total population amounts to less than 4 million, the extent
of the program is astonishing. Observers have linked these eﬀorts directly to the
attempt to `oil bilateral economic cooperation, especially in the mining sector'
(Bulag 2010, 102).
In another approach to improve its public relations and to work on a better Chi-
nese image among Mongolians, the Chinese government has speciﬁcally addressed
the Mongolian educational elites as a link to the broader society. The Chinese
Academy of Social Sciences, a leading Chinese think tank connected to the Min-
istry of Foreign Aﬀairs, has established a joint Chinese-Mongolian research project
to jointly re-write Mongolia's political history between 1911 and 1990. I was told
researchers would work hard to arrange history and to reach consensus on disputed
issues.15
But the Chinese government also punished the Mongolian population collec-
tively, for a visit of the Dalai Lama to Ulaanbaatar in 2002, where he was received
by Mongolian politicians. To sanction this visit, the Chinese government used its
asymmetric economic leverage and closed cross-border train traﬃc for several days
under the pretext of technical reasons (Rossabi 2005b). Given the high dependency
on Chinese imports, this sanction was felt drastically and by everybody as prices
for consumer goods increased dramatically immediately (Sarlagtay 2007).
Summary
To conclude this section two observations should be emphasized. On the one
hand, the Chinese government makes eﬀorts to maintain good state-to-state and
party-to-party relations by investing in ties with both Mongolian policy-makers
in their function as members of the parliament or the cabinet and the Mongolian
parties regardless of whether they are in power or in the opposition. Many of the
Mongolian politicians are oligarchic and have own business interests. They are
knowingly corrupt and abuse of political positions for proﬁt-seeking is common.
The extent to which this is a gateway for manipulation from China is diﬃcult to
assess.
But despite rampant corruption among politicians and oﬃcials it should be
15Conversation, Beijing 31 October 2009
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noted that Mongolia's democratic institutions with a relatively inclusive coalition
and a public opinion that happens to be overtly Sino-phobic thus far have re-
strained Mongolian decision-makers to sell-oﬀ Mongolia's vast natural resources
against private gains. As a consequence, the Chinese government has speciﬁcally
addressed the Mongolian population as a second important member of the winning
coalition with philanthropic programs to show its goodwill and to improve China's
reputation among ordinary Mongolians.
Somewhat at odds with my theoretical predictions, in section 9.4.3 it will be
discussed that the Chinese government also tried to reach out to the Mongolian
armed forces to which it donated more than US$1 million during the second half
of the 1990s. However, the military does not play an independent role in the
Mongolian winning coalition.
9.4. Realization of Chinese interests
Having presented the political economy of the Mongolian political system from the
perspective of the selectoreate theory, I will investigate in how far this interaction
is conducive to the realization of Chinese interests in this section.
9.4.1. Territorial integrity and the `one China' policy
The issue of territorial integrity is delicate in Sino-Mongolian relations, because
there are several diﬀerent minority issues in Sino-Mongolian relations that are
directly or indirectly connected to China's domestic security and political stability:
a Mongol minority living in China's Autonomous Region of Inner Mongolia, the
Dalai Lama's popularity among Mongolian Lamaist, and Muslim minorities in
western parts of Mongolia and the Chinese Autonomous Region of Xinjiang. The
role of these issues is usually down-played and therefore the extent of mutual
agreement on these topics is diﬃcult to assess.
In this regard, the Taiwan question is probably the least dodgy topic, but the
position Mongolian politicians take in the Taiwan question still is a reluctant one
only. To a certain extent the government gives in vis-à-vis the Chinese interest,
but it has tried to restrict its concessions to the lowest common denominator.
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Mongolia's adherence to the `one China' policy is repeated as a standard state-
ment whenever a Sino-Mongolian oﬃcial convention takes place. There have never
been oﬃcial diplomatic relations between Taiwan and Mongolia. This was caused
by the fact Mongolia was considered part of China by the Chinese Communists
considered as well as by the Kuomintang. Therefore, according to the Taiwanese
constitution, Mongolia was considered a part of the Republic of Taiwan and the
Taiwanese government vetoed Mongolia's accession as a member of the UN in the
1950s and 1960s.
In 2002, Taiwan upgraded Mongolia's status by acknowledging Mongolians to be
entitled to visas, instead of entry permits (The China Post 2002). In the same year,
a Taiwanese trade representative oﬃce was set up in Ulaanbaatar, a Mongolian
representation in Taipei followed in 2003. In 2004, bilateral trade between the
two countries had risen from close to non-existent to around US$5 million per
year. Recently over 30 Taiwanese-run companies were identiﬁed in Mongolia (Hsu
2005). Taiwan has also evolved as a migration destination for Mongolians. With
its relations to Taiwan becoming more rather than less formalized during the last
decade, Mongolia's compliance with the `one China' policy with regard to the
Taiwan question is reluctant only.
Mongolia's dealing with the Dalai Lama is much more complicated than the
Taiwan question. China's request to repudiate the Dalai Lama makes the Mon-
golian leaders chose between a policy pleasing their own coalition and selectorate
and one that is beneﬁcial to the Chinese leadership, but is opposed by the major-
ity of Mongolians. For this reason, Mongolian leaders were only partly willing to
comply with this interest of the Chinese government. Therefore, their position on
the compliance spectrum is somewhere between refusal and reluctance.
Mongolian Buddhism has invigorated after a period of suppression under social-
ism. Today it is considered to form part of Mongolia's national identity. More-
over, there are close historical links between Buddhism in Tibet and Buddhism
in Mongolia, as both follow a Lamaist tradition. The Dalai Lama is the reli-
gious authority for Mongolian Buddhists. He has visited Mongolia seven times
since 1979, two times after 2000 when China's rise had become more manifest
(Chung 2009). In reaction to the Dalai Lama's 2002 visit, when he was received
by Mongolian politicians, the Chinese government closed cross-border train traﬃc
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for several days under the pretext of technical problems. During his visit in 2006,
the Dalai Lama was not received oﬃcially by government representatives, but most
likely met the President in private (Sumiyabazar 2006). Although there was no
state reception, the Chinese government subsequently suspended a high-ranking
diplomatic meeting between both nations (Sarlagtay 2007).
The Dalai Lama issue touches the core of contradicting values and concepts of
the political order in China and Mongolia. Mongolians understand their nation as
a democratic country committed to religious freedom whereas the Chinese govern-
ment expects Mongolian politicians to restrain religious practices in favor of the
CCP 's interest to preserve the repressive political order. So far, the Mongolian
government has not been ready to sacriﬁce political freedoms and civil rights for
the sake of Chinese stability.
But the Dalai Lama issue is very likely to remain a stumbling block or could
even become more delicate in the future: The Dalai Lama has indicated that the
15th Dalai Lama should reincarnate in a democratic country. A Dalai Lama from
Mongolia would complicate China's diﬃculties with its domestic minorities because
as a Mongolian he would most likely enjoy great support from the Mongolian
minorities in China's Autonomous Region of Inner Mongolia and increase their
identiﬁcation with both Buddhism and Mongolia. This would extend the Chinese
authorities' concerns of separatism from Tibet to Inner Mongolia, which recently
has been a relatively quiet region.
One Mongolian analyst reasons that even though the Chinese government would
have greater oversight over a Dalai Lama in Mongolia than in India because it has
more means of inﬂuence over Mongolia than India, one can expect that Chinese
authorities will try to avoid an independent nomination of the Dalai Lama at all
by appointing a diﬀerent person.16 This scenario would most likely pose a great
challenge for Mongolian policy makers to manoeuvre between the Mongolians re-
quest for religious freedom and the Chinese government's interests. `The dilemma
between responsiveness to voters' preferences and national security, which surfaces
16This is possible, because there are conﬂicting interpretations of the recognition process. In
1996, in contradiction to the announcement of the Dalai Lama, Chinese authorities announced
a six-year-old boy as the ﬁgure of succession of the Panchen Lama, whose previous ﬁgure had
deceased earlier. Shortly thereafter, the Panchen Lama recognized by the Dalai Lama and
the lama, who had found this Lama disappeared (Sarlagtay 2007).
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every time the Dalai Lama visits, will likely become more crucial in domestic pol-
itics [. . . ] Religion in Mongolia is not yet politicized, but surely will be if it faces
a political challenge from China' (Sarlagtay 2007, 90).
The Dalai Lama issue indicates that the Chinese government has successfully
used its economic leverage to restrict the Mongolian government's manoeuvring
space in its dealing with the Tibet issue. However, it has by no means achieved a
complete submission of the Mongolian government and it is also very unlikely to
be successful in the future. This is because domestically, the Mongolian leaders
are dependent on the electorate's approval and are therefore very much vulnerable
to public opinion. Mongolians identify themselves with Buddhism. It is, however,
most noteworthy that with the closure of cross-border traﬃc, the Chinese author-
ities did not speciﬁcally target the Mongolian leaders, but chose to punish both
decision-makers and the voters.
9.4.2. Access to natural resources
Seen from an economic perspective, the Chinese government pursues two objectives
in its relations with Mongolia. Firstly, the Chinese government launched an agenda
of regional integration with its neighbors in order to enhance economic growth
in its underdeveloped western provinces. It has been a declared goal to achieve
development in the northwest and northeast of China with the aim of securing
political stability in these speciﬁcally remote, but strategic areas such as Gansu,
Ningxia, Shanxi, and the Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia Autonomous Regions by
regional economic cooperation with neighboring countries. Thus, Mongolia and
other Central Asian countries have increasingly been addressed by China (Rossabi
2005a). Secondly, the Chinese government is interested in exploiting Mongolia's
vast deposits of natural resources to spur growth of China's economy. With respect
to this second objective, Mongolia is probably the country in which the Chinese
government has faced most diﬃculties.
With regard to the ﬁrst point, Mongolia's trade ﬂows are naturally dominated
by business with its direct neighbors, China and Russia, due to its landlocked
position. Mongolia's only access to the north paciﬁc is through the Chinese port
of Tianjin which has been leased from the PRC since 1991. Reaching Tianjin,
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however, implies transportation through more than 1,000 km of foreign territory.
While trade with Russia decreased from 80% to approximately 25% from 1990
to 2001 China's share with Mongolia increased steadily from around 2% to more
than 35% (Campi 2004). While Russia remains the number one import partner;
China is the number one export destiny: In 2008 trade with Russia accounted
for 38.4% of all imports, mainly fuel. 80% of Mongolia's energy needs is met by
Russian imports. In contrast, 64.5% of all exports, most of them metals and ores,
went to China (The Economist Intelligence Unit 2010, 15). Mongolia's exports to
China totalled US$474.2 million in 2010 (The Economist Intelligence Unit 2010,
20).
The Mongolian economy does not only depend on its two neighbors for its trade;
China is also the biggest investor of foreign investment in Mongolia, even though
numbers on Chinese investments in Mongolia are controversial. In 1998, over $24
million, or 64% of the investment was reported to be supplied by Chinese ﬁrms
(The Economist Intelligence Unit 1999, 55). This number apparently fell during
the early 2000s, but thereafter it increased again. In 2003, Chinese FDI accounted
for 38% of all FDI in Mongolia and amounted to US$1.68 billion in 2008 (Yan
2009).
Given the strong inroads that Chinese capital has made into the Mongolian
economy, astonishingly little is known about these Chinese investments. The ma-
jority of these investments are small in scale and technologically poor in the retail
and gastronomic sector (Batchimeg 2005b). The textile sector also attracted Chi-
nese investments until 2005 because of export quotas to the U.S. market (The
Economist Intelligence Unit 2005a). In 2000 the construction of a Mongolian-
Chinese industrial zinc venture was reported as the ﬁrst large Mongolian-Chinese
mining venture (The Economist Intelligence Unit 2000b). A second major Chinese
investment project, Heilonjiang Huafu Industrial's US$200 million oil reﬁnery fol-
lowed in 2005 (The Economist Intelligence Unit 2005b). According to the local
newspaper UB Post the number of Chinese-owned metallurgical plants in Ulaan-
baatar increased from eight in mid-2006 to 40 by the end of 2006 (Batmonkh
2007).
If Chinese investment in Mongolia remains opaque, there seems to be consensus
on the view that Mongolia's economic reforms have promoted Chinese investments
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in Mongolia. Radical liberalization deprived the Mongolian government of the
means to protect domestic processing industries against competition from China
where access to capital to buy inputs, such as raw cashmere for example, was
generally better (The Economist Intelligence Unit 1996b). `The shock therapy
proposed by these [international donor] agencies has actually facilitated Chinese
leverage over the Mongolian economy' (Rossabi 2005a).
With regard to the second point, China's strategic interests in Mongolia's re-
source sector, I will now turn to China's attempts to strategically invest in the
Mongolian mining sector. Mongolia has a dozen major and many small-scale re-
source deposits. The government does not have the ﬁnancial and technological
capacity to exploit these natural resources. But a number of mining companies
from Canada, Australia, the U.S., China and Russia are interested in these de-
posits. Some of these deposits are expected to give the exploiting company some
leverage over world market prices because of the immense size of these sites. It
is noteworthy that in order to develop these two sites the construction of major
transportation routes for export are needed which are of strategic relevance in
their own right. The length, route and gauge of the railway will determine the
competitiveness of Mongolian exports, the economic development of the country as
a whole, and the potential leverage of its neighbors over the Mongolian economy.
By now, there is only one railway line running through Mongolia from north to
south connecting Moscow with Beijing. This line has the Russian gauge, which is
not compatible with the Chinese gauge.17
The exploitation of three major mining sites has been discussed recently, and
each of these is telling in the way how this situation is handled. The Oyu Tolgoi
case sheds some light on the weak moral and the desire of making private gains out
of the mineral bonanza on a great part of the Mongolian parliament and cabinet
members. In connection to that, it also gives insight in the incapacity of the
state institutions to eﬀectively implement and control the law. Contest over the
Tavan Tolgoi and the Madrai resource deposits are telling too: The Tavan Tolgoi
case delivers some insights in the complex strategic considerations around awarding
exploration concessions and in the reluctance of the Mongolian government towards
17Conference on `Strategy for Railway Infrastructure Development of Mongolia', Ulaanbaatar,
14 October 2009
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Chinese investors for strategic reasons. The Madrai case, ﬁnally, sheds some light
on the re-emerging leverage of Mongolia's northern neighbor Russia and illustrates
the limits of Mongolian manoeuvre space. All these sites will be discussed in more
detail below.
Oyu Tolgoi, is among the world's largest copper (36 million tons) and gold (45.2
million ounces) mines, and is located only about 80 km from the border to China
in South Gobi province. It is the ﬁrst of Mongolia's enormous resource deposits to
be developed. The wealth of Oyu Tolgoi was discovered by Ivanhoe mines, a small
Canadian drilling company in the early 2000s. Initially, Ivanhoe had the extrac-
tion licences with a 2% royalty for the Mongolian government. When it became
clear that the deposits of copper and gold were much larger than expected (The
Economist Intelligence Unit 2003) the Mongolian public questioned the fairness
of the agreement resulting in protests against the company. Consequently, the
government tried to raise its beneﬁt out of the mining operations, culminating in
the introduction of a 68% windfall tax if the world market price of copper and gold
would rise over a certain level. The government also amended the mining law and
introduced new regulations on the award of exploration and exploitation licences,
banned the free transfer of licences, and issued higher tariﬀs for licences. It was
also proposed that `the state should be entitled to a 30% share in `strategically
important' deposits' even if licences had already been rewarded to foreign investors
(The Economist Intelligence Unit 2006, 13f). Negotiations on the terms of the ex-
ploitation contract went back and forth. Only in 2009 and after several proposals
had been dismissed, an acceptable investment agreement was reached establishing
a stable long-term tax and regulatory environment (Bulag 2010). Having invested
a considerable amount of money into the exploration in Mongolia, Ivanhoe Mines
almost went bankrupt during this time. But it found an international partner,
Australian Rio Tinto.18
18Therefore, Mongolians have closely followed the detention of four staﬀ members of Rio Tinto's
Shanghai oﬃce in July 2009 because of allegations of spying, steeling state secrets and bribery.
Because Rio Tinto's chief negotiator of iron ore trade, an Australian citizen, was among the
detainees the international press connected the allegations with failed negotiations on iron
ore prices between Rio Tinto and the China Iron and Steel Association. Rio Tinto is one of
the major iron ore suppliers. Raw materials are delivered to the large steel mills at annually
negotiated prices. But because the Chinese domestic iron ore market is organized in a two-
tiers system, large steel mills, represented in the China Iron and Steel Association, could
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It is widely believed in the Mongolian civil society that the whole process of
ﬁnding the Oyu Tolgoi agreement was delayed so much, because of corruption and
greed. Covered behind the discussion on the state's role in exploration operations,
the members of the parliament and the government not only tried to increase
their private gains in the investment deal but were also subject to manipulation
and corruption from investors. Both resulted in chaotic and inconsistent voting-
behavior in the legislature (Baabar 2009b).19 According to the constitutional order
described in section 9.2 neither the parliament with its 76 members nor the 15-
member cabinet nor the president have the authority to take any independent
decision. In addition to mutual veto rights, there is a lack of clarity on the scope
and sectors of competences assigned to either of the institutions. Matters became
even worse when the government changed after the elections in 2008.
`For the last 6 years, corruption system developed almost perfectly
through 3 parliaments that the OT [Oyu Tolgoi] agreement faced.
There is unveriﬁed rumor that the Government oﬃcials during the
last three parliaments were given enormous amount of bribe by Ivahoe
Mines. This is the main excuse for the next parliament to demand
their share of bribe from Ivahoe Mines' (Baabar 2009b).
Interestingly, government oﬃcials were not only corrupted, they even perverted
the very process of democratic participation and started to organize protestors
buy large iron ore stocks at low ﬁxed prices. These were later sold on the black market
at higher prices to smaller steel mills which had to acquire raw material at the spot price
(Barboza 2009b). During high world market prices, this system was very proﬁtable for the
large steel producers. When demand in iron ore dropped in 2009, however, the China Iron
and Steel Association refused to accept the price cuts of 33% as proposed by Rio Tinto
and Japan's Nippon Steel Corporation and accepted by Japan and Korean steel producers
(Barboza 2009a). In Australia, the detentions were perceived as a Chinese retaliation against
Rio Tinto, because the Australian government had refused a 19.5 billion bid to increase its
shares in Rio Tinto by the state-owned Aluminium Corp of China, Chinalco, only a few weeks
earlier. In 2008, China imported 440 million tonnes, or half of the world's total iron (Xinhua
2009). It therefore would have greatly proﬁted from a bigger share in Rio Tinto. This political
motivation of the detentions seemed to be supported by the fact that several Chinese steel
companies denied to be under investigation in the media (Barboza 2009b). In Mongolia, the
Chinese attempts to increase its stakes in Rio Tinto was perceived as the attempt to aquire
access to Mongolia's Oyu Tolgoi resources.
19Conversation Ulaanbaatar, 13 October 2009
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to increase their own gains.20 A survey showed that 80% of all Mongolians in
fact wished to have the government accelerate the allocation of mining conces-
sions, because in their election campaigns for the parliamentary elections 2008 the
parties had promised to redistribute revenue from these mining sites directly to
the population.21 Moreover, the exploitation of the Mongolian natural resources
was expected to ﬁll Mongolian tax coﬀers. Money that was urgently needed for
development and poverty alleviation. Given these discrepancies, many ordinary
Mongolians suspected that protestors oftentimes were orchestrated in order to
blackmail foreign investors.
`It's becoming clearer that those protestors, who take to the streets,
almost aiming ﬁre-arms to investors, are organized by a few people
in the parliament. There are documents of evidence left that some
protests were headed by a Government cabinet oﬃcial, demanding
enormous amount of money' (Baabar 2009b).
Baabar, the most famous columnist in Mongolia, openly criticized the short-time
perspective of many Mongolian oﬃcials: `Everybody wants to have something for
making decision on behalf [of] their home country' (Baabar 2009a). He also warned
that the widespread corruption and instable investment conditions played in the
hands of Chinese investors.
`Western investors cannot achieve a common understanding with
Mongolian oﬃcials where in any other country corruption is consid-
ered as a commitment of crime. While, for Chinese bribery and cor-
ruption seems to be their native language. Mongolians understand this
language perfectly' (Baabar 2009a).
While personal greed was certainly a motivation on the part of some of the Mon-
golian oﬃcials to delay the whole process, others directly linked the messy state
20While the initial agreement with Ivanhoe Mines seemed to be below international standards,
the ﬁnal agreement with Australian Rio Tinto and Canadian Ivanhoe Mines, by international
standards, is however very beneﬁcial to the country. It includes considerations on the technical
and environmental standards to be applied and the employment and training of local labor
(Ooluun 2009b).
21Conversation Ulaanbaatar, 12 October 2009
216
9.4. Realization of Chinese interests
of decision-making in Mongolia to the interests of its two giant neighbors (Tsend-
doo 2010). According to those, both China and Russia gain most if Mongolia's
resources are not exploited by Western companies. Critics argued that while the
discussion on Western investors in Mongolia was vivid, Chinese and Russian in-
vestments were hardly questioned. Indeed, staﬀ members of a Mongolian strategic
think tank, considered it `a very clever move' by the president to focus public at-
tention on the Oyu Tolgoi agreement, while secretly negotiating with Russia over
the uranium ﬁelds in Madrai.22
Due to anti-Chinese emotions among the population, it would certainly be very
diﬃcult for Chinese companies to acquire shares in the major mining deposits in
such a discretionary way. During the 1990s, the Mongolian government had `delib-
erately' kept to a minimum Chinese investments in state industries including the
mineral sector (Campi 2004). On a visit in 2003, however, Chinese president Hu
Jintao openly stated the Chinese interest in investing in Mongolia's mining sector
and oﬀered a US$300,000 soft loan to improve infrastructure in the major min-
ing area close to China (Batchimeg 2005b). The Mongolian government resisted
pressure to quickly develop the area back then (Campi 2004).
Against this background, it was reasoned that demonstrations had been orga-
nized along with `systematic steps' to scare-oﬀ western investors (Tsenddoo 2010).
Although sounding conspirative, it was true that Western investors seemed to
become less attracted to invest in Mongolia. In the context of the Mongolian con-
siderations to amend the mining law and faced by several `black mail' protests,
the North American Mongolian Business Council alertly submitted a letter to the
Chairmen of the Mongolian Security Council pointing to the lack of security and
rule of law for investments in the mining sector (Open Society Forum 2005). In
July 2010, Mongolia was rated the world's least attractive jurisdiction for mineral
exploration and development by the Fraser survey (Shinebayar 2010).
In the course of the discussion on the ﬁrst investment agreement on the Oyu
Tolgoi reserves, competition over the second and third huge resource reserves,
Tavan Tolgoi and Madrai, started. Tavan Tolgoi is the largest unexploited cok
coal deposit in the world, also located in South Gobi province, approximately 180
km from the Chinese border. With 1.3 million tons, Mardai is the world's third
22Conversation Ulaanbaatar, 6 October 2009
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largest uranium reserve. It is situated in Mongolia's eastern Dornod province,
approximately 300 km from the Russian border.
In July 2010 the Mongolian government approved a proposal to develop Tavan
Tolgoi by a public listed company that operates mining, production, marketing
and sales under the management of a state-owned corporation. Eleven interna-
tional investors were named in Mongolian newspapers (Sumiyabazar 2010a). With
respect to Tavan Tolgoi, China is deﬁnitely the closest and largest export market.
The Chinese railway system has already been stretched to the Sino-Mongolian
border, and the Chinese repeatedly oﬀered to expand the railway into Mongolia
(The Economist Intelligence Unit 2003, 14).
However, the reliance on China as the single export market makes Mongolian
decision makers feel uneasy who fear their bargaining position in price negotiations
could suﬀer. Therefore, alternative markets for high quality coking coal such as
the South Korean and Japanese ones are also discussed (Mongolian Mining Journal
2009). This is despite the lack of transportation networks to these countries. The
transportation costs would signiﬁcantly increase the price of Mongolian minerals
in these markets and thus reduce its competitiveness. In early 2010, the Mongolian
parliament approved plans to build 5,000 km of new railways with Russian gauge
indicating that the time-consuming and costly procedure of changing carriages at
the border to China will be maintained (The Economist Intelligence Unit 2010).
Just as China is interested in Mongolia's raw materials, so is Russia. When
the Mongolian government seriously begun to develop its resource deposits the
Russian government started a political and economic come-back to the country.23
Dating back to pre-1989 times, some Russian-Mongolian joint ventures are still
existing, notably Erdenet, Mongolia's major copper mine in which Russia has a
49% stake (Blagov 2005) and the Ulaanbaatar Railway, a 50-50 joint venture of
Mongolia's main means of transportation handling around 80% of domestic and
100% of export-import shipments (Ooluun 2009d). Despite these legacies, bilat-
eral trade was slugging during the 1990s.24 The Russian government was very
23For diﬀerent reasons, Russia's leverage over Mongolia declined dramatically during the ﬁrst
decade after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. With economic disintegration of the Soviet
Union Russia was concentrated on its internal aﬀairs. The normalization of Sino-Russian
relations was another reason why Mongolia slipped out of the focus of Russian policy makers.
24By 2008 trade only reached the level of US$1.3 million. Russian investment from 1990 until
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outspoken in the protection of its strategic and geo-economic interest in Mongo-
lia's coal, uranium and railway sectors and put the Mongolian government under
considerable pressure to set up Mongolian-Russian joint ventures. In April 2009,
the Russian government used its 50% share in Ulaanbaatar Railway to forced the
Mongolian government to cancel a US$188 million modernization program of the
Mongolian railway by the US Millennium Challenge Corporation (Sumiyabazar
2009). Instead, it promised to invest in Mongolia's transportation system itself.
Russian investments in the Mongolian rail network were thereby conditioned on
shares in Mongolia's exploitation activities in Oyu Tolgoi and Tavan Tolgoi, or `at
least 25% of the proﬁts' respectively (Yakunin as cited in The UB Post 2009b).25
Later that year, Russian President Medvedev increased his pressure on the newly
elected Mongolian President Elbegdorj by unexpectedly confronting him with a
claim of US$180 million outstanding debts, an issue that was thought to be solved
by the Mongolian public.26 Most likely the Russian government will be success-
ful in pushing through an agreement of joint exploration of Mongolia's uranium
resources oﬀering preferential access to Russian investors.
Comparing China's search for resources in diﬀerent parts of the world, Sieren
stated, that it was nowhere so diﬃcult to engage in business for China as in Mon-
golia (Sieren 2008, 69). When the Oyu Tolgoi agreement with Ivanhoe Mines and
Rio Tinto was announced, the Russian government released aggressive attacks in
Russia's newspapers. China's English speaking newspapers, in contrast, published
only a brief and emotionless note of the agreement (Xinhua 2009). Asked for their
opinion on the Mongolian reluctance to give China access to Mongolia's natural
resource deposits and whether they believed that the Chinese government should
lobby harder for its interests in the future, Chinese academics responded that the
Mongolians were well aware of China as the only market. Therefore, China did
2001 amounted to US%29.7 million, but reached US$57million by 2007 (Ooluun 2009c).
25Given the bankruptcy of the Russian Railway, the nature of Russian interests, a blend of
national security and large scale private business was very clear to many Mongolians. These
interests were promoted `especially by backing the interest of oligarchs and strengthening their
support by means of raising its [the Russian government's] inﬂuence in Mongolian politics'
(Ooluun 2009a).
26It was however not clear who was to blame in this matter: Some claimed the money was paid,
some claimed the money got lost underway and probably ended up in private pockets, some
claimed the issue was never entirely settled, but former president Enkhbayar did not inform
the public about this (Conversation Ulaanbaatar, 9 October 2009).
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not need to lobby. Without consensus in the parliament nothing happened in
Mongolia anyway.27
Given these developments, it appears that the Mongolian strategy to develop its
natural resource deposits is at best one of reluctant compliance with China. In its
strategic thinking and in its orientation towards national security, the Mongolian
government, takes a rather reluctant position when it comes to allocating major
mining concessions to Chinese companies. For the sake of the national interest,
it prefers to position itself rather at the refusal end of the compliance spectrum.
In this context, fears of overdependence on the Chinese market and the limited
willingness of Chinese investors to process these resources in Mongolia were men-
tioned. This even led the Mongolian government to reject Chinese oﬀers to improve
transportation networks to the mining areas, even though infrastructure is badly
needed in the country.
Judged by its actions the picture looks diﬀerent: Russia's leverage and the weak
state capacity eventually push the Mongolian government back to the position of
a reluctant compliant. The Mongolian government appears to have limited space
for manoeuvring. Both, its landlocked position that results in lacking access to
markets others than the Chinese and the Russian and the considerable pressure
by Russia limit its capability to eﬀectively choose between alternative investors.
Moreover, the strategic attempt to protect Mongolia's economy from further domi-
nation by the Chinese is at odds with the erosion of the state's ability to implement
state policies. Spongy borders, corrupt custom services and local oﬃcials are a re-
ality. When the 68% windfall tax was introduced, gold sales to the central bank
sank to half of the amount in 2005, oﬃcial exports decreased by 13%, and illegal
exports to China rose dramatically (Sieren 2008).
9.4.3. Geo-political interests in Mongolia
Sino-Mongolian relations illustrate very vividly the key issues in China's neigh-
borhood policy. The relevant topics in Sino-Mongolian relations generally follow
the overarching themes of Chinese regional foreign policy. In 2003, Hu Jintao
named economic matters, security, and the support for Mongolia's policy against
27Conversation Beijing, 31 October 2009
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having foreign troops deployed within its borders as the three focal points of Sino-
Mongolian relations (Wang 2009). Having illustrated the mixed results which the
Chinese government achieved with respect to its economic objectives, I will now
turn to China's geo-strategic aims in Mongolia.
Mongolia is a vast country; it is underdeveloped in infrastructure and trans-
portation networks; it has long borderlines and only few inhabitants and it has
proclaimed itself to be a nuclear-weapon free zone. Thus, if Mongolia ranks as a
security issue on the Chinese foreign policy agenda it is not for its potential mili-
tary threat. From the perspective of neighboring China, the security concern refers
to Mongolia allying with any other major power. This could imply the potential
deployment of military forces on Mongolian territory, which then would result in
a direct threat to China's national security (Chang 2007, 20).
The Mongolian government pursues an explicitly stated strategy of balancing.
Mongolia's relation to its neighbors has always been a vector of the relationship
between both of them. Integration into the Soviet camp had strongly been moti-
vated by the search for protection in order not to be crunched by China (Batchimeg
2005b, 51). Later on, deeply integrated into the Soviet camp, Mongolia had no
other choice than to follow the Soviet attitudes towards China during the ColdWar.
During Sino-Soviet honeymoon period in the 1950s, Sino-Mongolian relations were
cooperative and trade and assistance were ﬂourishing. Following the Sino-Soviet
split, Sino-Mongolian relations lied fallow for two decades, Soviet troops were sta-
tioned in Mongolia and the country's economy turned to be exclusively reliant on
Soviet assistance (Campi 2004, 9, Batchimeg 2005b, 49). When the Soviet Union
collapsed in 1989, Russian inﬂuence diminished signiﬁcantly. Mongolia's subse-
quent orientation towards the West, and especially towards the former East and
Central European Soviet satellites was strongly motivated by the fear of renewed
Chinese dominance. In the post-Cold War period, Mongolia continued to balance
the inﬂuence of its giant neighbors by the engagement of other great powers. While
Mongolia's role as a buﬀer between China and Russia decreased in current terms, it
was worrisome for the Chinese government that the U.S. evolved as a counterpart
in the ﬁrst decade of the 21st century.
In the early 1990s, the Mongolian government adopted the so-called `third neigh-
bor' policy. It seeked non-involvement and neutrality with respect to potential dis-
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putes between its two neighbors and was designed to counterbalance both, China
and Russia, by the means of maintaining good relations to other powerful countries,
be it the U.S., Japan, Britain or Germany. This policy became most eﬀective in the
aftermath of 9/11, when Afghanistan and the central Asian region received more
attention by the U.S.. The Mongolian government took this opportunity to develop
closer ties to the U.S.; it joined the war on terrorism and sent troops to Iraq and
Afghanistan. In 2004, the Bush administration announced that Mongolia would
receive a US$1 billion grant within the framework of the Millennium Challenge
Account. A joint statement between of the two presidents was issued declaring
`a new era of cooperation and comprehensive partnership between two democratic
countries based on shared values and common strategic interests' (Khirghis 2005,
Byambasuren 2006, 23). In the course of 2005, the U.S. was pushed out of Central
Asia by the members of the SCO. In the context of closures of some U.S. military
bases in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia's strategic position increased. In
2005, for the ﬁrst time ever, an American president paid a visit to Ulaanbaatar.
Thus, after 9/11, the `third neighbor policy' became more successful in its aim
to enhance the security situation of the country. In 1994 already, the Mongolian
military forces held joint training sessions with the U.S. army. The Mongolian
armed forces also received equipment, funding and training facilities from the
U.S.. In 2001, a joint humanitarian rescue exercise was carried out and from 2003
onwards the previously small-scale rescue missions carried out by civil defence
troops were expanded to annual large-scale manoeuvres in Mongolia. These exer-
cises were expanded in 2006 again to multinational coordinated warfare training
sessions including regular army troops from the seven nations of Mongolia, the
U.S., Bangladesh, India, Thailand, Tonga and Fiji (Wang 2009).
Mongolia's rapprochement with the West has not passed unnoticed by the Chi-
nese government which tried to counterbalance U.S. leverage over the Mongolian
government. For example, after Mongolia had enjoyed its ﬁrst visit of an American
president in 2005, the Mongolian president was invited to Beijing. In order to bal-
ance U.S.-Mongolian relations a Chinese-Mongolian joint statement was released
declaring both countries would not ally or sign any treaty or agreement with a
third country that may adversely aﬀect the interest of each other (Wang 2005b).
The Chinese government also speciﬁcally addressed the Mongolian military. In
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1997 and again in 2000, China provided more than US$1 million of military as-
sistance in total, amongst others to ﬁnance two Chinese language teachers (The
Economist Intelligence Unit 2000a, 49, The Economist Intelligence Unit 1996a,
The Economist Intelligence Unit 1997a). Consultations on security and defense
between China and Mongolia were started in 2004 (Wang 2009). In 2009, a ﬁrst
joint military exercise with Mongolia, Singapore, Gabon, Russia and China were
held (The UB Post 2009a; Bulag 2010). Multilaterally, the Chinese government
attempted to integrate Mongolia into the SCO to balance Mongolia's coalition
with the U.S. by oﬀering observer status (Campi 2005).
Diﬀerent Mongolian governments adopted the `third neighborhood policy' as
a strategy to increase Mongolia's security situation. Mongolia clearly pursued a
strategy of balancing Chinese and Russian inﬂuence by choosing the U.S. as a
strategic partner. The orientation towards America and the European Union -
including the choice of a democratic political system - after the collapse of the
Soviet Union was a deliberate strategy to move closer under the security umbrella
of the U.S.. Also, the support of the U.S. was seen `as a guarantor of Mongolian
democracy' (Bulag 2010, 102). Subsequently, Mongolian governments tried to
increase attention of U.S. leaders to their country. The terrorist attacks in 2001
were helpful to this end.
However, due to its landlocked geographical position, Mongolia's abilities to
bend too strongly to one or the other side are limited. On the one hand, all
traﬃc must pass through Russia or China. `If China or Russia refuses to open
up airspace or seaports to Mongolia, then its multinational joint exercises with
other countries and the successful arrival of the related personnel and equipment
would be cut oﬀ' (Wang 2009, 25). This acutally happened in August 2008 when
Chinese authorities did not allow foreign military aircrarft to ﬂy over its territory
during the Beijing Olympic games (Bulag 2009). The success of this strategy was
aslo dependent on the strategic importance American decision-makers attributed
to Mongolia and their willingness to engage in Mongolia. Some strategic thinkers
in Mongolia believed U.S.-Mongolian relations already passed their zenith after
Mongolia had withdrawn its troops from Iraq in autumn 2008. However, Mon-
golian still had one asset of formidable American interest: its traditionally good
relations to North-Korea and the potential role Mongolia could play as a mediator
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in the North-Korea question in the future (Endicott 2005).
On the other hand, from the diplomatic language it could be read that the
Mongolian government's space for manoeuvring to truly choose its position was
limited. It had to pay a visit to the Chinese government after having received
the U.S. president and Beijing could impose a declaration of non-alignment on the
Mongolian government. Furthermore, the economic dependence of Mongolia on the
PRC gives the Chinese great leverage to sanction Mongolia's snuggling with any
third neighbor. For example, Chinese fear of U.S. inﬂuence in Mongolia emerged
as a reason for avoiding to built a new gas pipeline from west Siberia to China
through Mongolian territory in 2001 (Batchimeg 2005b, 56). Instead, the pipeline
was built along the Japan-bound Taishet-Nakhodka route and Mongolia was left
out. The Mongolian government had hoped to gain from better infrastructure,
transportation networks, and opportunities to increase its state revenues through
transit fees (Blagov 2005; Rossabi 2005b).
Against this background, the Mongolia's compliance with China's geo-strategic
interests is classiﬁed as a reluctant one. It became clear that the Mongolian gov-
ernment prefered to balance China more actively, but it clearly did not have the
possibilities to do so. It ended up hedging. However, given its small manoeuvring
space, its geographic location sandwiched between Russia and China and the great
economic leverage of China over Mongolia, the Mongolian act of balancing was
quite impressing.
9.5. Summary of ﬁndings
I conclude this case study with a summary of my ﬁndings. First of all, with respect
to Mongolia's compliance to Chinese interests, China's success was limited. The
Chinese government faced serious opposition and sceptical reluctance to respond
to Chinese interests in all three key issue areas of China's foreign policy despite
the considerable leverage of China over Mongolia. Mongolia's compliance to the
interests of the Chinese government was average at best.
1. `One China' policy: With respect to the status of Taiwan, Mongolia acknowl-
edged the PRC as the only Chinese state, but it enjoyed vivid relations
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with Taiwan, and unoﬃcial representations have been established in both of
the countries during the last years. Against the background of Mongolian
Lamaism and a broad sympathy for the Dalai Lama among the population,
the Dalai Lama has visited Mongolia several times. His Holiness was even
received by the Mongolian government in 2002 which caused drastic reac-
tions on the part of the Chinese authorities. The Mongolian government
did, however, not oppose a renewed visit in 2006, although it then stressed
the a-political nature of Dalai Lama's visit. This position corresponded to a
reluctant compliance with Chinese interests.
2. Access to natural resources: The Chinese government faced deliberate oppo-
sition by Mongolian policy-makers with regard to Mongolia's huge natural
resource deposits. In a heated public debate on the exploitation of Mongo-
lia's top mineral deposits fears of Chinese companies extracting the minerals
without developing the country were raised. Moreover, in the past, the gov-
ernment rejected oﬀers of the Chinese infrastructure investments in Mongo-
lia's mineral rich regions, literally denying the Chinese access to Mongolian
natural resources. Hence, the Mongolian government refused to comply with
Chinese interests.
3. Geo-political interests: Diﬀerent governments in Mongolia pursued the `third
neighbor' policy which aimed at balancing the inﬂuence of China and Russia.
As a result, the Mongolian government showed a reluctant position on the
spectrum of compliance with China.
From this one can conclude that even though the role of the electorate appeared
weak in comparison to that in consolidated democracies, the electorate acutally
played a signiﬁcant role in Mongolia. The elections in Mongolia suﬀered from
serious draw-backs not only in terms of fairness, but also in terms of linking par-
ties to a political direction. Due to the lack in programmatic orientation of the
major Mongolian parties, voters faced diﬃculties to direct decision-making into a
programmatic direction and to sanction misbehavior on parts of the parliamen-
tarians. Doubtlessly, many Mongolian politicians were very much concerned with
their private gain and neglect national welfare.
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However, the majority of voters formed part of the winning coalition. Therefore,
a certain responsiveness to the voter was required. Policy-makers needed to react
to public concerns and could not completely ignore the population. Despite con-
siderable corruption and intransparency a public discussion on the distribution of
national resources evolved. In 2006, the government announced its participation
in the Extractive Industry and Transparency Initiative. Furthermore, the names
of interested foreign investors were released, a tendering process was opened and
concessions were awarded on the basis of competition at least for the main ex-
ploitation sites. Certainly, these processes were not without irregularities and the
lower public attention, the more irregularities were to be expected, for example
with regard to smaller mining sites and subsidiary companies.
Second, even though the process of coming to the Oyu Tolgoi investment agree-
ment, and the frequent reversals of drafts gave rise to many questions, the agree-
ment itself corresponded to international standards. The Mongolian government
did not sell its natural deposits under value, neither in terms of proﬁt partici-
pation nor in terms of work and environmental standards. At least in these high
proﬁle projects, it did not trade short-term private beneﬁts against long-term pub-
lic losses.
These domestic incentives had consequences for the Chinese-Mongolian relations
and the interaction between Chinese and Mongolian actors. On the one hand,
Mongolian politicians tried to use public opinion and speciﬁcally the common anti-
Chinese feelings of the population for their own sake of power politics. Political
actors repeatedly played the China card to discredit political opponents.
On the other hand, Chinese actors reacted and adapted to Mongolia's political
economy. The Chinese government well understood the democratic mechanisms
in Mongolian politics and its implications in terms of incentives for Mongolian
decision makers. Accordingly, the Chinese government addressed both the deci-
sion makers and to a lesser extent the electorate. Individual decision-makers were
addressed directly through state-to-state and party-to-party relations, involving
most likely business collaborations and corruption. The Mongolian public, the
electorate was also directly and indirectly targeted. The border closure in 2002
in the context of the Dalai Lama's visit to Ulaanbaatar, for example, was seen
as a collective punishment with the clear intention to let the nation feel China's
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economic leverage over the country. From the perspective of the voter, it could be
read as a call to abandon religious and spiritual practices and values in favor of
economic well-being. But the Chinese government also tried to engage the Mon-
golian voters with positive incentives such as disaster relief, visa exemption or the
access to Chinese healthcare facilities. Targeting at the very root of Mongolian
Sino-phobia, the Chinese government even attempted to improve its standing in
the Mongolian public with the help of Mongolian historians by changing historical
narratives. The intention of all these attempts was to reduce voter's sensitiv-
ity and fear of China and Chinese engagement thereby increasing the space for
manoeuvring for Mongolian leaders to respond to Chinese interests.
Finally, with respect to Mongolia's domestic stability, it is diﬃcult to assess
whether the increased Chinese interests aﬀected the quality of Mongolia's demo-
cratic institutions. Even though Chinese companies were frequently accused for
bribing Mongolian politicians, many Mongolians perceived corruption as a home-
grown problem. Similarly, the various conspiracy theories around the violent riots
in the aftermath of the 2008 elections, the astonishingly slow and reluctant at-
tempts to investigate the incident and the refusal of any political party or ﬁgure
to take political responsibility raised additional questions on the political culture
in Mongolia.
Given the small size of Mongolia's economy together with its landlocked position,
it seems that economic dependence on China - rather than manipulation - is a
continuous threat to Mongolia's sovereignty. It seems that China is using this
dependency to force Mongolian decision makers to comply with Chinese interests.
However, they are doing so only very reluctantly.
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results
This chapter delivers a synthesis of the three case studies that were discussed
in the three previous chapters. While each of them delivers valuable insights on
the bilateral relations of the respective country with China in its own right, only
a comparison of the three cases can test the validity of hypothesis H1. This is
because the three cases vary in the size of their coalitions and H1 stated that China
is more successful in realizing its interests in autocracies than in democracies.
Moreover, the theory suggested that diﬀerent patterns of compliance of small and
large-coalition governments should cause the sender state to adapt its strategy
vis-à-vis small and large-coalition governments. Small coalition governments were
expected to exchange narrowly targeted private goods against policy concessions,
while large coalition governments should demand broader public goods in exchange
for compliance with the interests of the sender state. In consequence, one would
expect that the population in large-coalition governments is addressed diﬀerently
from those in small coalition governments. As a result, I expected the Chinese
government to oﬀer more non-targeted goods or policies that address the needs of
the population at large to decision makers in democracies.
Diﬀerences in political systems were a criterion for case selection. Burma as a
military autocracy has the smallest coalition including only the armed forces which
occupy the most important state functions and the economy (Clapp 2007). Until
the constitution of 2008, there was no formally deﬁned selectorate (International
Crisis Group 2009). The government's coalition was, and still is, very exclusive.
Cambodia has a hybrid political system. It has a constitutionally deﬁned se-
lectorate, the electorate, which is excluded from the winning coalition, however.
The winning coalition comprises a relatively small number of members of business
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elite, the bureaucracy, and the military (Cock 2010a). Mongolia's democratic po-
litical order has proven to provide for the most inclusive winning coalition of the
three. It incorporates a signiﬁcant part of the constitutionally deﬁned selectorate,
namely the majority of the electorate (Landman et al. 2005; Freedom House 2006).
Yet the winning coalition seems to be dominated to a signiﬁcant extent by more
narrowly deﬁned vested business interests represented by the Mongolian oligarchs
(Barkmann 2006b).
Was the Chinese government more successful in realizing its interests in small
coalition systems than in large coalition governments? As summarized in table
10.1, the ﬁndings of my comparative analysis do indeed suggest so. They are
in favor of the theoretical argument. The governments of both small-coalition
systems, Burma and Cambodia, were highly compliant with China's interests. In
Mongolia, the country with the larger coalition, the government complied only
reluctantly or even refused to respond to China's interests at all. In sum, in all
issue areas, China could very successfully realize its interests in the small coalition
countries, while it faced diﬃculties to pursue its objectives in the large coalition
country. This comparative ﬁnding is in support of H1.
Table 10.1.: Results of the Case studies: Compliance by issue area and country.
Issue area
Country coalition size territorial integrity ressource access geo-politics
Burma small eager eager eager
Cambodia small eager eager eager
Mongolia large reluctant refusal reluctant
However, a closer look at the results, reveals some unexpected details which
may hint at interfering variables. First, while the results strongly support the
existence of a relation between compliance and coalition size, it appears that this
relation is not necessarily linear. Contrary to the linear expectation, which would
have suggested eager compliance by the very small coalition government of Burma,
reluctant compliance by the small coalition government of Cambodia and refusal
by the large coalition government of Mongolia, I observed both the very small
and the small coalition governments to take eager positions. Similarly, the large
coalition government in Mongolia, while being signiﬁcantly less compliant with
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Chinese interests than the smaller coalitions, takes on the refusal position only
once, whilst it takes on the reluctant position with respect to the other issue
areas. Furthermore, recall that in the detailed analysis I found the Cambodian
government was more prone to blindly comply with the Chinese interests than the
Burmese junta even though the coalition size of the latter was smaller than that
of the former.
While these observations do not contradict hypothesis H1 as such, they suggest
that other factors could be at play which also aﬀect the level of compliance of
a government. This is further supported by the diﬀerence between Burma's and
Mongolia's actual position with respect to China's geo-political interests and their
desired positions. In both cases, I observed that the two governments actually
wanted to take on a position towards the reluctance and the refusal end of the
spectrum, but could not do so.
This could possibly be explained by the fact that governments are constrained
in their choices. In the case of Mongolia, I suspect that it could be its geographical
location between Russia and China that constrained the options of the Mongolian
government of how to deal with China. Even though Mongolia has good relations
to the U.S., these relations are dependent on China or Russia allowing interaction
between the two (Wang 2009). Similarly, in the Burmese case there are reasons
to assume that its international isolation makes it more compliant with the PRC
than the junta actually desires. In this case, as mentioned in section 7.4.3, the
Burmese government would like to diversify its external relations. However, while
India is not able to provide the necessary protection against international critics,
the relationship with Russia thus far has not developed into a viable alternative
to the links with China.
With respect to the actual interaction between the Chinese government and the
diﬀerent actors in the three case study countries, it proved diﬃcult to shed light
on this as most of the interaction takes place in a rather secretive environment.
Certainly this complicates comparison between the three cases. Because reliable
macro data are very scarce, and little is known about the interaction at the indi-
vidual level, it is beyond the capacities of this research project to systematically
compare whether the Chinese government interacts diﬀerently with diﬀerent-sized
coalition systems. Without any claim of comprehensiveness, a number of observa-
230
tions become apparent from my descriptive investigation relating to the question
whether China treats the coalition partners and the disenfranchised diﬀerently in
large and in small-coalition systems.
It is worthwhile to consider how the governments were addressed in the three dif-
ferently sized coalition systems. First of all, the Chinese government was prudent
to establish good state-to-state relations, no matter how big the winning coalition
was and which actor claimed the power to form the government. In order to do
so, it pursued a very pragmatic if not opportunistic approach accepting whoever
prevailed in domestic conﬂicts over power. For example, in Burma the Chinese
government welcomed the oppositional NLD to power after their earth slide vic-
tory in the 1990 elections, but later, after the military SPDC had restored their
authority, the Chinese continued to accommodate the military junta (Ruisheng
2010). Similarly, the Chinese government pragmatically cooperated with the eth-
nic rebel militias as the de facto ruler in their regions (International Crisis Group
2009). In Cambodia, the Chinese government swiftly changed its loyalties from its
former allies to its most hated rival Hun Sen after it became clear in 1997 that he
would dominate the political scene for at least some time to come (Storey 2006;
Marks 2000). With respect to Mongolia, this approach resulted in the acceptance
of government turnovers after the elections in 1996 and 2000. In a nutshell, with
regard to the power claims of governments elsewhere in the world, the Chinese ap-
proach - rhetorically enforced by the principle of non-interference - is dominated
by pragmatism and turns a blind eye to the legitimacy question.
Second, and as a consequence of this approach, the Chinese government seeks to
establish contacts to all potentially powerful political ﬁgures. The Chinese govern-
ment tried to reach out to all potential challengers, whether they were members
of the winning coalition or not. In all three case studies, the Chinese manner to
approach these alternative actors seems to be rather similar. The focus is on build-
ing and maintaining networks, in which the targeted leaders are co-opted through
courtesy vis-à-vis individuals. The leaders of these organizations are made more
pro-China without necessarily receiving material or ﬁnancial support for their or-
ganization.
Based on the Chinese assessment of their political potential, one can observe
diﬀerent treatment of these competing groups. In Burma, the Chinese govern-
231
10. Discussion of case study results
ment established contacts to the opposition groups among the population after
it perceived it necessary to increase the legitimacy of the current government.
The Chinese government also attempted to make the Burmese opposition more
receptive for inclusion in the existing coalition rather than challenging the current
rulers (International Crisis Group 2009). Interestingly, the Chinese approached
the Cambodian opposition parties only at times when they had the potential to
become a coalition partner in the government while ignoring them during other
periods in time (Kurlantzick 2007). In contrast, in Mongolia, where elections can
easily lead to new government formations, the Chinese government through the
CCP 's bodies maintains persistent party-to-party relations to all major Mongolian
political parties (Batchimeg 2005a).
Although China is dealing with both governments and their challengers, all
three cases suggest a strong emphasis of Chinese attention towards the coalition
members as the primary targets of China's external engagement. First of all, two
collective actors who happen to form part of the coalition in two of the cases
seem to be the prime targets of Chinese engagement: The military and business
elites. In all three countries, the armed forces were among the recipients of Chinese
assistance. In Burma, they were provided with equipment worth more than US$1.2
billion (Tin Maung Maung Than 2003; Guo 2007; International Crisis Group 2009).
In Cambodia, they repeatedly received several US$ millions of assistance (Storey
2006; Rith and Cochrane 2005; Burgos and Ear 2010). The military in both Burma
and Cambodia was among the most important coalition members. But even in
Mongolia, where the military is no independent coalition member, China invested
at least US$1 million in the Mongolian armed forces (Rossabi 2005b; Liu 2007).
Furthermore, business elites seemed to be speciﬁcally addressed in Cambodia
and Mongolia where they formed part of the coalition. In how far business tycoons
in Burma are addressed independently, was diﬃcult to assess. In Burma, they
built the ﬁnancial bases of the military rule, but they are often army-bred. These
business elites, with close connections to the government, are used both for political
and economic objectives. They serve to channel speciﬁc political Chinese interests
to the government (Jeldres 2003; Lintner 2002) and as native business partners for
investment projects in the respective countries (Global Witness 2009). In contrast,
the bureaucracy which was identiﬁed as a coalition member in Cambodia, was no
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particular target for Chinese engagement, at least not observably. This might
reﬂect both the incapacity of state organs and the fact that the bureaucracy is
dominated by CPP personnel in Cambodia. Therefore, targeting the party leaders
instead of state institutions is probably more eﬃcient.
Moreover, the Chinese willingness to massively provide subsidised loans, cred-
its and grants to other governments in order to invest in infrastructure projects
provided by Chinese companies or to procure Chinese goods seems to reﬂect the
composition of the Chinese winning coalition. The Chinese winning coalition itself
is dominated by business interests and a very strong military that has commer-
cial interests too. Among the most striking examples of this is the provision of
grants and loans to the Burmese and Cambodian governments to procure military
equipment while the Chinese military-industrial complex is very closely connected
to the highest Chinese leadership.1 Similarly, the Burmese and Cambodian pro-
curement of container scanning systems from a Chinese radiation company with a
monopolist position in the Chinese market was ﬁnanced by subsidised state loans
and grants from the Chinese government. Hence, close connections exist between
this company and the families of the Chinese political leaders, too.
Finally, I found that the way the broader population of a country was addressed
by the Chinese government diﬀered depending on whether it belonged to the coali-
tion or not. Apart from disaster relief after the 2004 tsunami and the 2008 cyclone,
the Chinese government has not speciﬁcally addressed the Burmese people. Even
this humanitarian aid was given to the military government, in one case even to
the ministry of defense and it is therefore highly questionable whether it has fully
reached the aﬀected communities (Chenyang and Fook 2009; Xinhua 2008a). The
sole program speciﬁcally designed for the rural population in Burma's northern
provinces under the command of the ethnic rebel groups, was a Chinese crop sub-
stitution program. It targeted at mitigating the negative eﬀects of the opium ban
for former poppy growing rural dwellers, but was misused by Chinese agro-business
companies and had disastrous consequences for the rural population it addressed
(Kramer 2009; Chenyang and Fook 2009). The marginalization of the Burmese
population by the Chinese government is in line with the theoretical expectation
1Its front company Poly Technologies Corporation, for example, was managed during the 1980s
by Deng Xiaoping's son in law.
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according to which only important coalition members are addressed. Even though
targeted at the population, the crop substitution program is not in contradiction
to this, since it arose from China's self-interest to stop drug trade from Burma to
Yunnan province. China did not really seem to care very much that the interests
of the Burmese population were in fact not furthered by the project.
In Cambodia, where a detailed data base on China's economic assistance exists,
none of the projects addressed the broader society (Council for the Development
of Cambodia 2010). Improved infrastructure is, of course, beneﬁcial to the whole
population, but the Chinese infrastructure projects are not formulated to improve
the access of Cambodia's remote country side to domestic markets as such, but
aimed at developing the main transport corridors which in turn serve Chinese
business interests.
Interestingly, however, the Chinese government strongly supported the ethnic
Chinese communities in Cambodia to expand their services in the educational sec-
tor to ordinary Cambodians (Kurlantzick 2008). As a result, the Chinese language
schools evolved as a channel which the Chinese government later used to reach out
to the Cambodian society in order to spread the Chinese point of view and to pro-
mote its interests (Marks 2000). This ﬁnding seems to contradict the theoretical
reasoning which predicts that actors that are excluded from the coalition would
not be addressed.
It appears that in Mongolia, the only country in which the electorate forms
part of the winning coalition, the population is signiﬁcantly more addressed by
China than in any of the two other case studies. For instance, the Chinese gov-
ernment assisted Mongolia in handling crises provoked by extraordinary harsh
winters and provided funds for solar-powered generators, hospitals, and repair of
bridges (Rossabi 2005a; Campi 2005). The Chinese attempt to approach the Mon-
golian electorate in order to inﬂuence the anti-Chinese perception of the majority
of Mongolians, becomes most apparent in its educational programs (Tucker 2008;
Sumiyabazar 2010b; Bulag 2010).
In conclusion, despite certain observable anomalies, such as the Chinese military
aid to Mongolia, my analysis seems to support the theoretical prediction according
to which the sender adapts to the distribution patterns in small and large coalition
systems in order to increase the responsiveness to its interests. Even if one avoids
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numerical comparison due to the lack of comprehensive and transparent data,
there are some outstanding observations suggesting that the Chinese government
indeed adapted its targeted group according to the coalition size: For example,
2,000 additional governmental scholarships for Mongolian students stand against a
student exchange program of only 50 Burmese students. The diﬀerence in numbers
is striking, even more so if one considers that Burma's population is more than ten
times that of Mongolia. Moreover, comparing the military assistance the Chinese
government provided to the three countries, the US$1 million grant that Mongolia
received in military aid is dwarfed by the amounts paid to Cambodia's or Burma's
armed forces. These reached US$5 million annually, or more than US$1.2 billion
of military equipment respectively.
What can be drawn from these comparative insights on how the rise of China
aﬀects the stability of political regimes elsewhere? The empirical evidence of my
case studies supports the theoretical argument. On the one hand, it illustrated
that leaders in small winning coalitions are able to monopolize gains achieved by
cooperation with an external playe. It showed how these gains can in turn be
redistributed amongst their supporters and so strengthen their power position. In
the very inclusive regimes in Burma and Cambodia cooperation with the govern-
ment translated directly and indirectly into support for the respective leaders in
power. At times, Chinese actors also directly targeted the members of the winning
coalition.
It is diﬃcult to assessn in how far the Chinese practices are detrimental to
democratic structures in larger winning coalitions. Corruption clearly diminishes
the quality of democratic institutions and can even pose a serious challenge to the
system as such. In the case of Mongolia studied here, corruption of political actors
posed a threat to the consolidation of democratic rules. But even though Chinese
actors are widely believed to use corruption and bribery, most Mongolians do not
perceive China as the root of this problem.
On the other hand, the strong support for hypothesis H1 that the Chinese
government is better able to pursue its interests in autocratic countries than in
democracies suggests that the theoretical argumentation is correct in its core. The
mechanism of external autocratic exploitation works quite well. With respect to
the ﬁnding that China delivers more economic cooperation to autocracies than
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to democracies which led to the rejection of H4 in chapter 4, the case studies
suggest that this ﬁnding was at least partly caused by measurement problems. It
suggests that the economic cooperation variable did not properly capture what it
was supposed to measure: the transfer of resources.
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In recent times, a debate has emerged whether the PRC as a newly emerging
autocratic power contributes to the durability of autocratic regimes. Even though
this question appeared in two research communities more or less simultaneously, it
has so far not been studied systematically. Halfway the ﬁrst decade of the current
millennium, researchers in the ﬁeld of democracy studies became increasingly con-
cerned with the stagnation of democratization around the world. Subsequently,
their research focus shifted towards a better understanding of the nature of hybrid
and autocratic regimes. However, this research focused predominantly on domes-
tic factors such as autocratic institutions. External factors have generally been
studied less extensively. The existing approaches, for example by proponents of
diﬀusion theory (Levitsky and Way 2005; Gleditsch and Ward 2006; Brinks and
Coppedge 2006) or the discussion on external revenue (Ross 2001; Knack 2004;
Ulfelder 2007; Morrison 2009) so far strongly focus on the impact of Western in-
ﬂuences. The question whether non-democratic powers such as China and Russia
are becoming a force of autocracy promotion also has been raised only recently
(Carothers 2006; Ambrosio 2009; Burnell 2010).
Observing China's increasing engagement in the developing world over the last
decade, experts in the ﬁeld of area studies - the other research community - began
to wonder about China's external interests and strategies. A heated debate about
the `Beijing Consensus' and China's new `soft power' evolved (Cooper Ramo 2004;
Kurlantzick 2007; Brautigam 2009; Halper 2010). This debate has been intense but
- partly due to the general lack of data - it is characterized by a relatively unstruc-
tured approach towards the topic. Only a few comparative, let alone quantitative,
approaches exist to address the question what guides China's actions.
At the interface of two only loosely connected scientiﬁc debates, this study con-
tributes to the existing body of research in several ways: i) It delivers a theoretical
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framework explaining why one should expect autocratic major powers to become
a factor in autocratic durability elsewhere, ii) it quantitatively examines and ex-
plores the determinants of China's foreign behavior against the background of the
theoretical framework, iii) it quantitatively assesses the impact of China's rise on
the longevity of autocracy in other states, and iv) it takes a comparative look at
the implementation of China's foreign policy objectives in Asia, thereby testing the
validity of the overall argument as well as scrutinizing the patterns of interaction
between Chinese leaders and elites elsewhere.
This study empirically investigates China's external behavior based on a the-
oretical framework. According to this theoretical framework autocratic regimes
are beneﬁcial to the Chinese government because autocratic leaders are easier to
inﬂuence from the outside. Therefore, it is easier for the Chinese government to
pursue its interest in autocratic countries. I argued that this theoretical consid-
eration should make the Chinese government prefer others to be autocratic too
and in turn it should lead the Chinese government to increased cooperation with
autocratic regimes. Cooperation with an external partner, however, is helpful to
an autocratic government to stay in power, especially if the external actor coop-
erates exclusively with the autocrat and not with competing societal groups. The
autocrat can then capitalize from the beneﬁts of cooperation and redistribute the
created resources among his supporters.
What does the empirical investigation of the argument tell us about the validity
of this theoretical reasoning? In the qualitative part of my study, the compari-
son of three case studies delivered strong support for the core assumption of the
theoretical framework that diﬀerent political regime types determine the degree
to which a regime can be exploited from outside. That is, my comparative case
studies show that the Chinese government has been more successful in realizing
its foreign policy interests in small coalition regimes. In both autocratic regimes
that were examined in this study, Burma and Cambodia, the Chinese government
was more successful in pursuing its interests while it faced signiﬁcant diﬃculties
in the case study of the more democratic Mongolia.
Even though this ﬁnding does neither say anything about the Chinese intentions
nor does it proof that the Chinese government has a preference for autocratic
regimes, it clearly indicates that it makes sense for the Chinese government to
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have a preference for autocratic small coalition regimes. This ﬁnding delivers
a formidable reason for the Chinese government to prefer other governments to
be autocratic as well. As long as actors are presumed to act rationally, it is
reasonable to assume that the Chinese government indeed has a preference for
autocratic regimes. This preference may be purely functional in nature rather
than normatively guided.
This raises the question whether this theoretical preference for autocratic regimes
translates into speciﬁc cooperation with them. In order to answer this question,
I undertook a quantitative investigation into the drivers of Chinese economic co-
operation, a blend of private and state assistance and foreign direct investments
from China. It seems that the Chinese government is indeed more inclined to
direct meaningful amounts of economic cooperation to autocratic countries. Also,
I found that during the last few years, autocratic governments received higher
amounts of economic cooperation from China on average. Both ﬁndings suggest
that a Chinese preference for autocratic regimes could indeed exist.
Moreover, the quantitative investigation revealed that Chinese economic coop-
eration is strongly determined by the recipient's compliance with the `one China'
policy and that it is need oriented. The latter means that it is targeted towards
poor countries. While resource wealth has partly been a driver - oil rich countries
have received higher amounts of Chinese economic cooperation in recent years -
other determinants for the selection of cooperation partners and for the amount
of economic cooperation remain less clear. In general, the results of the quanti-
tative investigation point to the diﬃculties inherent to analysing China's external
engagement on the basis of ambiguous and uncertain data.
Even though these evident limitations of data availability cannot completely be
overcome in the qualitative case studies, the in-depth investigation there allowed
for a better understanding of the more detailed pattern of cooperation and the
way how this cooperation contributes to autocratic survival.
China's usual oﬃcial rhetoric is one of neutrality with respect to other countries'
domestic aﬀairs. The case studies I have investigated suggest that from a formal
point of view, the Chinese government usually acts in accordance to that rhetoric
on non-interference. The Chinese government usually pragmatically acknowledges
de facto power rather than questioning the legitimacy of a leader. When doing
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so, Chinese foreign policy-makers and diplomats often stressed that the PRC was
simply continuing its state-to-state relations with the government of a diﬀerent
country.
However, the case studies also show that cooperation with an external player
such as China aﬀects the domestic balance of power within a country. An external
power that cooperates only selectively de facto contributes to the stabilization
of power of the person or coalition that it supports. This is exactly what the
Chinese government does: it supports the incumbent government. As a result, the
case studies illustrate how - in contradiction to China's rhetoric - this policy of
neutrality de facto takes side for a speciﬁc party and translates into support for
the incumbent leadership in autocratic countries. Chinese engagement, aid, and
material support are responsive to the speciﬁc needs of a given leader in power
and his respective winning coalition. Also, small winning coalitions with their
narrowly deﬁned interests that are relatively easy satisﬁed from the outside, are
observably and systematically exploited. Chinese diplomats often refer to the win-
win nature of China's external relations. And indeed, both sides gain something,
but depending on the inclusiveness of a political regime, the circle of winners can be
very small. The smaller the coalition, the easier it is to create win-win situations.
Hence, the pattern of cooperation is that China targets the incumbent leader
or his winning coalition, thereby applying the rhetoric of non-interference in do-
mestic aﬀairs. The actual result of such `non-interference policy' is that the power
position of the incumbent autocratic government is enhanced. This ﬁnding from
the case studies seems to support those critics in the broader debate who have
argued that the Chinese government has become a de facto patron for autocratic
regimes (Halper 2010), despite its oﬃcial rhetoric that pays tribute to a policy of
sovereignty and non-interference.
The last question to be answered is: Is China a cause of autocratic longevity?
This study suggests so. First of all, the logic conclusion from the comparative case
studies is that China's cooperation de facto shores up the power position of the
incumbent autocratic regime. This is likely to contribute to autocratic survival.
The statistical analysis alos indicates that China indeed has an impact on the
survival of autocratic leaders, especially if they are strongly exposed to and de-
pendent on trade with China. As my statistical analysis shows, strong dependence
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on trade with China in relation to a country's overall trade improves the life ex-
pectancy of autocratic leaders.
However, the causal link between trade dependency and autocratic longevity is
not entirely clear. First, it has been argued that China's trade, more than that
of other nations, is politically controlled (Halper 2010; Fuchs and Klann 2011).
Second, if trade with China is related to increased exports of natural resources the
discovered relation between trade and autocratic longevity could also be created
indirectly through rentier eﬀects. Rentier eﬀects are the easy money earned by the
exploitation of natural resources. Thirdly, there is the possibility that China's ex-
ports are speciﬁcally helpful to prolong autocratic survival, because cheap Chinese
consumer goods probably have a stabilizing eﬀect by making consumption more
aﬀordable to the poor and thereby bringing about more social peace. It becomes
clear that the detected correlation between bilateral trade volumes and autocratic
survival calls for more research that takes a closer look at the structure of Chinese
trade.
Nonetheless, the eﬀect that I found in the data in terms of autocratic stabiliza-
tion is relatively small, particularly if one considers that bilateral trade of many
countries with China is still relatively low compared to overall trade volumes.
Moreover, I did not observe that other forms of cooperation such as Chinese eco-
nomic cooperation or encounters with China's highest leadership level prolong
autocratic survival. This ﬁnding is most surprising, because the existing literature
has identiﬁed non-tax revenues to be a major contributor to regime survival (Mor-
rison 2009). Moreover, it was the Chinese diplomatic protection for pariahs such
as North Korea, Burma, Sudan, and Zimbabwe that frequently received attention
in the past.
The ﬁnding that Chinese economic cooperation does not have an impact on
autocratic survival might reﬂect both that the Chinese eﬀect might indeed be
diﬀerent from that of other powers and that substantial noise in the data might
cloud the results. For example, Chinese resource transfers are usually in kind
and rarely involve cash transfers. They are thus strongly tied. Even though
they are usually targeted at the needs of the recipient's government and their
interest groups, this might imply that the direct redistribution of these resources
might be constraint. This in turn could decrease their overall usefulness as an
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instrument to remain in power. On the other hand, the closer investigation of
Chinese economic cooperation also revealed some inconsistencies in the data. Both
aspects call for more research that improves the understanding and measurement
of China's external behavior.
What else can we learn from this theoretically guided study about autocratic
survival? In general, the fact that exposure to China is of importance for autocratic
survival ﬁrst and foremost suggests that Levitsky and Way's linkage and leverage
approach works in both ways (Levitsky and Way 2010). That is, exposure to
autocratic - as opposed to democratic - powers has an impact too.
In addition, my survival analysis does not discern evidence for the rentier eﬀect
on the survival of leaders that previous studies have found. This is however less
worrisome if one considers that previous studies in this ﬁeld are based on a diﬀerent
operationalization of regime stability. Both Morrison (2009) and Smith (2004)
used a structural measure indicator based on the polity index (see chapter 5.1) to
measure regime stability. Others used the type of political regime or the likelihood
to transition to democracy rather than survival as the dependent variable (Ross
2001; Ulfelder 2007).
Furthermore, I explored Svolik's (2010) innovative data set on the survival of
ruling coalitions as an alternative measure for autocratic stability. This is a novel
approach and an important eﬀort to look beyond the survival of individual leaders
and to investigate the survival of ruling coalitions or regimes. It is certainly help-
ful to improve and further develop the scientiﬁc understanding of what enables
autocratic leaders to remain in power. The fact that the coalition-based analysis
did not reveal many additional insights in comparison to the leader-based results
in my analysis points towards the need to rethink the model and to adjust it to the
new concept of ruling coalitions. It indicates that the determinants explaining the
survival of individuals do not necessarily also explain the durability of ruling coali-
tions. As far as patterns in the behavior and performance of autocratic regimes
might be more determined by the nature of a ruling coalition than the character
of an individual leader, the ruling coalition-based approach opens the ﬂoor for a
new research agenda.
While my research sheds some light on the impact of China's rise on the longevity
of autocracies, it leaves open a number of questions: Has China's emergence made
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the world more autocratic? Does the new Chinese engagement aﬀect the quality of
democratic structures in democracies or hybrid regimes and, if so how? In how far
does China's experience of centralized development truly spread as a role model
for other non-democratic countries or countries at a cross-road in their political
development? Most importantly with respect to the existing debate in literature,
this study also does not go into the question of what the Chinese government
actually intents to do. However, one can cautiously draw a few conclusions with
regard to such questions.
In the past, Chinese cooperation has not necessarily created the highly exclusive
political structures that facilitate economic exploitation of developing countries.
In some cases, though, it may have contributed to the development of unequal eco-
nomic distribution or has favored the rise of particular elites, as has been argued
in the case of Cambodia (Mengin 2007). With the increasing amount of foreign
investments allocated to other autocracies over the last decade, incentives for Chi-
nese foreign policy-makers to maintain prevalent autocratic political structures
under the disguise of `political stability' have reached a new dimension. These
incentives are likely to lead to an even stronger Chinese preference for autocracies
in the future.
More speciﬁcally, China's SOEs have spent billions of dollars in countries such
as Burma or Sudan, especially in the energy sector where they have developed
exploration sites of mineral oil or gas reserves and constructed new pipelines.
Given these considerable sunk-costs in long-term investments, one should doubt
whether the Chinese government will be able to maintain its neutral policy of
non-interference in the future. It is true that the Chinese willingness to openly
get engaged and exert pressure on actors in autocracies so far has been remark-
ably reluctant in times of political turmoil. In the case of Sudan, for example,
the Chinese government was only inclined to take action and make the Sudanese
government agree to an international peace-keeping mission as a response to hu-
man rights violations when it was considerably pressured by threats of boycotts of
the 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing. It was also reluctant to openly take actions
with respect to the later Sudanese referendum on South Sudan's secession or in
the process of Burma's 2010 elections (Raﬀerty 2010).
However, there are powerful interest groups behind China's SOEs who will
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most unlikely take on a wait-and-see attitude when political change might seriously
threaten the economical viability of their investments in these countries. Moreover,
Chinese state corporations have ministerial rank and therefore they can voice their
interests in the Chinese government. They might push more actively for their
interests which might imply a more interventionist Chinese foreign policy in the
future. The case of Burma where negotiations with the opposition took place
behind the scenes exempliﬁes indeed that Chinese foreign-policy strategists already
stretch the principle of non-interference nowadays (Kleine-Ahlbrandt and Small
2008).
However, unless there are major changes in China's political system itself, it
is probably too optimistic to assume that this emerging ﬂexible non-interference
leaves much room to allow or even encourage the establishment of truly liberal and
inclusive democratic forms of government in countries of China's key interests. In
contrast, there is much reason to believe that these path-dependencies will lead
Chinese agents to arrange stabilization of prevailing small coalition regimes by
pushing for cosmetic reforms.
In the medium to long run, this Chinese preference might further contribute to
the spread of hybrid regimes whether classiﬁed as `electoral' (Schedler 2006) or
`competitive' autocracies (Levitsky and Way 2002) or `illiberal' democracies (Za-
karia 1997). While the Chinese leadership is not pleased to see closed autocracies
such as North-Korea or Burma to transform to full-ﬂedged democracies, it is not
particularly satisﬁed with the prevalence of these awkward dictatorships in their
current form either. As the cases of Burma and Cambodia indicate, the Chinese
government gains most from regimes where the leaders succeeded in maintaining
control over the political process and economic resources, but in which reforms
have been adopted that make the political arena seemingly more competitive and
pluralistic. These regimes are most resilient to Chinese interests while they are
more in line with Western expectations of plurality and political freedoms.
For quite some time, the Chinese government has been deeply frustrated with
the performance of the Burmese regime which frequently provoked international
critique and thereby embarrassed the Chinese leaders who were widely perceived
as Burma's autocratic patron (Kleine-Ahlbrandt and Small 2008). Furthermore, it
was not helpful for the development of close relations and for the pursuit of China's
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interests that the Burmese central government, obsessed by its own security, was
also suspicious of China's intentions (Storey 2007a). Finally, the junta's lack of
legitimacy amongst its own population and the latent risk for popular upheaval
continue to jeopardise Chinese investments in the country.
In contrast to this worrisome relationship with the Burmese regime, in its liaison
with the Cambodian regime, the Chinese government achieved all its objectives
without such irritation. The case study revealed that Cambodia's government
shows even more willingness to embrace the Chinese interests, while the costs of
having close ties to the Cambodian government for China's international reputa-
tion are low. Even though the Cambodian government was criticized from time
to time for its low compliance with Western conditionality this critique did not
implicitly or explicitly fall back on the Chinese government as it did in the case of
Burma. In brief, Cambodia's electoral window dressing and its integration into the
international community make it a much more comfortable and beneﬁcial partner
to maintain autocratic cooperation with.
As a consequence, the Chinese government has encouraged economic and politi-
cal reforms in Burma and North Korea. Based on its own experience, the Chinese
leadership perceives economic development and well-being to be a cornerstone of
political and hence autocratic stability. On the other hand, in Burma, the Chinese
call to work on national reconciliation and political reforms aims at establishing
a political regime which is more inclusive and co-opts the currently excluded op-
position forces into a strong centralized government (International Crisis Group
2009). To achieve this and to increase the legitimacy of such a government among
the population, political structures are needed that appear more open, but ensure
the dominance of ruling coalition. This most likely will involve a transformation
of these closed autocracies into a form of competitive autocracy. In such compet-
itive autocracies, democratic institutions exist and are considered to be a means
of gaining power, but incumbents dominate the political process and by abusing
the state they gain advantage vis-à-vis their opponents (Levitsky and Way 2010).
Against this background, future research on China's impact on autocratic dura-
bility should take a closer look on the inﬂuence of China's foreign engagement not
only on actors and their distributional coalitions in these countries, but also on the
institutional pillars of comparative authoritarianism. In how far, for example, does
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China's engagement contribute to the establishment of those institutions that are
particularly important for the dominance of the incumbent over others? In this
respect, it would be worthwhile to investigate whether the Chinese government
shares its techniques or even assists others in matters such as the establishment of
dominant state-controlled media, the control of communication technology such as
the internet or the management of civil society organizations and domestic unrest.
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A. Variable sources and operationalization
Table A.1.: Operationalization of variables
Variable Operationalization and data source
Leaderfall Binary variable of leadership turnover which is coded `1' if a leader exits power in the
following year and `0' otherwhise.
Source: `Power and Insitutions in Authoritarian Regimes' (Svolik 2010)
Coalitionfall Binary variable of coalitionfall which is coded `1' whenever a leader coming to power
is unrelated to the government, a government party, the royal or ruling family, or a
military junta under the previous authoritarian leader.
Source: `Power and Insitutions in Authoritarian Regimes' (Svolik 2010)
Diplomatic relations
with Taiwan
Binary variable which is coded `1' for every year in which a country's government
diplomatically recognizes Taiwan.
Source: Basic information was taken from Wikipedia, Yahuda (1996), and a number




A country's trade (exports and imports) with China in constant million $US.1
Source: Direction of Trade (International Monetary Fund 2010)
Continued on next page
1Note: Current values have been transformed to constant $US values (base year 2005) with the consumer price index taken from the
























Table A.1  continued from previous page
Variable Operationalization and data source
Trade (% of total
trade)
A country's trade (exports and imports) with China in % of a country's total trade.2
Trade shares were calculated as: (bilateral trade/total trade)*100.
Source: Direction of Trade (International Monetary Fund 2010)
Economic coopera-
tion
Economic cooperation in million U.S.$ (1998-2008).3 Current values have been trans-
formed to constant U.S.$ values (base year 2005) with the consumer price index taken
from the World Development Indicators (World Bank 2010).
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China (2010).
Diplomacy Number of encounters with Chinese president or prime minister per year. Data set is
based on the documentation of PRC agreements with foreign countries.




Length of a leader's tenure since last failure or length of coalition durability. The
value of `1' is given for the year subsequent to a fall.
Source: `Power and Insitutions in Authoritarian Regimes' (Svolik 2010)
GDP/c GDP per capita (ln) in constant international $ (base year 2005). The TED data set
was used for Myanmar and the World Development Indicators for Turkmenistan.
Source: Penn World Tables 7.0 (Heston et al. 2011), TED (The Conference Board
2011), World Development Indicators (World Bank 2010)
Distance Distance of a country's capital to Beijing in kilometres (ln).
Source: Capital distance data (Gleditsch 2008)
Oil revenue (% of
GDP)
Measure of oil rents as a percentage of GDP.4
Source: Ross (2008)
Continued on next page
2Note: Current values have been transformed to constant $US values (base year 2005) with the consumer price index taken from the
World Development Indicators (World Bank 2010).
3Note: Because this database contains only those countries which received transfers, missings were recoded as zero.
4Ross' oil rents variable was transformed according to the following formula: (oil rents/GDP)*100
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Table A.1  continued from previous page
Variable Operationalization and data source
Proved crude oil re-
serves
Proved crude oil reserves in billion barrels (ln).
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration (2010)
Mineral wealth
dummy
Index of the production of ﬁve strategic minerals: iron ore, chromium, cobalt, copper
and manganese. Constructed from dummy variables for each mineral, coded `1' if
a country was involved in the production of the respective mineral, and coded `0'
otherwise. The index adds up how many of the ﬁve minerals a country posses. The
index is normalized to range from 0 to 1 by the division through ﬁve.
Source: U.S. Geology Survey (2008)
Autocracy dummy Binary variable coded `0' for democracies and `1' otherwise. Based on Cheibub's
democracy dummy to identify whether a country is autocratic or not.
Source: Cheibub et al. (2010)
Size of winning coali-
tion W
The size of the winning coalition W is an composite index based on four equally
weighed variables REGTYPE (Banks 2007), XRCOMP, XROPEN and PARCOMP
from the Polity IV data (Marshall and Jaggers 2008). More speciﬁcally, one point
is added to the index `for each of the following conditions: if Banks' regime type
variable is nonmilitary, if XRCOMP is greater than or equal to 2 (meaning the chief
executive is not chosen by heredity or in rigged, unopposed elections), if XROPEN is
greater than 2, and if PARCOMP equals 5 (indicating the presence of a competitive
party system)' (Mesquita and Smith 2010, 940) The variable is standardized to range
from 0 to 1 where higher values indicate a larger winning coalition.
Source: Replication data (Mesquita and Smith 2010)
Size of selectorate S The size of the selectorate S is coded `0' if no legislature exists according to Bank's
LEGSELEC variable, `1' if selection is nonelective, such as by heredity or ascription,
and 2 if the legislature is elected. This variable is standardized to range from 0 to 1
by dividing it by two (Mesquita and Smith 2010, 940).
Source: Replication data (Mesquita and Smith 2010)
























Table A.1  continued from previous page
Variable Operationalization and data source
OECD ODA (% of
GDP)
Total oﬃcial development aid from all DAC donors as % of GDP.5 ODA was set in
relation to GDP according to the following formula: (ODA/GDP)*100.
Source: OECD DAC database (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Devel-
opment 2010)
Population Number of residents (ln).
Source: The Penn World Table (Heston et al. 2011)
Military transfers SIPRI Trend Indicator Values (TIVs) in $US million at constant (1990) prices (ln).6




Average number of a country's neighbours experiencing leaderfall/coalitionfall in a
given year.
Source: `Power and Insitutions in Authoritarian Regimes' (Svolik 2010) and Corre-
lates of War Project. Direct Contiguity Data, 1816-2006. Version 3.1 (Correlates of
War Project 2007)
UN voting behaviour Conformity of a country's voting behaviour with Chinese votes in the UN General
Assembly in percent - including abstentions and absentees.7 Conformity is expressed
in percentages of annual voting situations.
Source: Voeten and Merdzanovic (2009)
Population density Population density (ln).
Source: World Bank (2010)
Urban growth Annual growth rate of population living in urban areas.
Source: World Bank (2010)
Continued on next page
5Because this database contains only those countries which receive development assistance, missing values for all other countries were
replaced by zero.
6Note: Because this database contains only those countries which received military transfers, missings were recoded as zero.
7Voting situations in which a country or China was coded as `not a member' were ignored.
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Table A.1  continued from previous page
Variable Operationalization and data source
Military dictatorship Dummy measure for regime type.
Source: Cheibub et al. (2010)
No of previous fail-
ures
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Table B.1  continued from previous page
Country Years










Côte d'Ivoire 1998-2001, 2007-2008
Democratic People's Republic of Korea 1998-2008

























Iran, Islamic Republic of 1998-2008
Continued on next page
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Saint Kitts and Nevis 1998-2008
Saint Lucia 1998-2008
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 1998-2008
Samoa 1998-2008
San Marino 1998-2008
Sao Tome and Principe 1998-2008
Saudi Arabia 1998-2008
Senegal 1998-2008











Syrian Arab Republic 1998-2008
Tajikistan 1998-2008
Thailand 1998-2008
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 1998-2008
Timor-Leste 2002-2008
Togo 1998-2008
Trinidad and Tobago 1998-2008
Tunisia 1998-2008
Continued on next page
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United Arab Emirates 1998-2008

























































































































































Absolute trade with China (ln) 1.00
Autocracy dummy 0.11 1.00
Proven oil reserves
in billion barrels (ln) 0.47 0.19 1.00
Mineral wealth index 0.36 0.07 0.37 1.00
Dummy for diplomatic
relations with Taiwan -0.29 -0.23 -0.34 -0.21 1.00
UN voting with China in % 0.27 0.18 0.19 0.16 -0.21 1.00
Population (ln) 0.53 0.17 0.48 0.47 -0.27 0.31 1.00
GDP/c (ln) 0.20 -0.16 0.31 0.04 -0.06 0.06 -0.34 1.00
Military transfers
from China (ln) 0.18 0.12 0.15 0.14 -0.11 0.21 0.26 -0.06 1.00
Economic cooperation (ln) 0.38 0.22 0.31 0.26 -0.32 0.26 0.35 -0.04 0.20 1.00
Distance in km (ln) -0.27 -0.22 -0.20 -0.08 0.29 -0.05 -0.18 -0.02 -0.16 -0.05 1.00
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B.3. Economic cooperation regressions
Estimation results when missing values in the dependent varialbe economic
cooperation were replaced by ipolation, but recoded zero.
Figure B.1.: Coeﬃcients and conﬁdence intervalls of the determinants of Chinese
economic cooperation over time, 1998-2008.
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B.3. Economic cooperation regressions
Figure B.2.: Coeﬃcients and conﬁdence intervalls of the determinants of Chinese
economic cooperation over time, 1998-2008.
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Table B.3.: Probit regression of whether China provides economic cooperation to
non-OECD countries
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Economic cooperation Economic cooperation
Coop. > 0 Coop. > 0.01% GDP
Autocracy dummy 0.401 0.386 0.490*** 0.445**
(0.267) (0.289) (0.188) (0.198)
Dummy for dipl. rel. -1.014*** -1.030*** -1.063*** -1.032***
with Taiwan (0.248) (0.252) (0.274) (0.287)
UN voting with China in % 0.008** 0.008** 0.009* 0.008*
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Proven oil reserves 0.023 0.020 0.023 0.023
in billion barrels (ln) (0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020)
Mineral wealth index -0.079 -0.133 -0.414 -0.463
(0.452) (0.467) (0.398) (0.392)
Distance in km (ln) 0.390* 0.268 -0.006 -0.108
(0.217) (0.177) (0.199) (0.169)
Population (ln) 0.014 -0.034 -0.162** -0.224***
(0.076) (0.082) (0.079) (0.086)
GDP/c t-1 (ln) -0.217** -0.235* -0.481*** -0.511***
(0.099) (0.123) (0.119) (0.140)
Military transfers (ln) 0.046***
(0.017)
Bilateral trade (ln) 0.029 0.047
(0.026) (0.032)
ODA % of GDP 0.013 0.024
(0.052) (0.058)
Constant -0.591 1.091 6.562** 9.782***
(3.144) (2.773) (2.964) (2.696)
Observations 1497 1312 1497 1421
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01




The table below lists all autocracies that are in the post-Cold War sample
according to the deﬁnition in 4.1 and 5.1. I diﬀerentiate between the spells of
authoritarian ruling coalitions and individual leaders and also enlist their
respective durations. Open ended spells indicate the continuity in power of a
ruling coalition or leader as of 2008.
Table C.1.: Autocracies in the sample, 1992-2008
Country Spell of Coalition Duration Spell of Leader Duration
Afghanistan 1996-2000 5 1996-2000 5
Algeria 1962- 1992-1999 6
2000- 9
Angola 1993- 16 1993- 16




Bahrain 1971- 38 1971-1998 28
1999- 10
Belarus 1996- 13 1996- 13











Brunei 1984- 25 1984- 25
Burkina Faso 1980- 22 1980- 22
Burundi 1987-1992 6 1987-1992 6
1996-2004 9 1996-2002 7
Continued on next page
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Table C.1  continued from previous page
Country Spell of Coalition Duration Spell of Leader Duration
2003- 2
Cambodia 1991- 18 1991-1992 2
1993-1996 4
1997- 12
Cameroon 1960- 49 1983 - 26
Cape Verde 1975-1991 17
Central African Republic 1979-1993 17 1982-1993 12
Chad 1984- 19 1984- 19
Comoros 1989-1994 6
1996-2002 4 1996-1998 3
1999-2004 4
Congo 1969-1992 24 1980-1992 13
1997- 12 1997- 12
Cuba 1960- 49 1960-2007 48
2008- 1
Dem. Rep. of the Congo 2003-2006 4 2003-2006 4
Djibouti 1977- 32 1977-1999 23
2000- 9
Ecuador 2000-2003 4 2000-2003 4
Egypt 1952- 57 1981 - 28
Equatorial Guinea 1968- 41 1979- 30
Eritrea 1993- 16 1993- 16
Ethiopia 1992- 17 1992- 17
Fiji 1978- 22 1978-1999 13
2000-2005 6
2006- 3
Gabon 1960- 49 1967- 42
Gambia 1965-1993 29 1965-1993 29
1994- 15 1994- 15
Georgia 1992-2004 13 1992-2004 13
Ghana 1981-1993 13 1981-1993 13
Guinea 1958- 51 1984- 25
Guinea-Bissau 1974-1994 21 1980-1994 15
1999-2000 2 1999-2000 2
2003-2005 2 2003-2005 3
Guyana 1966-1992 27 1985-1992 8
Haiti 1991-1994 4 1991-1994 4
1999-2000 2 1999-2000 2
2001-2003 3 2001-2003 3
2004-2005 2 2004-2005 2
2006- 3 2006- 3
Indonesia 1966-1998 33 1966-1998 33
Iran 1979- 30 1989- 20
Iraq 1968-2002 35 1979-2002 24
Ivory Coast 1960-1998 34 1993-1998 6
1999-2000 2 1999-2000 2
Continued on next page
298
C.1. Sample
Table C.1  continued from previous page
Country Spell of Coalition Duration Spell of Leader Duration
2007- 2 2007- 2
Jordan 1953- 56 1953-1998 46
1999- 10
Kazakhstan 1991- 18 1991- 18
Kenya 1963-2002 40 1978-2002 25
Kuwait 1991- 18 1991-2005 15
2006- 3
Kyrgyzstan 1991-2005 15 1991-2005 15
Laos 1975- 34 1991-2005 14
2006- 3
Lebanon 2005- 4 2005-2007 3
2008- 1
Lesotho 1986-1993 8 1991-1993 3
Liberia 1996-2002 6 1996-1996 1
1997-2002 6
2003-2006 4 2003-2006 4
Libya 1969- 40 1969- 40
Madagascar 1960-1993 34 1975-1993 17
Malawi 1964-1994 31 1964-1994 31
Malaysia 1957- 52 1969-2002 22
2003- 6
Maldives 1965- 44 1978- 31
Mauritania 1960-2004 45 1984-2004 21
2005- 4 2005-2005 1
2006-2007 1
2008- 1
Mexico 1946-2000 55 -1993 6
1994-2000 7
Moldova 1991-1996 7
Morocco 1956- 53 1962-1998 37
1999- 10
Mozambique 1975- 34 1986-2004 19
2005- 4






North Korea 1948- 61 1948-1993 46
1994- 15
Oman 1970- 39 1970- 39
Pakistan 1999- 10 1999- 10
Paraguay 1946- 63 1989-1992 4
1993-1998 6
1999-2002 4
Continued on next page
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Table C.1  continued from previous page
Country Spell of Coalition Duration Spell of Leader Duration
2003- 6
Peru 1992-2000 9 1992-2000 9
Qatar 1972- 37 1972-1994 23
1995- 14
Russia 2004- 5 2004-2007 4
2008- 1
Rwanda 1962-1994 33 1973-1994 22
1995- 14 1995-1999 5
2000- 9
Samoa 1986- 23 1989-1998 10
1999- 10
Saudi Arabia 1946- 63 1982-1992 11
1993- 16
Senegal 1981-2000 20 1981-2000 20
Seychelles 1977- 33 1977-2003 27
2004- 5
Sierra Leone 1992-1996 5 1992-1996 5
Singapore 1965- 44 1990-2003 14
2004- 5
South Africa 1948-1993 46 1989-1993 5
Sudan 1989- 20 1989- 20
Swaziland 1968- 41 1986- 23
Syria 1961- 48 1970-1999 30
2000- 8
Tajikistan 1992- 17 1992- 17
Tanzania 1961- 48 1985-1994 10
1995-2004 10
2005- 4
Thailand 1991-1992 2 1991-1992 2
2006-2007 2 2006-2007 2
Togo 1963- 46 1967-2004 38
2005- 4
Tonga 1999- 10 1999-2005 7
2006- 3
Tunisia 1957- 53 1987- 19
Turkmenistan 1992- 17 1992-2005 14
2006- 3
Uganda 1986-2006 21 1986-2006 21
United Arab Emirates 1971- 38 1971-2003 33
2004- 5
Uzbekistan 1991- 18 1991- 18
Vietnam 1954- 55 -1996 6
1997-2000 4
2001- 8
Yemen 1990- 19 1990- 19






























































































































































































































Age of coalition (years) -0.08 1.00
Leader fall 0.47 -0.03 1.00
Age of leader (years) -0.03 0.40 -0.03 1.00
Chinese ecomomic
cooperation (% GDP) 0.01 -0.13 -0.02 -0.00 1.00
Trade with China
(% of total trade) -0.05 0.03 -0.08 0.09 0.22 1.00
No of dipl. meetings -0.03 0.00 -0.05 -0.07 -0.04 0.07 1.00
GDP/c t-1 (ln) -0.12 0.31 -0.08 0.21 -0.25 -0.02 0.04 1.00
GDP growth (t-1) -0.03 0.02 -0.03 -0.00 -0.09 0.14 0.06 0.08 1.00
Population (ln) 0.01 0.07 -0.03 -0.09 -0.13 0.16 0.18 -0.31 -0.02 1.00
OECD ODA (% GDP) 0.19 -0.15 0.11 -0.07 0.37 -0.10 -0.08 -0.49 -0.09 -0.08 1.00
Population density (ln) 0.06 0.03 0.01 -0.11 -0.12 -0.12 -0.01 0.10 0.01 -0.09 -0.07 1.00
Military dictatorship -0.01 0.01 -0.07 0.06 0.06 0.21 -0.01 -0.23 0.05 0.17 0.00 -0.08 1.00
Oil revenue (% GDP) -0.04 -0.07 -0.03 0.02 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.11 0.10 -0.09 -0.14 -0.22 -0.09 1.00
Urban growth 0.01 -0.02 0.05 -0.03 0.01 0.03 -0.12 -0.24 0.08 0.04 0.23 0.00 0.22 -0.07 1.00
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